Data security and data processing by Madnick, Stuart E.
DATA SECURITY AND DATA PROCESSING
*
Professor Stuart E. Madnick
Project Supervisor
REPORT CISR-8
SLOAN WP-771-75
March 3, 1975
_______I ·11
i
DATA SECURITY AND DATA PROCESSING
Professor Stuart E. Madnick
Project Supervisor
ABSTRACT
In the 1972 the Center for Information Systems Research (CISR), in
association with the MIT Information Processing Center (IPC), became one
of four study sites participating in the IBM Data Security Study. CISR's
primary area of investigation was user requirements for security. The
study was completed in early 1974 and the findings of all of the study
sites were published as a series of reports from IBM (G320-1370 through
G320-1376) in June 1974.
CISR faculty and staff contributed nine of the twelve papers which
constitute "Volume 4, Study Results: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(G320-1374)." Seven of these papers are reproduced in this report.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen the rapid development and proliferation
of computers in organizations of all sizes and functions. Often, as
this growth proceeded, security was not considered in the system
design stages. However, recently it has been recognized that
computing systems are easily compromised. This is especially true
since most security systems have evolved on an ad hoc basis with
patches made in elements of the system to thwart any perceived
weaknesses. One objective of this study, therefore, was to evaluate
the impact and implications of this practice of ad hoc security
provision.
Preliminary evaluation of a cross section of current systems
revealed a number of issues that warranted further study. These
included, for example, an identification of those who perceive a need
for security and the differential effects of alternative
technological configurations and organizational roles on this
perceived need. Data was then collected on these and other variables
by pencil-and-paper questionnaires and by personal interviews.
1.1 SUMMARY OF GENERAL FINDINGS
After analyzing this data, we conclude that:
* Presently, only a small proportion of computer users use
security features. These users who do require security are
also those who are aware of potential security problems.
* `In organizational settings, those individuals who are close in
job function to the computer system tend to be more aware of
potential security problems.
* Significant differences exist in the levels of awareness in
the various user communities. These industries use different
approaches to security because of the nature of processing and
the perceived value of the information being processed.
This section presents a reasonable structure for analyzing the
security issue: to define problems, to validate hypotheses and,
finally, to discuss the implications of this research for the future
of the computer industry.
1.2 COMMUNITIES STUDIED
To test the empirical validity of our hypotheses, we chose four
distinct computer communities--the medical, financial, educational,
and service bureau industries. We believe that these four areas are
a reasonable sample of the real world. Extensive field interviews
were undertaken to determine the state of the art in computer
utilization and, more particularly, in the development and usage of
security systems. The organizations that were visited displayed a
wide range of technical and administrative capability and
sophistication. (The study teams received the fullest cooperation at
all sites; we are grateful for this cooperation.)
After the field interviews were completed, questionnaires were
developed to test the various hypotheses. Because of differences in
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the nature of processing, a different questionnaire was required for
each industry. The same questionnaire was used for organizations
within a given industry. The questionnaires wre prepared so that
they could be completed by both technical and nontechnical managers.
In each organization, as many subjects as possible were included.
2.0 GFNEPAT. HYPOTHESES
Our research led to the development of both general and specific
hypotheses. The former are testable assumptions that cut across all
of the industries that were sampled, whereas the latter are those
that seem to hold true only in one particular setting or industry.
specific hypotheses will be examined more carefully later in this
report.
2.1 SrCUPITY AWARENESS
Our research supports the following general hypothesis:
H1: he security demanded by a user depends on the user's
awareness of security threats.
We have oserved that the degree of a person's concern for
security depends on that individual's awareness of security threats
and vulnerabilities. People perceive the instigators of security
violations as mirrors of themselves. If they know thousands of ways
to subvert their system's security, they assume that their "enemies"
are equally knowledgeable. Conversely, if they are not aware of any
defects in their security system, it is assumed that the system
cannot be penetrated. For example, our survey of the service bureau
industry indicated that numerous security techniques are available.
Purthermo-re, the potential for security threats is high, because of
the number of different organizational users and the proprietary
nature of their data. Nevertheless, of all the available techniques,
only a handful are actually used and these are used by the most
sophisticated users. The majority of users assume that the computer
system is secure and that they are adequately protected. Only among
the users with a high awareness of the probability of security
breaches does one find a high usage of security techniques.
Consider the implications of this hypothesis. If awareness
merely depended on advertising and explicit education, then the
computer industry could control the user's requirements for security
by a restrictive advertising and educational policy. However, other
sources of awareness exist. Thus, the computer industry can increase
awareness by advertising and education, but they cannot unilaterally
stifle awareness. Other factors, such as legal regulation and public
concern, may become significant. Recently, major changes in producer
behavior have occurred through these routes of influence, for
example, consumerism.
After receiving all the evidence, we believe that awareness is
increasing rapidly. At least three factors are involved:
Breadth of Exposure: Continual press coverage of the entire
area of computers, privacy, and confidentiality -- emphasis
is often placed on harnessing this technology to serve the
needs of mankind;
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Increases in Personal Contact: The pervasive nature of
computers within an organization -- more and more people are
in direct contact with the computer system;
* Economics: As the trend in costs moves from hardware to
software and personnel, the normal arguments that security
costs too much will diminish.
2.2 SECURITY AWARENrSS RELATED TO JOB FUNCTION
The first hypothesis can be extended further by stating:
H2: In an organization, an individual's proximity (in terms of
job function) to the computer system influences his
awareness of security as a problem.
In some of our questionnaires we asked the following three
questions:
1. How would you describe your exposure to and/or use of the
company's computer system?
Extensive . 4 3 2 1 Negligible
2. Generally, how would you describe your personal concern for
such things as security leaks, bugging, and the invasion of
privacy?
extremely Not
Concerned S 4 3 2 1 Concerned
3. How would you rate the company's present system with the
security of computerized information?
Excellent 5 4 3 2 1 Poor
The answers to these questions indicated some very interesting
general conclusions. We found that those who had direct contact with
the computer system were significantly more concerned about security
both in general and in their organization. User department managers
and of the systems staff responded in the same way. In other words,
this group (that is, high sophistication of use) answered the
questions near the extremes of "extensive," "extremely concerned,"
and "poor." They could see the pitfalls in the system. The other
group of managers who had little or no exposure to the computer
system fell at the other end of the spectrum in their answers. This
group (naive use) answered the questions near the extremes of
"negligible," "not concerned," and "excellent." These users had a
very low awareness of the problem of security.
Based on a review of the psychological literature of attribution
theory, our belief that systematic differences exists in user concern
with security is, in fact, well-supported. Psychologists believe that
individuals evaluate the motivations and behavior of others by
attributing to them their knowledge, values, and feelings.
.onseguently, an individual who is exposed to the computer system
knows how the system can be compromised; this knowledge can influence
his attribution process.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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This finding an the supporting theory indicate that further
effort on developing a general theory of user behavior, user
awareness, and user expectation is warranted. For example, if an
organizational chart can be used to evaluate levels of security
awareness within a firm, its use may be a prerequisite to answering
such questions as:
. Is it in the interest of the company to extend awareness to
other people and groups within the organization?
Also, is it in the interest of the computer manufacturer to
raise the security awareness levels within a firm?
2.3 SECURI TY AS A FUNCTION OF INDUSTRY
Our final general hypothesis has evolved from a comparison of
our findings in the financial, medical, service bureau, and
educational institutions.
H3: Differences in levels of security awareness and in
approaches to the security problemi depend on the nature of
processing in an industry and the perceived value of the
information being processed.
This hypothesis clearly follows from the two preceding
hypotheses because it expands on the determinants of awareness, but
also accounts for some of the differences that we have noted when
comparing user communities. Throughout this discussion, refer to
exhibits 1 and 2 for the definition of data security, some common
threats to data security, and means for protecting a computer system
from such threats.
To illustrate this hypothesis, we will discuss some of our
observations on the nature of processing and the value of information
in the four user communities. Some of the dimensions that
characterize the nature of processing are shown in Exhibit 3.
2.3.1 Financial Community
In the financial area, the awareness level was relatively high
in comparison to the other industries. Processing was done
extensively throughout the organization. The perceived value of
information was high because of the substantial monetary gains one
could reap from penetrating the system. These factors had led to the
adoption of security along all dimensions -- technical, procedural,
and personnel. The primary security concern in this industry was to
prevent financial loss, especially through embezzlement.
2.3.2 Medical Commnitv
However, in the medical community, the data being processed, the
structure of processing, and the resultant concerns for security are
guite different. Generally, health institutions have not had to face
the entire spectrum of problems raised by computerization. This is
because the introduction of computers in medicine is relatively
recent compared with an industry like finance where computers were
introduced in the mid-1950's. Because the medical industry has not
had to deal with security, it is not surprising to note that levels
of security awareness are relatively low. The perceived value of the
information being processed in medicine should also be considered.
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Fxhibit 1
Ke_ Definitions and Concepts in Data Securit!
* ata Security: The state of data (or information) in which it
is safe from unauthorized or accidental modification,
destruction, or disclosure.
* fData: Any identifiable aggregation of bits stored on a
machine-readable medium that can be manipulated or translated
into some meaningful form.
The nature of data is derived from the use of it. Basically,
two attributes apply, essentiality and confidentiality.
2nfidentiality: If some data concerns a private party or person
(client or patient), and if only certain persons are permitted access
to it, it possesses a degree of confidentiality .
Essentiality: If some data has a high degree of importance for a user
such that, if lost through unintentional modification or theft it can
only e recovered at a high expense, then it possesses a degree of
essentiality.
Examples: b A proprietary software package possesses high
confidentiality because parties outside the vendor-buyer relationship
are not allowed examination or use of the package. Its essentiality
may be very high for the owner, whereas for the buyer it is rather
low (an extra copy can always be obtained). ZIP codes have both low
confidentiality and low essentiality, because of their public nature
and availability.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Exhibit 2
Common ecurity_t lhreats and Countermeasures
Common threats against data security are computer installation
sabotage, accidental system breakdown, fraud, embezzlement,
interception errors, disclosure of data, theft, sabotage, or
unauthorized copying of data. Data security can be created and
maintained by some or all of the following elements:
-thcnical nrot.v ctiojl-automatd L:
* computer system integrity (such as operating
system, backup power, and fire protection)
· remote access control (such as terminal
authorization, and user identification)
· data encoding (encryption).
Procedural Prgt ection_ (manualL:
physical access control (such as guards, badges,
and locks)
data handling rules (such as offsite storage and
written requisition of storage volumes)
program modification rules
* input/output separation
input/output controls
^ audit.
Personnel Protection:
preemploymnent s;cre(,ning
supervision
division of responsibility.
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Although information is vitally important and extremely sensitive,
its economic value is perceived as low to those who handle it. These
factors have determined a more personnel-oriented approach to
security. High reliance is placed on the integrity of personnel
because so many are involved in the delivery of medical are. The
intent in medical data processing is to prevent catastrophes, that
is, health impairment or patient embarassment, as well as to maintain
the viability of the institution.
2.3.3 Education Community
In educational communities, security awareness is moderate to
high because of the divcors, nature of the processing environment.
Every type of threat is possible (but perhaps not likely) in the
university, hcause internal users are probably the most ingenious of
all. However, information is not perceived as having as direct an
economic value as in the financial industry. The result has been a
more technical approach to security especially at the operating
system level so that. users can be protected from each other. In
Pducational institutions, a primary objective of a security system is
to prevent mischief.
2.3.4 Service Bureau Community
Service bureaus are somewhat similar to educational institutions
because of the high concentration of technical expertise; however,
they differ from educational institutions because the atmosphere is
much more competitive. The nature of information processing is such
that high premiums are placed on speed, efficiency, and performance.
Also, more proprietary data generally resides on their systems.
Thus, the resulting approach has been to focus on the operating
system for internal security, as well as to make security options
available to those customers who demand, and pay for, them.
Prevention of financial loss through breakdown of system,
manipulation of accounting mechanisms, or theft of proprietary data
have thus been the objectives of their security systems.
2.4 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
We now turn to the implications of our hypothesis for the
manufacturers, user industries, individual firms, and the consumers
or clients. Different awareness levels and approaches to security
suggest that security interfaces may have to be tailor-made for the
particular industry in question, so that different needs can be met.
Although the interfaces may vary, the underlying security facilities
needed are the same for all industries studied. In the future, it is
guit? possible that agreement could be reached on the minimum amount
of security required for various industries or classes of data. The
result of this could be the promulgation of industry standards with
respect to good practices of secure operations.
At the organization or industry level, we have observed that
those working closest to or most frequently with a particular data
item will be most concerned with the security of that data. This
proprietary interest in one's data could cause problems if top
management were forced by budget constraints to protect one group of
data over another.
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Finally, the third hypothesis has implications for altering
consumer behavior; if different approaches to security are taken in
different industries, then the consumer may perceive that personal
data may be more secure in one industry than in another. Consumers
may fight to impose the security standards of one industry on the
operations of another industry.
3.0 SPECIFIC FINDINGS FROM INDUSTRY SURVEYS
Consider some of the more specific findings for the four
industries that we studied. A brief profile of the user community
will provide background against which to view the security-related
findings of our research.
3.1 FINANCIAL COMMUNITY
We have previously mentioned that the financial community is one
of the more advanced areas since it has been using data processing
techniques for the past two decades. Our sample was composed of
three banking institutions, a mutual funds company, and a mutual life
insurance company. Being a mature set of users, many of the security
issues were originally dealt with in these sorts of institutions. We
will now present some of the more significant points that were
uncovered by our questionnaire research are:
* Sixty percent of the managers surveyed believe that a central
decision maker is required in data security matters, but there
is wide disagreement as to where in the organization this
decision maker should be (both in terms of functional area and
level of management).
* Computerization does not substantially increase the
vulnerability of data.
* Data security in the organizations surveyed has received
moderate to high attention in the systems development stage.
* Managers are generally quite concerned with the
confidentiality of data handled by their departments. Their
attitude toward protection of data against disclosure has
increased moderately over the past three years because of the
following reasons:
1. Social forces
2. Company policies
3. Personal ethics
4. Experience with harmful disclosure
However, managers do not expect their attitude toward data
disclosure to change over the coming few years.
* The security precautions currently used cause little operating
inefficiencies. The technical precautions (see Exhibit 2) are
more bothersome than the procedural-personnel precautions in
organizations with sophisticated processing. Thus, although
technical precautions may be perceived as more important than
nontechnical precautions, managers have been willing to spend
extra security dollars on the less bothersome nontechnical
aspects like input/output controls, audits, and personnel
policies before spending dollars on sophisticated software
techniques. In the future, additional physical protection will
not be effective.
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'xhibit 3
THv NATURP OF PROCESSING
The two important ways to characterize the nature of
processing are: the technical nature of processing and the
organizational nature. For data security considerations, both
are important.
echnical _Aspects:
* Ratio between use of central processor and use of
input/output devices.
* Multiprogramming
* Multiprocessing
* Data communication
* Time-sharing
* Online/Batch.
OQrcanizational Aspects:
* Dependency on data processing within organization
Pervasiveness of processing, for example, number of
employees in direct contact with processed data
* Location of users of data, that is, inside or outsile of
organization
* Purpose of data, for example, for immediate operations or
for long-range planning
* Degree of decentralization (dissemination) of processing
* Time horizon for the use of processed data
* Organizational experience with processing.
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Obviously, th? financial community perceives a secure operating
environment as a combination of technical, procedural, and personnel
precautions. Financidl institutions more than most other industries
have already dealt with many of the substantial security problems
caused by com},utorization. Many of the problems that occurred were
effectively countered by a strong security system of nontechnical
components. After all, data processing in the financial institutions
has been predominantly the automation of manual processes.
3.2 MEDICAL COMMUNITY
The medical community is faced with costs that are rising
rapidly at the: same time that my people do not have access to the
care that they need. Many of these problems are due to temporal
characteristics in organization and financing; therefore, these
problems can certainly be ameliorated in the future. However, the
entire system of medical care is ready for broad change.
Change could be in the areas of national health insurance or
numerous prepaid group practices. As change occurs, the information
needs of the industry will also be altered. Currently, information
processing is both administrative and medical. Larger inroads have
been. made in the first type of processing and this will continue to
be a fruitful area of endeavor. However, the next decade will see
great advances in the realm of medical information processing. As
these systems are developed and as the user community becomes more
sophisticated, greater demands will he made for more secure operating
environments.
In our study of this industry, we have purposely focused on the
user; we have assessed his perceptions of the security issue in
Establishing what problems exist and what the necessary conditions
are felt to be for counteracting any of these perceived security
problems.
These are some of the observations that we have made in the
field with managers and physicians:
Computers are perceived as a threat to confidential
relationships, for example, physician-patient and
manager-employee.
* As computer usage expands in the industry, there will be an a
increasing need for security.
* In a Medical/Management Information System numerous types of
data are processed and stored, including employee payroll and
patient diagnosis. These data items are fundamentally
different in nature and content, some being public knowledge
and others being highly confidential. We can hypothesize
that:
1. These different data types can be identified.
2. The different data types have varying needs for
security due to their various degrees of sensitivity.
3. The access rights of an employee to different kinds of
data depends on his need-to-know and on the
sensitivity of the data.
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Most physicians and managers see the role of the computer
dramatically expanding in their institutions over the next few
years. As this growth takes place, it will be incumbent on
computer manufacturers to provide assurances to medical users
that information can be secure from interference. Without
these assurances, the medical industry may become even more
concerned that security threats constitute potential breaches
of medical ethics.
3.3 SPRVICE BUREAU COMMUNITY
We included the service bureau industry in our survey because we
believe that most computer systems in he future will be operated as
service bureaus of some kind. In univrsities, this has been true
for several years. Also, in private industry, the trend is toward
running the !lectrol:ic Data Processing division as an in-house
service bureau since economies of scalc in both personnel and
hardware seem to justify this trend. In our survey, we interviewed
several establishments whose services ranged from simply selling raw
machine time to selling the use of proprietary data bases.
Findings common to all service bureaus surveyed were:
* Numerous relatively sophisticated security mechanisms are
currently implemented in the service bureau industry.
* These mechanisms are usually site-implemented and
site-maintained -- in only a few cases were they provided by
the manufacturer.
* Almost without exception, these mechanisms are difficult to
use, given the naivete of the average user.
* Users of the service bureau services are far more security
conscious in word than in deed.
* Despite their general availability, these mechanisms are not
used by the users.
· In general, somewhere in the region of 90% of the resources of
a service bureau are consumed by about 10% of its clients.
This 107 is a sophisticated set of users, for the most part,
and tend to make extensive use of the available mechanisms -
often implementing their own.
One may wonder why these sophisticated techniques exist
primarily in the service bureaus, and also why the use of the
mechanisms is so limited. First, service bureaus are usually founded
and operated by technical people who generally are concerned about
security and are aware of the problems caused by security breaches.
Second, in the service bureau environment, users are isolated from
one another, and the system is independent from the users to permit
time-sharing. These requirements encourage the use of security
systems with strong access features. Third, and perhaps most
important, security is an option on most service bureau systems, and,
therefore, real costs are incurred by the user in both effort and
dollars. Most users cannot comprehend the techniques and are not
entirely aware of the potential problems inherent in default
procedures; therefore, the optional techniques are not used. As one
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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service bureau official described the situation: "With regards to
security, some of our customers are sensitive, some are not -- but
they are all naive." If these rather unsatisfactory conditions are
to be rectified, the average user must be better informed on how to
use security techniques; the techniques must be easier to use; they
also should not be offered as an option but rather made an integral
part of the system.
3. 4 EDUCATIONAL COM4MUNITY
The security requirements of the educational (university)
community are a combination of the requirements of the financial and
the service bureau communities. A large part of educational
information processing is centered around research and teaching
(student problem data and solutions). This type of processing is
often based on online time-sharing and, thus, resembles the security
needs of the service bureau community. The requirements for integrity
and prevention of destruction or disclosure are similar in both
communities. ecause large amounts of administrative data, such as
payroll, financial accounting, and so forth, are processed in the
educational communities, its security needs are also similar to the
financial community. Security needs for educational information will
be discussed in detail later.
4.0 TRENDS IN COMPUTeR SECUPITY
In summary, users demand security only when they are aware that
security can be a problem for them. From this base, we have
developed theories that relate to the security awareness levels in a
firm and how these levels depend on the proximity of the individual
to the computer system. This same awareness phenomenon determines the
approach to security that an industry in general or a particular firm
will take.
In addition to presenting this general theory, we have tried to
convey a sense of the concern for security in four distinct
industries -- finance, health care, education, and computer services.
We will consider some of the more likely trends in the computer
industry. And finally, we present The Data Security Game in the
Appendix as a way of putting all of the disparate elements of this
problem into a meaningful context.
4.1 IMPACT OF SECURITY ON THE ORGANIZATION
When extensive computer security is first introduced into an
organization, the personnel may react in a negative manner. Usually,
these reactions occur because of: (1) a feeling of loss of power
and/or (2) difficulty in getting their work accomplished.
The feeling of loss of power occurs because of the nature of a
secure system. People no longer can have unrestricted, unlimited
access to the entire system. Because most good system designs allow
the installation to determine each person's accessing ability, this
problem is primarily a management issue. Generally, when each
employee realizes that his information is better protected because of
the security, he is more willing to accept his own limitations.
A serious problem exists if the secure system poses real
difficulties to a user in accomplishing his work. Besides
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introducing discontent, such a situation can lead to bad practices.
For example, ir, a noncomputer environment, if a door requires 30
minutes to lock and 30 minutes to unlock and this door must be used
frequently, it is likely that the employee will rapidly learn to
leave the door open -- thus defeating the purpose of the lock.
As another example, consider the case of Doctor A who
desperately needs information about a patient who has been admitted
in an emergency. The patient is a regular patient of Doztor B, who,
tor some reason, is unavailable to give the attending physician
access to the patient's file. Does this leave Dr. A helpless to
atterd the patient? In such cases, it should be possible to use a
formal procedure whereby Dr. A can request access to the patient's
file. The system will record this fact, and Dr. A's action will be
subject to review.
In most contemporary systems, there is usually either no
"escape" mechanism or the effect is accomplished by "turning off" the
entire security mechanism (such as by the computer operator or
systems programmer). In neither case is the procedure responsive,
well-defined, nor is the action recorded for later review.
A possible implementation may he based upon the establishment of
three levels of user access to information. The normal "access is
allowed" and "access is prohibited" can be augmented by "access may
be allowed." Thus, in an environment with high ethical standards
and/or other constraints that tend to encourage ethical behavior,
certain users may be given "access may be allowed" permission to
other users' information. In this case the access would be
automatically recorded and the final decision as to the
appropriateness of the access is deferred to human review at a later
time.
4.2 SECURITY AS AN ISSUE
We foresee that security will become an increasingly important
issue in the computer industry within the next decade. This belief
is based upon a number of diverse factors. As we have pointed out,
one of the strongest trends in the future will be the changes within
the user communities. As awareness expands, security will become a
more and more important issue in the purchase of both hardware and
software. Other key factors are at play as well. For instance,
regulation in the computer field has been discussed. Also, the
clientele of computerized organizations will make their voices heard
more in years to come. The strength of the response from these areas
will undoubtedly depend on the extent to which security problems
continue to develop and the concomitant ability of the computer
industry to adapt to its rapidly changing environment. We have
identified four areas that have the power to effect increases in the
level of awareness: (1) computer manufacturers, (2) computer users,
(3) the general public, and (4) the government.
4.3 FORCES AT WORK
The computer industry can play an important role in changing the
general level of security awareness. Numerous options are available
to this group -- especially, the familiar routes of advertising,
marketing, and education. Major product lines can be offered that
stress their ability to solve many of the common security problems.
The three major technical problems to be overcome are interty,
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Tntegrity --- The predictable and meaningful behavior of the system
(i.e., Does the system follow orders correctly? Can it
be confused?).
Authorization or Access Control --- The facilities, procedures, and
restrictions for establishing access controls to be
enforced by the system.
Certification --- The extent to which the integrity of the system can
be proven or measured.
Example by analogy: Let us consider a guard for a warehouse.
(1) Integrity --- We must make certain that the guard understands
all aspects of his job -- leaving no uncertain aspects. For
example, if his replacement is late for work, he should not just
leave. Every situation must be identified and appropriate
actions specified.
(2) Authorization --- The warehouse would be rather useless if there
was no way to get things in and out. Thus, there must be rules
established that the guard can follow to determine whether a
request for access should be permitted. Since the guard cannot
be instructed, when hired, on the specific handling of each of
these future requests, he is, instead, told how to determine the
correct action (e.q., if Joe says it is "OK," then allow the
access -- thus, Joe can authorize accesses).
(3) Certification --- Given that we have carefully instructed the
guard on his duties, can we be certain that he will follow these
rules faithfully? We would like to certify our guard's
competence by some test.
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authorization, ant certification as depicted in Exhibit .
Competitlve advantages can be gained by marketing secure hardware and
software. To emphasize the importance of security, a broad
educational program could be undertaken that indicated the more
freguent threats to computer. systems. Currently, the manufacturer has
a great deal of leverage in raising the level of security awareness.
Another constituency whose voice will be heard is the buyers or
users of computing equipment. As attempted and actual violations
increasingly occur, the demands of the users will increase. The
experience of the CODASYL Data Base Task Group (DBTG) serves as an
example of how security consciousness can be impacted in this area.
For some time now, DBTG has been involved in the design of a data
base management system that has security built into the system. This
activity has been undertaken because of the general lack of security
in existing data base management systems. Other userToriented impact
areas are the various journals specific to the user community. For
instance, accounting journals often devote space to the issue of
security from a controller's or treasurer's perspective; computer
joulnals, and even medical journals, contain articles on computer
security. It is difficult to estimate the magnitude of the effect
that such exposure might cause. A large potential exists in the user
constituency for increasing security awareness.
A third group that could cause increases in awareness is the
general public, that is, the clientele of the various user
communities. One cannot disregard the influence of this group because
of the advances that the consumer movement has made in the past
decade in the United States. Policy, as made by legislators, relies
on the input of pressure groups such as unions, lobbyists, activists,
and professional organizations. The success of these efforts
depends ultimately on the volatility of the issue at hand. For
example, automobile safety, pollution, and ecology became very
controversial issues in the 1960's. The result was that the
automobile industry was forced to comply with some stringent
regulations. If public concern over computerized recordkeeping and
the right to privacy were to grow substantially, then the computer
industry could be another target of consumer groups. Because
computerization is a potentially inflammatory public issue, the
computer industry and/or user groups cannot even together stifle
public security awareness.
As we have implied previously, one final constituency is the
government that can exercise its control over the industry through
legislation. The possibilities for regulation are mounting. In
fact, Sweden has recently enacted the world's first law intended to
prevent computerized invasion of privacy. The United States is also
considering legislative action in this area. The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare's (HEW's) study of the problem
recommends a "Code of Fair Information Practice," which would be
enforced against all automated personal data systems, governmental
and private. Unless manufacturers take the initiative, the immediate
impact of such legislation would probably fall most heavily on the
user communities as they were forced to comply with regulations.
However, after a tine there would be second-order effects that the
industry as a whole would have to adjust to. It is very difficult at
present to assess the total, long-run impact that such legislation
might have.
These, then, are four groups that play significant roles in the
process of changing security awareness. Note that this process of
change is truly dynamic with leverage points and attitudes in
constant flux.
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4. LIKEIY ACTIONS
To accoiaylish the requirements of education and standardization,
organizations may evolve to protect both users of computer products,
as well as the rights of the general public. This observation is
made because it is not clear that current conditions offer protection
from either poorly manufactured products or the misuse of present
computer technology. This organization should ideally represent the
manufactu rer, the user, the governmen.t, and the general public.
This organization would have the responsibility for determining
and promulgating classes of minimum requirements appropriate to
various categories of user requirements. It would also certify
particular systems as meeting the standards of a security class when
operated in a certain manner. By adopting such a plan, users would
have more knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the
products they buy, and the general public would see the extent to
which their rights are protected.
It is not clear how such an organization should be formed. One
possibility would be to separate the privacy policy-making from the
security validation. For example, an independent organization could
take responsibility for classifying and testing the security of
systems (in a manner similar to the Underwriters Laboratory). The
security requirements to be used for a specific system would be.
determined by the appropriate government regulations, industry
standards, and the peculiarities of the company. In medicine and
finance, for example, there already exist groups responsible for
establishing standardized procedures and codes of ethics. We plan to
make our findings available to such groups to aid them in making
recommendations regarding computer security.
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5.0 APPENDIX: THE DATA SECURITY GAME
In summary, we have dealt with a complex web of interrelated
problems that interact to form a system. A basic means for putting
this system into a meaningful perspective is by the use of scenarios
that include the major actors in the "drama." Scenarios are valuable
because they force one to look ahead and to plan. The ata Security
Game puts much of the discussion of the previous pages into an
understandable form.
The Game is usually played by two players:
1. Manufacturer (M), who designs and produces computer
technology.
2. The User (U), the organization that uses computer
technology.
At a more sophisticated level, a third or fourth player may request
(or demand) participation.
3. The Public (P), which by pressure groups and campaigns,
influences decisions about the application of computer
technology.
4 a. The Government (G), which through agencies, commissions, and
bureaus controls the application and perhaps design of
computer technology.
An almost unlimited number of games can be played by some or all
of these parties. A few examples are:
* M creates a scure operating system for U according to M's
assessment of U's needs (without ever actually ascertaining
them).
* M creates a secure operating system for U according to the
specifications of G.
· * U orders a secure operating system from M, but U fails to
realize that he is asking for a system that is technically
infeasible.
* P exerts pressure on U to comply with minimum acceptable
standards of security. U cooperates because of concern for
public image.
* U changes its recordkeeping systems and introduces expensive
security measures in response to legislative action from G.
* M has to scrap a costly new product line because it does not
conform with G's regulations on the design and manufacture of
computers.
Obviously, the Game generates a rich set of paradigms for
consideration. The reader is encouraged to create more variations.
The exercise helps to focus attention on the important determinants
of policy security.
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COIPUJTERS AND EDUCATION
As one might expect, the role of the computer in education has
been a rapidly expanding one. In describing te current uses of
computers in this field, it seems convenient to impose a simple
framework. We can describe data processing in the educational
environment as falling into three major categories:
I. Administration
II. Research
III. Classroom Support
ADMINISTRATION
within the educational environment, administrative data
processing can he subdivided into three categories for discussion.
It is important to realize that these categories represent only one
of several breakdowns of this area. The and Study (1), for example,
uses a slightly different one. The analysis in this paper is done
from an information security point of view, and thus, has a
functionally different set of criteria for subdivision.
The first category is Cororate Processing, so called because it
is virtually identical to the central administrative data processing
of a large corporation. The financial and accounting applications of
the institution are found here, as well as the personnel processing
common to all employers, such as employee payroll and benefits. In
addition, programs for resource allocation are often included, among
these being programs for scheduling classrooms and physical plant
operations (analogous to production scheduling in the business
world). In many ways this is the most "standard" of the various
campus applications.
The second category is Student Processing. Here we find the set
of data processing functions which are unique to students. In
something of a chronological order, we can name Admissions,
Registrar, Bursar, and Alumni Offices as groups that engage in
Student Processing. Although it may seem somewhat arbitrary to
separate Admissions from, say, the processing of applicants for jobs,
it is in fact done almost without exception in universities. Even
payrolls are kept separate, with students and staff in separate runs.
Further, from a security standpoint, the school often has more
confidential information on its students than on its employees.
Therefore, we keep Corporate and Student Processing separate.
The final category is Departmental Processing. This subset of
administrative data processing is a direct outgrowth of the
decentralized departmental organization of most universities, and it
includes many of the same functions as Corporate and Student
Processing. Graduate admissions, for example, are commonly handled
both at the departmental and central level. Resource allocation is
also handled as a cooperative effort between the master schedulers in
a central office, and the departments who staff the various courses.
Payroll, on the other hand, is an example of a function that is
generally not duplicated. However, the department for which a
faculty member teaches is likely to have to worry about which account
or research fund should be tapped fcr salary and expenses, so that
there is still some interaction. A great deal of aggregate planning
is done at the department level, in the design of curricula and
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research programs. In summary, Departmental Processing is a
decentralized subset of administration which has a more microcosmic
vicv, and hich requires interfacing with the central programs and
data bases in order to be effective.
Having examined the components of administrative data
prccessing, let us review some general characteristics of this area:
timing, accountability for funds, security. This kind of processing
operates mostly on fixed short-term deadlines -- registration day,
budget submission day, not to mention payday. This is often in sharp
contrast to the demands of Research or Classroom Support Processing,
which, a we shall see, are quite flexible. Such a need for accurate
timing dictates a high degree of system continuity and reliability.
The manager of such an operation is likely to be quite conservative,
a fact which underscores the similarity of this type of processing to
its industrial counterpart.
Another facet of this area that resembles commercial enterprise
is the accountability of managers for funds used. Because of the
relatively standard nature of the tasks being performed, techniques
have been established for their valuation and management. Further,
because the users of administrative systems are employees rather than
students, the resources of these facilities can be more closely (and
more formally) managed. Noteworthy here is the absence of the
"interesting area of research" syndrome, which often allows
feasibility studies to be bypassed in research when considering the
acquisition of new hardware or software. Thus, innovation is more
difficult in the administrative area.
A final aspect, and one which is important to this analysis, is
the need for security. It is clearly necessary to protect
confidential data on both students and staff from unauthorized
disclosure. Further, as in most corporate applications, it is
essential to protect programs and data bases from accidental or
deliberate modification or deletion, as well as to protect historical
data files on tape or other media. A wide spectrum of physical and
programming measures is needed to ensure adequate protection.
The combination of differing programming needs (e.g., FORTRAN
versus COBOL) , the need for conservative, reliable, short-term
service, and the need for system security has led almost every
university to physically separate administrative data processing
facilities from all others. This has automatically solved the
majority of their security problems so far. There is, however, a
terrific price for this security. First, the physical separation has
necessitated duplication of hardware and programming staffs. In an
era of budget throttling and cost cutting, this duplication tends to
be very unpopular. Second, and perhaps more subtle, is the fact that
deliberate isolation of the administrators from the facilities
utilized by Research and Classroom Support systems has meant that the
administrators have been isolated from the technological progress
being made in these areas. Although one would not expect this type
of processing to keep up with the forefront of research (nor would
this be desired from the standpoint of continuity and reliability, as
mentioned earlier) the gap between the two technologies has been
allowed to widen to such an extent that even if all security problems
were solved tomorrow, it would be several years before most
administrative facilities would be able to consider a merger of any
sort with existing research facilities. The MIT Office of
Administrative Information Systems is good example of this problem
(2) .
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One interesting exception to this general method of solving the
security problem is found in Departmental Processing. Because this
processing is at the department level where a large supply of cheap,
high-quality labor exists (thesis students), more and more work is
being done on these applications. Oddly enough, because the students
who work on such projects do not have access to the administrative
facilities, the work has been forced onto the newer research
facilities, with the expected benefit of the newer technology. Thus,
we see information systems for management and aggregate planning
being developed, for example, in the Sloan School of Management at
MIT (3) which far outstrip the capacity of the central administrative
facility in the sophistication of information handling techniques.
However, these applications are in desperate need of solutions to the
security problems which the central facility solved by physical
separation. Thus, we find the departments pioneering applications
for the central facility by pushing into research facilities with
innovative and complex planning systems which will force the security
problems to be faced, probably well in advance of the needs of the
central facility.
It should he noted, in conclusion, that there are two possible
ways for the administrators to proceed. First, they may find it
advantageous to combine facilities with the administrative
organizations of other universities. An example of this type of
venture is WICHE (Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education),
which combines many universities in the design of standard
administrative programs (4). This would provide a stable system, and
also promote innovation through ccmmon development of systems.
However, the problem of security still exists because many schools
would be sharing common hardware if this cooperation were carried to
its logical conclusion. The other alternative is a merger into a
central campus computing facility either as a complete move, or as a
remote satellite facility. This brings more risks in terms of system
instability, but has the advantage of allowing a much smoother
interface among the various kinds of central and departmental
programs. In any case, it seems clear that over the next five years
security problems will come to the point where they can no longer be
avoided.
RESEARCH
The research community can be divided into two groups, those who
research on computers, and those who research with computers. The
former category is composed mostly of computer scientists, electrical
engineers, and a few computer-oriented information systems
specialists. The latter includes more of the campus every day, and
even now, on the MIT campus, there is not a single department
(including the Music Department) where the impact of the computer has
not been felt heavily.
There are, of course, other distinctions that could be made
here, for example, thesis versus non-thesis research, and sponsored
versus non-sponsored. while we may make these distinctions here as
examples of different accounting methods, our primary emphasis will
be upon the differences between research on and with computers. This
emphasis allows us to focus on the security aspects of research
processing.
By nature, Research Processing is highly decentralized. This is
primarily due to thesis projects, which are generally pursued
individually under the supervision of an advisor or committee. In
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terms of the number of persons participating, this constitutes more
than half of the research effort of most universities. In addition
to extreme decentralization, Research Processing can be characterized
by a lack of definite deadlines. This is quite intuitive -- one can
hardly set deadlines on pure research and development. The kinds of
time constraints generally encountered are in the form of arbitrary
limits such as project expiration dates and thesis deadlines, which
are generally quite flexible. A related facet of managing research
efforts is the allocation of funds. When examining administrative
processing, we observed the formal structure for financial
accountability. A different problem is encountered with the thesis
user. Generally, the thesis user is not spending personal funds on
computing. The department will often have a set procedure for
computer resource allocation. The problem occurs when the user
consumes the full amount of the allocation and is not yet finished.
It seems absurd to think that the student must quit. Somehow, more
funding must be obtained. Control of not only the allocation of
funds, but the use of funds thus becomes a problem.
A related problem is the expertise of the individual user. The
researcher who is a computer specialist is likely to have computer
expertise which permits efficient use of the computer resources,
while the person who merely wants the computer as a tool for other
research may be totally unfamiliar with the proper methodology, thus
wasting vast amounts of money. Further, it is possible that the
non-computer researcher may be unwilling to invest time in learning
efficient techniques. From this perspective, we must realize that
these users have their own priorities, and it is unrealistic to
assume that the computer should be allowed to detract appreciably
from the primary goals of research in the user's selected field.
The last aspect of Research Processing to be discussed here
(research on computers) can be viewed as a mixed blessing.
Certainly, the campus has been the scene of the most significant
advances in computer technology -- the computer itself, core memory,
software systems such as the MIT Compatible Time Sharing System
(CTSS) and others. In addition, the research on computers within a
given campus community often results in "tuning" improvements within
existing equipment, such as improved device management, scheduling
algorithms, etc. Sometimes, entire new systems, such as the MULTICS
system at MIT, become available to the community as a direct
outgrowth of campus research. However, this technological fallout
has two bad effects. First, educational systems tend even more than
others to become "tailored" with a series of modifications that
render them incompatible with all other systems. Second, when new
resources are introduced, there ensues a great deal of contention
about system stability and documentation for general use. One
example of this problem is the development of the MULTICS System at
MIT from 1968 to 1971. During this time, the system underwent
constant "tuning" changes, as well as several major revisions. Thus,
many non-computer users who might want to use the machine for service
were in direct contention with the systems development people, who
wanted constant improvement.
For purposes of this discussion, the Research Processing area
can be regarded as an extremely decentralized group of users, whose
expertise ranges from superlative to negligible. It is characterized
by a lack of structure both from time and budget perspectives.
Finally, we find that research on computers sometimes requires
experimentation at a machine level which can seriously conflict with
the standard service needs of the rest of the research community.
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CLASSROOM SUPPORT
In recent years, the computer has begun an important and
many-faceted role in the classroom environment. It comes to the
classroom both as subject and tool. We shall divide Classroom
Support Processing along these lines, into support for computer
courses and support for non-computer courses. The reason for this
breakdown is the fundamental differences in the teaching objectives
of these two areas, which are reflected in the types of activity
produced.
There exists within the curricula of most large universities a
set of courses designed to teach computer programming and other
aspects of systems design and utilization. Whether the computer is
being taught in its own right or in the context of some application
such as mechanical engineering, the orientation of such courses is
toward the exploration of the capabilities and limitations of the
computer system. This ocus upon the computer results in a great
deal of student use, and, as we shall see, in a serious security
problem from imaginative and mischievous student programmers.
In contrast to the computer courses, a rapidly growing segment
of the computer resources on campus is being consumed by students who
have no interest whatever in computers or programming. These
students are using pre-packaged programs that perform simulations,
linear programming, and other computations that aid the students in
their work. A good example of this type of program is the area of
financial management, where a student might have access to small
utility programs for present value analysis and discounting, as well
as large packages for linear programming and modeling. The important
distinction here is that the non-computer student is neither trained
in nor (in most cases) interested in the computer. Thus, the kind of
in-depth exploration of the computer system characteristic of
computer courses is not found here. However, from the security point
of view, we find a different problem -- the control of large numbers
of inexperienced and sometimes indifferent users. As we shall see,
there is an implied problem of usage control by the instructor, who
must see that the class budget is efficiently and equitably
distributed.
In summary, we have divided the educational computing
environment into three areas: Administration, Research, and Classroom
Support. Figure 1 shows the overall breakdown, along with some rough
figures on each area as a percent of total activity. It should also
be noted that the type of processing is relevant, ranging from batch
processing to interactive time-sharing. All of the categories in our
schematic can be regarded as existing in a continuum which has batch
monoprogramming at one end, followed by multiprogramming, limited
inquiry systems, and finally interactive systems at the opposite end.
The reason for this view is the difference in security requirements,
for example, the problem of collection and distribution of decks in a
batch environment versus terminal access control in time-sharing
systems.
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1967 1973
ADMINISTHA) ION
(Corporate, Student, Departmental)
PESEARCH
(On Computers, With Computers)
CLASSROOM SUPPORT
(For Computer Courses, For Non-Computer Courses) 30% 35%
_., . i . _, 
Note: An estimate of the three areas as a percentage of total university data processing expenditure is
included. The percentage in 1967 (See Reference 1 ), and the author's estimate of the percentage
in 1973, respectively, reflect a relative increase in Classroom Support Processing. 2% is allowed for
other uses.
'Author's Estimate
?igure 1. A Schematic of the Educational Environment
The next section will discuss a framework for describing
security requirements of our three areas in terms of this framework.
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COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY
SECURITY--THREATS AND PROMISES
Security, whether in computer systems or in some other context,
is a topic that eludes positive definition. It is usually described
negatively. For example,security is not having your house broken
into, or not aving your medical records printed in the newspaper.
It is not required here that we arrive at a definition which will be
accepted with great finality by all readers. However, it is
essential that some working definition be developed that will
facilitate the comparison of the security requirements of the
different areas described previously, as well as permit a general
discussion of computer system security.
An "ideal" computer system can be defined as one that provides
uninterruptible and fully controlled service, and in which all data
and programs are available only to authorized users, and only in a
particular mode. hile the notion of an "ideal" computer system is
admittedly a vague one, it does serve us well enough to establish the
nature and function of computer security. Whatever we define as our
desired system, computer system security is the ability to prevent it
from being changed. One distinction that should be made here is the
difference between programming errors and system errors. It is
consistent with the notion of an "ideal" system to expect it to
generate errors in the output of jobs whose input is incorrect. To
execute exactly the program submitted is all we may ask (for the
present) of any system. The system deviates from its desired
performance when, for example, the accidental or intentional errors
of some task are permitted to interfere with the execution of
supposedly independent tasks. Thus, we see security as the act of
maintaining a set of system-wide relationships among programs, data,
processes, users, and other system entities that define a computer
system. A secure computer system, then, is one that promises that
its security mechanism is capable of dealing with every component of
threat without failure, insuring consistent performance of the
system.
THREATS--THEIR ORIGIN AND TARGETS
Having defined security in terms of coping with threats to the
system, we now turn to the problem of classifying those threats. The
first qualifier would logically seem to be the source, or origin of
the threat. The source of a threat can be viewed along several
different dimensions. In a company, for example, threats can be
classified as originating within the firm, or outside. For our
purposes, however, we seek a dimension independent of the purpose of
the machine, and one that is relevant to the organization of the
computer system itself. Therefore, we will regard threats as
originating in one of three modes:
1) External Mode
2) Supervisor Mode
3) User Mode
The first mode reflects all threats that do not involve the
execution of an instruction under control of the operating system.
This includes most of the kinds of security problems referred to in
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the literature as "physical problems," such as fire, vandalism, theft
of ta pes, etc. It also includes the type of programs known as
"background utilities" where the accidental mounting of a wrong disk
pack can result in loss of good data through accidental
initialization. In this case the threat is not under the control of
the computer system, but is in direct control of an operator, who
mounts a pack and pushes a button. Power surges are another common
type of problem that originates outside the system framework of
sequential execution of instructions.
The two remaining modes represent a distinction made in the
design of many modern computer systems, such as the IBM System/360
and System/370 ("Supervisor State--Problem State"), and the GE 6000
("Master Mode--Slave Mode") . Because the experience of the author is
mainly on IBM equipment, most of the examples herein will be drawn
from that environment. (See 5,6.) The most general description of
the difference between Supervisor Mode and User Mode is that the
entire instruction set of the machine is executable from Supervisor
Mode, while User Mod] permits only a restricted subset (in the
360/370 Sries, all I/O instructions and several control instructions
require Supervisor State) (5).
It should be noted here that not all programs in the operating
system run in Supervisor Mode. This mode is generally reserved for
important control routines, such as the I/O controller. If we think
of Supervisor Mode as a mode of operation restricted to special
system routines and User Mode as the mode of all programs that
execute under the control of these routines, then for any
non-external threat, the threat may be thought of as originating
within Supervisor Mode or outside Supervisor Mode (User Mode).
Assuming that the ability to switch from User to Supervisor Mode is
closely controlled in most machines (which it is), we say that there
is a difference in the nature of the two threats, because one is a
threat of internal disruption while the other is a threat of system
penetration.
One example of a Supervisor Mode threat is the IBM Attached
Support Processor (ASP). In the current version of ASP being used at
MIT in conjunction with the IBM esource Security System (RSS), ASP
runs in Supervisor State, with all protection disabled. ASP has been
modified by the local programming support staff to a large extent.
Any ugs in ASP have an excellent chance of clobbering the operating
system because protection is disabled. Thus, we see that there can
be threats from within the Supervisor Mode. Threats may also
originate, of course, from the programs that run in User Mode.
Common threats of this type include the attempt to switch to
Supervisor Mode without authorization, and the issuing of invalid
requests to system service routines. (One of the classic examples of
this in the System/360 is requesting the system clock to deposit the
current time into the middle of the operating system programs, which
it does on some versions without checking.)
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In summary, we have categorized threats according to their
origins: those external to the computer itself, those internal to the
computer and its privileged mode of operation, and those internal to
the computer in normal operating mode. Having established where the
threats are coming from, let us turn our attention to their targets.
For our purposes, it is convenient to divide threats into two
major categories:
1) Threats against Operating System and Subsystem Integrity.
2) T'hreats against data set access control.
We shall not attempt the impossible task of enumerating all of the
possible threats against a computer system. We will instead mention
some of the salient types of threats, and note their places in our
framework. Hopefully, this will suggest to the reader other
particular cases that we have omitted. The breakdown of our two
major categories is outlined in Figure 2. As can be seen,
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operating System and Subsystem Integrity includes a wide range of
system functions, including accounting and control functions as well
as ;y:;tem stlhility. On1( important fture of this category is its
recursive nature. All of tho kinds of fatures inherent in
system-wide operation, such as accoulnting, validation, and continuity
also occur in subsystems, to an extent that depends upon the
sophistication and design objectives of the subsystem. An example of
system and subsystem integrity problems is the design of an
interactive program for use under CP/CMS (Control Program/Cambridge
Monitor System, a set of software used on the IBM System/360 Model
67). The environment is shown in Figure 3. As can be seen, there
are three levels of system, each with a separate set of control and
accounting problems: first, the CP System, which provides a virtual
machine environment that must be protected and isolated; second, the
CMS System, which provides the command language and file system and
must manage requests, and finally, the interactive program, which
might have its own accounting and complete user environment to
support and protect.
OPERATING SYSTEM AND SUBSYSTEM INTEGRITY
1) Accounting Mechanisms
2) User Validation
3) Priority and Process Scheduling
4) Integrity of Actual Code
5) Mem6ry Access Control
6) Continuity of Operation
DATA SET ACCESS CONTROL
1) Read
2) Write
3) Execute
4) Append
5) Delete
6) Restrict Access to specific programs
7) Control of access to offline files (tapes, cards, etc.)
Figure 2. Target Categories
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Three-tiered User Environment
The other category of threat is against Data Set Access Control,
where we define data sets in the most general sense as aggregations
of data (or instructions), which may be either on line, or off linein the form of cards, tapes, or printout. Here we find the
conventional read, write, and other access categories for online data
sets, as well as the full range of physical access controls necessaryfor off line files. All control of programs and data within the
computer system (with the exception of those programs and data
specifically designated as protected parts of the operating system)is thus placed in this category.
A schematic diagram showing the relationship between the origins
and targets of several sample threats appears in Figures and 5.
Having outlined our security framework, we will now turn to a brief
comparison of the security requirements of the educational
environment.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
-Volume 4 47
~~ I_ ~ ~ ~ ~ II~~__----
Figure 3.
Figure 4. Schematic of Fxample Threats
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EXAMPLES OF SECURITY THREATS
1. A power surge.
2. A tape is stolen from the library.
3. A user shuts off a dedicated terminal in a retrieval system.
4. A bug in the operating system causes a core lockup.
6. When no more space is available in the OS/360 job queue, new jobs are entered on
top of jobs already in the queue, thus destroying spooled input before they can be
processed.
6. The teleprocessing access method interprets a line error as an "attention" interruption,
and discontinues the program in progress.
7. User gives the time of day command a bad address, causing it to overwrite part of
the OS.
8. In OS/360, users have almost unlimited access to delete data sets, even those
belonging to others.
9. A user enters a character in a numeric input line and causes the program to end.
Figure 5. Example Threats
SECUPITY IN EDUCATIONAL COMPUTING
Given our simple framework for classifing threats, the most
convenient way of surveying the security requirements of the
educational computing environment seems to be the use of the simple
charts shown in Figures 6, 7, and 8. These charts outline the most
important aspects of the three areas defined in the first section.
They will be supplemented by brief individual discussions here,
followed by some general observations on the environment as a whole.
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Relatively standard set of operator and Relatively important standard set of
environmental problems. problems concerning storage of
confidential data and program files on
cards and tape, as well as operator error.
Minimal problems here due to use of Minimal problems due to extremely
very standard software designed to standard and reliable software.
minimize operating system problems.
Restricted user community and Considerable problem of accidental
standard software minimize these modification since most users have full
problems. system access. Restricted user
community mitigates these problems,
but if facilities are shared, outside users
are a problem.
Administrative Security Profile
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EXTERNAL
SUPERVISOR
USER
Figure 6.
SYSTEM AND SUBSYSTEM NTEGRITY DATA SET ACCESS
Standard set of operator and For classified research, input/output
environmental problems, plus research handling problems will occur.
problems if experimental equipment is Also, standard risk of operator error.
interfaced with the system. Also
problems of remote terminal control.
Experimental operating systems (and Operating system modifications
modifications to existing operating increase the risk of data set access
system software) may cause the system problems while in supervisor mode.
to be less reliable, increasing the
problems in supervisor mode.
Most users are not interested in In an environment like OS, considerable
challenging the system. Experimental problems with many inexperienced
operating systems may allow accidental users having access to one another's
penetration. Computer science users files.
may need to experiment at this level, Also, there is a problem of protecting
and may cause problems if not isolated. users from their own errors, which is
not possible under OS/360.
Research Security Profile
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EXTERNAL
SUPERVISOR
USER
Figure 7.
SYSTEM AsND SUBSYSTEM NTEGRITY DATA SET ACCESS
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EXTERNAL
SUPERVISOR
USER
Figure 8.
Full set of standard problems, plus Large scale problems in the collection
problems of experimental equipment and distribution of student decks and
if facilities are shared with research printouts, especially when these contain
users. Also, control problems with solutions to problem sets or
remote system and subsystem terminals. examinations.
Same as research area. Same as research area.
Extremely large scale problem of Equally large scale problem of students
student exploration and challenge to both deliberately and accidentally
system and subsystem control in almost d.rlaging or copying data sots to which
every area from accounting, to they should not have access, or mis-
validation, and continuity of service. using data sets to which they should
This is particularly true of those have limited access.
students who are taking computer-
oriented courses.
Classroom Support Security Profile
The Administrative area, as expected, has minimized many of the
threat categories by its use of standard hardware and software and
its restriction of users (almost all are members of the programming
staff). However, two areas are important here. First, External Data
Set Access threats are extremely important, due to the large number
of confidential and historical data sets, and the large amount of
physical handling of these files. Also, threats from User Mode to
Data Set Access come from the possibility of programming errors
within the staff, as well as large scale possibilities if facilities
were shared with other areas.
In the Research area, we find increased threats for two major
reasons: first, the use of non-standard hardware and software vastly
increases the potential threat from External and Supervisor Mode
respectively, and second, the great increase in the number of users
and the corresponding decrease in control makes User Mode security
much more important. While it is true of most researchers that their
preoccupation with research makes tampering with the system unlikely,
it is also true that for those who are researching on computers at
the most basic level, some simulation or virtual machine support is
necessary if they are to use common facilities. This implies a great
deal of subsystem support. Overall, we find our security problems
expanding.
The last area, Classroom Support, carries the research problems
one step further, involving even greater numbers of students, some of
whom are "hackers," and all of the problems inherited from attempting
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to gain from research technology in the form of hardware or software
modifications. We find here the full range of educational security
problems. External, Supervisor, and User Modes seem very well filled
out with standard and experimental equipment, and cooperative and
malicious users.
There are clearly discrepancies in importance between
compromising the solutions to a problem set and the medical records
of students. If, however, one sets aside the intrinsic value of the
information and observes the security profile, it can be asserted
that all of the security problems of the educational environment show
up within the Classroom Support environment. It follows, then, that
a computer system that satisfactorily solved those problems for the
classroom environment would be satisfactory for general use.
The remainder of this paper deals with a specific aspect of the
Classroom Support environment, namely, the creation of a monitor
subsystem to allow controlled, time-sharing in a secure student
environment. Fxternal and Supervisor Mode threats will be left for
other research, and we will concentrate here on the implementation of
a subsystem that must deal directly with User Mode threats in a
time-sharing environment.
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TH_ CLASS MONITOR SYSTEM
I NT RO DU CT ION
This section discusses one attempt to satisfy the need for
controlled time-sharing for Classroom Support processing. The Class
Monitor System for OS/360/TSO (Time-Sharing Option) was implemented
during the summer of 1972 at MIT. In order to explain its design
features and implementation strategy, it is first necessary to
briefly describe the TSO environment.
At tt.e time, the M IT Computation Center ran OS Release 21 with
TSO on a System/370 Model 165 with 1.5 megabytes of core storage.
Several IBM 3330 Disk Storage Drives are available, as well as two
IBM 2301 Drum Storage Units for swapping system data sets. A hybrid
of ASP (Attached Support Processor) and LASP (Local Attached Support
Processor) is used in support of the Main 165. Although several MIT
modifications have been made to the system, the basic structure and
user interface of TSO remain standard (7,8). It should be noted here
that MIT has a standard data set naming convention for user data
sets, which reflects the account number and programmer to be billed
for the online storage. A standard MIT/TSO data set might have the
following name:
U.M1234.9999. HEWITT. FORT
where U = User File, M1234 = Account Number, 9999 = Programmer
Number, Hewitt = Arbitrary Name, and Fort = FORTRAN Source. Each
programmer on the system has a unique programmer number, and each
projct is assigned a unique account (or problem) number. Thus, only
valid problem-programmer combinations are accepted within the system.
Under TSO, a unique problem programmer number is associated with each
USEPID-PASSWOPD combination, and the prefix "U.PROB.PROG" is
automatically added to all data set references (see Reference 7 for
details of TSO data set conventions).
Under standard TSO, as might be expected, "all users are treated
equally." That is, each entry in the User Attribute Data Set (UADS)
is assumed to be a "full" user, with all of the privileges available
to users of the system. The only exceptions to the notion of the
standard user are users whose UADS entry contains either an
administrative or operator flag. Thus all standard users have the
same command repertoire and data set access rights. Under OS/360,
these data set access rights are quite extensive, because they
include all data sets in the system. In fact, until recently there
have been only two ways to remove access to data sets in the system
-- first, they may be password protected (a clumsy and not often used
facility), and second, the physical device containing the data set
may be placed in read-only mode (this is done at MIT with the system
residence volume). Note that the second method cannot protect
against read access, while even the first cannot hide the existence
and location (volume serial number) of the data set in question.
thus, we see that the standard TSO user has a quite potent facility
at his command, which includes the ability to modify or delete more
that 90 percent of the data sets on the system, either accidentally
or deliberately. Rounding out our discussion of standard users,
consider the administration of USERID's within the system. The
central user accounting office must handle both batch and TSO
accounting. At any given time, there are several thousand active
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combinations of problem-programmer numbers, as well as hundreds of
valid TSO USERID's. As classroom use of computers increases, the
potential load on this office is obvious -- several thousand
students, each involved in several courses, combine to produce many
thousands of USERID-PASSWOFD combinations. If we assume that the
instructor in any given course would probably exercise fairly tight
control over the course budget, the workload of the central office in
closely overseeing all users becomes immense.
The Classroom Support environment lends itself naturally to
decentralized control of computer resources. Because the student
users are already organized into classes, it seems logical to allow
the person in charge of a particular class to allocate computer
resources in any desired manner. Further, some controls should be
provided for the class administrator to ensure that the class budget
is spent equitably. For example, in the current MIT accounting
system (which, although primitive, is not unlike many university
centers), if a class of ten students were each assigned standard TSO
USERID's, all ten users would be billed against the class budget for
the course. Now because they are "full" users, there is absolutely
nothing to prevent a student from logging onto the system and using
it to create, compile, and run FORTRAN decks instead of executing the
desired tutorial program. Moreover, because all users in the class
are being billed against the master budget (a separate account for
each user is unthinkable) a single enthusiastic student can "play"
until the entire budget is consumed, preventing the other nine
students from ever logging on at all. This rather disturbing
scenario at least has the advantage of assuming non-hostile
intentions on the part of the student. If a student who wished to
cause trouble was released on the system, almost every user data set
on the system could be deleted without fear of discovery.
It is clear that there is a need for a subsystem that can
achieve the dual purpose of relieving the central accounting office
and providing control of student users. Figure 9 indicates an
expanded set of design goals, which will be discussed individually.
Following that discussion, the implementation of the MIT Class
onitor will be described.
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DESIGN GOALS FOR CLASS MONITOR
1) Get immediate and uninterruptable control at logon.
2) Validate users aid log invalid users como!etely off the system.
3) Give tne valid user a pre-designated "subset" of full TSO.
4) Protect itself and its files.
) Handle user file maintenance.
6). Get uninterruptable control at logoff or console shutoff.
7) Handle on-line accounting.
8) Provide a mechanism for maintenance of the master accounting file.
9) Have low operating overhead.
10) Be easy to use for inexperienced students.
11) Be easy to maintain for center personnel.
Figure 9. Design Goals for Class Monitor
GOALS OF THE MONITOR
No matter how we implement our system, it is still necessary to
use the concept of the TSO USERID. Now, however, we assign several
"open" USERID's to.our class and install the Class Monitor in each
one. The first goal of our system, then, is that the Class Monitor
must intercept the standard logon in some manner and gain control of
the logon session, thus encapsulating the user in a new environment
immediately and without failure.
Because we have given out "open" USERID's, the process of
validation and account balance checking must be undertaken by the
-lass Monitor logon processor, so that only valid users are admitted.
If students fail to give the proper identification, they must be
logged off the computer system. Note that the USERID had to be
logged completely onto the TSO system before the execution of the CMS
processor could begin. Therefore, it is necessary for CMS to fire a
direct call to the system logoff routine to prevent the user from
taking any action prior to being logged off the system.
Having admitted the student to CMS, we now face the problem of
control. The Monitor must be able to allocate the user only those
commands that are necessary to do the assigned work, and in a manner
that will make it difficult to perform any but the intended tasks.
As will be seen later, extreme care must be taken to avoid giving the
user commands with which he may bootstrap into a more powerful
environment. For example, if we give the user a restricted command
library, and also the ability to copy command processors, the user
will simply copy more powerful commands into the library and then
execute them. This is a difficult area in the design of subsystems
that attempt to contain student users.
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If the Monitor is tc have online accounting, as well as a
command library of some sort, it is clear that these data sets must
be protected from user tampering. Further, it is desirable that the
existence of such files be hidden from the user, to eliminate the
temptation of such tampering.
Perhaps the most difficult area for the monitor system is the
handling of user file maintenance. First, we encounter the problem
of giving the user the ability to create and delete data sets. This
entails releasing commands that constitute a direct threat to other
data sets on the system. Second, many interactive teaching programs
use online data sets to save intermediate results between logon
sessions. Thus we should like to provide some means of creating and
deleting data sets from within a higher level language such as
FOPTRAN or PL/I. Finally, we encounter the problem of billing the
individual student for data set space because the entire file
maintenance system of IPC TSO is built around the notion that all of
the files under one USERID should be treated as a single group.
Ideally, the Monitor should allow for program control of data set
allocation, automatic distinction between different students' files
under the same USFRID, and billing procedures for these files.
It is essential that the Monitor get uninterruptible control at
logoff time, to ensure a clean CMS termination, and proper billing at
the student level. Further, it is essential that control be received
in the event of an abnormal termination such as console shutoff or
telephone disconnect, because these events could easily bypass the
subsystem accounting nechanism.
The concept of online accounting is important for class use.
This is primarily true due to the scarcity of computer resources at
this level. The MIT TSO system does not, at this time, have online
accounting, primarily for reasons of security. That system produces
punched card records of each logon session, and performs a daily
update Monday through Friday. With the limited resources available
to classroom users, a student could easily log on several times
during a weekend, and consume much more than the parcel of time
allotted, knowing that the billing would not catch up until Monday.
This is quite unsatisfactory for the classroom environment. In fact,
there is some reason to believe that the accounting should be done
periodically during the logon session, so that the session could be
terminated when the balance reached zero instead of waiting for
LOGOFF processing to update the balance. At the very least, the
Monitor must compute a reasonably accurate cost figure for the
session, update an online accounting file, and display both the
session cost and balance to the user, so that the students may budget
their time properly.
A necessary adjunct of online accounting is the ability to
maintain the on line accounting file by adding or deleting users,
allocating funds, changing passwords, printing reports, etc. All of
these standard maintenance functions must be provided in
conversational form so that the class administrator can maintain the
file without assistance from the central accounting office.
The final three design goals are common to all types of
subsystems. Obviously, the Monitor must not consume large amounts of
computer time in providing the student environment, or the benefits
of this nvironment will be outweighed by its consumption of
resources. Because the Monitor is to be used by students of all
disciplines, it must provide a set of interactions that are extremely
straightforward, so that there is little chance of confusing
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inexperienced students. Finally the Monitor must be easily
maintained: bcause tie programming support staffs of the university
generally have a fairly high turnover rate.
%7, have now outlined a set of design goals for a Classroom
Support subsystom. In the scond part of this section, we will
discuss the implementation of the MIT Class Monitor System, which
attempts to achieve these goals.
THP MIT CLASS MONITOR SYSTEM
The Class Monitor System consists of three major components:
Logon Processing
Session Control
Logoff Processing
We will examine each of these components and the implementation
strategy used, concluding with a summary of the strengths and
weaknesses of the system as currently available.
when a TSO user logs onto the system, the Terminal Monitor
Program (TMP) is invoked. This is the standard IBM control program,
which supervises the console session. It is the TMP that accepts and
executes all user commands. The TMP also has a very important
feature which we use to get control. At the beginning of the console
session, the TMP looks at the PARM field of the EXEC statement which
invokes it. (See Figure 9 for details on the operation of the
invocation process and catalogued procedure used.) If any non-blank
characters are present in this field, they are placed into the
command buffer and taken as the first command line to be executed.
"urther, no information is accepted from the terminal until this
first command is processed to completion. This includes processing
of "attention" interruptions, which are suspended until the first
command terminates normally, and until the TMP issues the first READY
message to the console.
The availability of the "first command" option means that the
Monitor can specify a single load module that will be executed before
any user intervention is permitted. This load module must, of course,
contain the CMS user validation scheme as well as some ability to
assure that invalid users are logged off the system. As a matter of
convenience, the Master File Update Routine is included as a
subroutine in the LOGON module, thus allowing us to implement this
version of the Monitor using only two load modules, one at logon, and
one at logoff. The modules are both written in PL/I. Figures 10,
11, and 12 give the basic flowcharts of the system, and each one will
now be explained.
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Figure 10. Macro Flowchart of CMS Logon Routine
Figure 10 depicts the operation of the LOGON processor. A
standard TSO "nopass" option is used for all TSO CMS USERID's which
allows the invocation of the TMP without a TSO password, that is, TSO
logon is accomplished by merely typing "LOGON USERID." At this time,
when finished with initialization, the TP passes control to the CMS
LOGON routine. The first function performed is the basic user
validation. CS uses group numbers for user identification. This
was done so that the class administrator would not have to cope with
both USERID's and passwords. Under this scheme, the administrator
may assign group numbers based on a signup list or class enrollment
sheet and either assign or collect unique passwords. This scheme also
tends to assist students by giving them a number instead of a
character string as their identifier. If they forget their password,
they can always identify themselves to the administrator by group
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number and have their memory refreshed. The user is given two tries
to enter a valid group number/password combination. If unsuccessful,
the user is logged off the system completely. This is made possible
by the mechanism of the system logoff routine. It is called directly
from within the I.OGON processor and simply turns on a bit in one of
the system control blocks for the process. Whenever control is
returned to the TMP, this bit is automatically checked and, if on,
causes the logon session to be cancelled. Because control is
returned directly from the LOGON processor to the TMP, this screening
method cannot be subverted. The next task is to determine the
account balance. If there is any money left in the account, the user
continues processing. If not, an appropriate message is printed, and
the user is logged off. At this time, we are certain that the user
is a valid one, either a student user or an administrator. We must
now solve an important problem caused by the modular nature of TSO.
Although we now know the valid user's group number, as soon as
the LOGON processor is finished executing, all of the current
information disappears as a new program is fetched into the TSO
region for execution. How, then, does the LOGOFF processor know
which group number to charge for the session? It is clearly
undesirable to have the group number and password reentered at the
end of the session. The problem is solved using the User Profile
Table, one of the control tables that remain in use throughout the
session, and in which, for example, the characters for character and
line deletion are recorded. Several bytes of installation-usable
space are reserved in this table, and one halfword is used to record
the group number. Each time the TMP invokes a command, the address
of this table is passed in the argument list. This allows our LOGON
and LOGOFF commands to communicate.
Having recorded the identity of the user, we check an
administrative flag in the accounting record. If the user has
administrative privileges, we give him an opportunity to access the
.aster File for maintenance. Otherwise, we simply return to the TMP,
our work completed. If the user accesses the Master File, we return
to the TMP when finished.
The Master File Access Routine is a PL/T procedure callable from
the LOGON processor. It is simply a conversational file maintenance
routine, which provides the obviously necessary functions of
administration, such as adding and removing group numbers, changing
passwords, allocating money, printing reports, etc. Most of the
programming and design involved are relatively mundane, and available
to the interested reader in the CMS Programmer's Guide (10). One
feature that is relevant here, however, is the hierarchical scheme
currently employed for administration. Users are classified either
as non-administrative (no access to Master File), administrators
(access to the records of all student users in the file), and
super-users (access to all records in the file). Without judging the
merits of the scheme, it is interesting to note that almost all
subsystems of this nature possess the "deity syndrome," that is,
there is always one particular user (in this system called a
"super-user"), who has absolute accessing rights to all information
within the system. This usually starts as a protective measure
during the debugging stages of the development, when it is clearly
advantageous to have an override mechanism for emergencies. But
somehow, as time goes on, this facility is never removed, so that the
creator of the system always has "the power." It is likewise true of
CMS that the current CMS administrator has absolute access to all
Master Files for all classes. Because the class administrator is
often an inexperienced student assistant, it has been found that the
override facility has been very useful so far.
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LOGON processing, then, includes user validation and screening,
account checking, posting of group numbers, and Master File access
for administrators. Control is then returned to the TMP.
When the TMP regains control from the CMS LOGON processor, the
system logoff bit is immediately checked. If this bit is set, the
session is terminated. If not, the user is presumed to be valid, and
a READY message is issued to the terminal. (For a description of the
CMS LOGON and LOGOFF user interface, see Figure 11.) At this point,
we are at the TSO READY State. This is often referred to in other
time-sharing systems as the Supervisor Level, or Command Level. When
a user is in READY state, the TMP is ready to process commands from
the terminal.
Having performed the necessary functions at LOGON, we are now
faced with the problem of controlling the user console session, as
depicted in Figure 11. As noted earlier, we would like to give the
user the absolute minimum number of commands necessary to perform the
assigned task. In doing so, we would like to use standard TSO
commands as much as possible, so that when a user has a question
about a command, all of the existent TSO documentation (such as the
Command Language Reference Manual) will still be relevant. The
procedure, then, is to start with the standard set of TSO commands
and simply remove those that are not needed. This turns out to be an
extremely easy task, because of the straightforward way in which TSO
processes commands. When a command line is sent to the command
buffer for processing, the TMP has a standard search path for
locating the proper program to fetch. The part that concerns us here
is the location of the commands themselves. They all reside in a
partitioned data set called SYS1.CMDLIB. Each command is a separate
member of the data set, with its command name and abbreviation
corresponding to a member name and alias. In order to restrict the
commands available to the user, we simply copy the desired subset of
the TSO commands into a new partitioned data set, and substitute that
data set into the search path in place of the standard command
library. The DDNAME of this new data set is LIMITLIB, and the TMP is
modified to make the substitution. Thus, we tailor the command set
of a given class by varying the members of the LIMITLIB used for that
class. When commands are requested which are not included in
LIMITLIB, the standard TSO error message "COMMAND XXXX NOT FOUND" is
received.
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Figure 11. Class Monitor Console Session
For some applications, the LIMITLIB alone is a satisfactory
solution to control problems. However, in many cases it is necessary
to allocate and delete data sets in order to run instructional
programs. If we release the ALLOCATE and DELETE commands to users
for this purpose, then they will be able to allocate any data sets
they wish (or accidentally allocate large data sets by incorrectly
specifying the allocation parameters) as well as delete any data set
on the system. Therefore, we use the TSO EXEC feature, which allows
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us to store commands in a data set for execution. Then we rename the
commands e need, placing the renamed members in and executing them
with our EXEC file to maintain the confidentiality of the command
name. Firally, we remove the option of the EXEC command which allows
the command data set to be listed, so that the user cannot learn the
new command names (otherwise, the user could simply invoke them from
LIhITLIB by their new names). This procedure allows us to include
commands in LIMITLIB which we wish to restrict to a subset of CMS
users. The LIMITLIB data set and the EXEC command, then, provide user
control during the console session.
At the end of the console session, CMS must get control to
perform accounting functions and print charges. This is accomplished
by inserting a CMS module into LIMITLIB as LOGOFF. The flowchart for
LOGOFF is shown in Figure 12. When the user types the command
LOGOFF, the CMS module is fetched instead of the standard system
program. After CMS performs its accounting functions, it calls the
system LOGOFF routine, assuring that when control is returned to the
TMP, a normal session termination will occur.
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RETURN TO TMP
Figure 12. Macro Flowchart of CMS Logoff Routine
Referring to Figure 9, let us evaluate the current version of
the Monitor in light of our design goals. Following that, we will
liscuss some of the security aspects of the Monitor.
We have seen that CMS LOGON gets the desired control at logon
time, and properly validates all users. The combination of LIMITLIB
and EXEC provides the ability to tailor the TSO command language.
Protection is accomplished mainly by hiding essential commands and
data sets from the user. At the present time, no file maintenance is
performed by CMS, due to the lack of an interface between higher
level languages and DAIR (Dynamic Allocation Interface Routine).
Several schemes are being studied to implement a file subsystem. The
LOGOFF routine gets control when the user issues a logoff request.
In Version 2 of the Monitor, abnormal termination such as console
shutoff will also be handled. Online accounting and Master File.
maintenance are provided. The system has proven to be extremely easy
to use and maintain, due to its modular design and close resemblance
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to normal TSO. Finally, the overhead has been measured at
approximately one dollar per student session, and this figure will be
reduced in the next version.
SP.CUt(ITY AND TIIE MONITOR
Although the Class Monitor has proved a useful tool in
non-computer courses at MIT, it is of limited value in the control of
computer-oriented courses due to its vulnerability. It lacks
protection in two major areas.
First, because the data sets used to implement the monitor are
simply normal user data sets, they may be edited, listed, or deleted
by other "full" TSO users. A specific example of this occurred last
fall, when a staff member at the Computation Center, in an effort to
assist a Class Monitor user, listed his EXEC files using a command
not available within LIMITLIB. Thus the code names (and access) to
all commands were given to this user. Further, students who are
given full TSO access for other projects are free to alter or destroy
all of the essential data sets for the Monitor. Therefore, the
Monitor is open to sabotage frcm non-Monitor users.
A second area of vulnerability arises from the fact that all of
the programs within the Monitor are written in PL/I, and run in User
lode. If we give a PL/I programming class access to a version of the
Monitor that includes the ability to edit, compile, run, and delete
PL/I programs, we face two problems. First, anything that the
Monitor does, they can do (for example, gain access to the User
Profile Table, and change the group number to be billed for the
session). Second, tho logical structure of TSO provides no method of
keeping different users' data sets apart in a single USERID, and
releasing file maintenance commands gives unlimited access to all CMS
data sets. Therefore, we have relied upon the good nature of our
students when using the Monitor for more sophisticated applications.
The final section discusses the IBM Resource Security System,
and what additional security it will bring to the Class Monitor in
the OS/TSO environment.
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RSS ND CLASSROOM SUPPORT SECURITY
I NTRO DU CTION
In May of 1973, the IBM Resource Security System (RSS) was
installed at the MIT Computation Center as part of a study on
operating system security. RSS is designed as an addition to OS
Release 21 which, when fully implemented (and debugged), provides the
rddit.ional software necessary to "secure" the operating system.
Recause extremely detailed documentation is available for RSS (12,
13, 14), only a very brief description will be given here.
RSS is a system primarily concerned with data security, and one
that clearly reflects its military ancestry (it was originally
designed for use in the World Wide Military Command and Control
System). System res;ources (programs, data sets, and terminals) are
accessed by users on the basis of security levels, access categories,
and need-to-know. Security levels reflect the sensitivity of data, in
a manner directly analogous to the military "confidential, secret,
and top secret" classification. Data sets are assigned one of eight
security levels, and each user has an attribute which sets a maximum
permissible level of data access. Access categories provide a means
of implementing the concept of a group need-to-know by associating
jroups of users with groups of system resources. For example, all of
the administrative users in a given department might be authorized to
the set of confidential files for that department. Finally, in the
extreme case, individual users can be authorized to specific data
sets on a specific need-to-know basis.
Perhaps the most important reflection of the military design
strategy in RSS is the concept of a Security Officer. The control of
all security procedures within the system rests with the person (or
persons) designated as Security Officer. This control includes the
definition of access categories, maintenance of the security profiles
of all users, and the control of the authorization procedure for all
controlled data sets.
Through the authorization procedure described in 12, users are
given rights to data sets on the basis of their code words, which
specify access categories, levels, and need-to-know. The RSS System
then monitors the use of all controlled data sets and attempts to
prevent any access to the system that might subvert the control
mechanism.
After taking a brief look at the potential effectiveness of RSS
in alleviating the security problems of the Class Monitor, this
section will conclude with some comments on the design of operating
systems for use in the Classroom Support Environment.
THE POTENTIAL OF RSS
When OS/360 was originally introduced, the designers were very
proud of the ease with which data in the system was accessed. It was
a very "open" system, and the most flexible available in terms of
file system organization. As the need for data protection became
clear and TSO was added to the environment, RSS was developed to gain
control of the system. For the Class Monitor, this meant the ability
to protect its control data sets from outside disturbances, and
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further, to authorize the contents of those data sets to specific
programs. For example, the accounting file could be authorized only
to LOGON, LOGOFF, and the Master File Access Routing, thus
preventing access by student programs. However, it should be noted
here that even though this is a major improvement in OS/TS), the
result is no advance in the state-of-the-art. Indeed, there is some
reason to believe that the design of a time-sharing system in which
one user can access another user's files (or even know that they
exist) was a terrible mistake at best, and that data set protection
in TSO in fact brings the design of the system up to a level just
below that of systems such as VM/370, because the user in TSO can
still find out that controlled data sets exist from the system
catalog.
In the Classroom Support Environment, as noted previously, a
very decentralized user community exists. Unfortunately, in RSS only
the Security Officer can protect data sets and assign privileges.
This military notion of security centralization is in direct conflict
with the needs of our environment. This and other problems of RSS in
a "service bureau" environment are discussed by Daley (15).
RSS provides no assistance in the other major area of
difficulty, that of preventing the user from accessing the User
Profile Table and other sensitive control tables during execution.
Although RSS in most cases can catch a user before the OS environment
is affected, it offers no assistance in maintaining the subsystem
environment needed in our application.
In summary, the addition of RSS to OS/360 provides some useful
control of sensitive data sets, but fails to provide the mechanisms
necessary for subsystem control, such as automatic user exits from
various sections of the TMP, and authorization mechanisms that
operate without the Security Officer. Much modification of TSO is
needed before the Class Monitor can be secured, and RSS must be
extended to include more specific authorizations, such as the
execute-only access and program-program-file permission discussed by
Daley. RSS, while solving many data set access problems, falls short
of the requirements of the classroom environment.
CONCLUSIONS
Fxperience in the Classroom Environment at MIT has shown that a
decentralized approach such as the Class Monitor System provides the
necessary simplicity and computing power for students, as well as the
control required for administrators. severe problems occur, however,
in attempting to provide adequate subsystem integrity. It seems
clear that any operating system that intends to service this
environment must include mechanisms for subsystem implementation
which include access (either by user exits or open entry points) to
most major modules of the system. File systems, accounting systems,
command processors, and many other areas must be available to provide
adequate subsystem security.
In conclusion, we should note that there are some viable
alternatives to the OS environment for Classroom Support. Madnick
and Donovan (16) make a strong case for the use of virtual machine
systems in areas where security is a problem. Certainly this idea is
appealing in attempting to isolate computer research, for example,
from other campus activities. Even with a class virtual machine,
however, some mechanism will be required to protect members of that
-lass from one another, making some subsystem necessary. The i4ULTICS
design (17) makes the implementation of subsystems somewhat easier.
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The needs of the Classroom Support environment, then, are mainly
in the area of subsystem security. Hopefully, the work of the RSS
Study Group at the Sloan School of Management will provide a
framework for analyzing these needs. Such a framework will assist
designers in meeting the security needs of the classroom support
environment more completely.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Service Bureau Industry has been included in the user
requirements survey because there is good reason to believe that most
computer installations of the future will be run as service bureaus
of some ind. In universities, this has been the case for some time.
There is a definite trend in industry toward running the EDP division
as an in-house service bureau. Returns to scale, in terms of both
personnel and hardware, justify this trend.
We have primarily focused our attention on time-shared and
remote ob entry service bureaus. These seem to be most advanced in
terms of security facilities, in comparison with conventional batch
opera tion.
1.1 Questionnaires
A questionnaire was developed to ascertain the attitudes of the
service bureau industry. A sample copy of this questionnaire is
included in Appendix 1.
Due to time constraints, the sample surveyed was quite limited
and, as such, did not yield statistically significant data. Thus, in
the observations that follow, the questionnaire data was augmented by
personal interviews and the experience of members of the Sloan
Information System Security Project.
In addition to a general study of the service bureau industry,
five service bureaus were studied extensively:
* Interactive Data Corp. - IDC
* National Computer Software Systems - NCSS (3)
* First Data
* Computility
* Interactive Sciences Corp. - ISC
These service bureaus are considered representative of the range
of services typically offered.
1.2 Overview of the Industry
The service bureau industry is one which has recently
experienced, and continues to experience rapid growth. It is also a
highly competitive industry. There has been much talk of late about
regulation in a non-economic sense - namely by introduction of
legislation that will exert control over all personal data, be it in
computerized data bases, or not. The service bureau may be required
to provide a sufficiently secure system in which to keep such data.
The ability to do so may well appear to have secondary, economic
regulatory effects (1).
An outstanding facet of the service bureau industry is the wide
variance exhibited on a number of fronts. Some of these fronts are:
Users
The users of the service bureau range from the most naive, to
the ost sophisticated of computer users.
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* Size of Operation
There are several very large, country-wide service bureaus - two
examples of which are IDC (Interactive Data Corporation) and-
NCSS (National CSS) - and a myriad of small-to-medium
companies-such as First Data and Computility.
* Type of Service
S2rvices offered by service bureaus range from selling raw
,achine time to selling the use of proprietary programs and data
bases.
An example of the latter category - sale of the use of
proprietary data bases - is IDC. IDC, along with various third
parties, supplies a variety of packages which the user may use
on the IDC-supplied data base. The use of this proprietary data
base is one of IDC's primary services.
There is belief expressed by some that proprietary programs
and data bases will become the major service of the industry.
* Customer Base
As a result of these varied services, the service bureaus cater
to a widely varying customer base.
The classes of customer correspond to the classes of service
offered by the industry: some buying only raw machine time;
others buying the use of data bases; others buying the use of
various packages.
All of these different classes have different security
needs, and are at different levels of sophistication. But more
of this later.
Despite the large variance in such factors as users, services,
and size of operation, certain findings were ommon to all the
service bureaus surveyed:
* There is not much.variance in the responsibility to the customer
which the service bureau agrees to assume. All those service
bureaus surveyed undertook to take "all reasonable precautions"
against loss or disclosure of user data. It does not take a wary
eye to notice the great legal lattitude allowed by the word
"reasonable."
This essentially places the responsibility with the user; he
must decide whether to make use of the supplied security
facilities.
* The supplied security mechanisms are often site implemented and
site maintained. These mechanisms augment those supplied by the
manufacturer, and are often more sophisticated.
* Almost without exception, these security mechanisms are
difficult to use, given the naivete of the average user. As one
service bureau official described the situation: "With respect
to security, some of.our customers are sensitive, some are not
-- but all are naive!"
· * .Users of the service bureau are far more security conscious in
word than in deed. Despite the general availability of security
mechanisms, the great majority of users make little use of them.
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Fstimates ranging from 30-90 percent of the resources of a
service bureau are consumed by about 10 percent of its clients.
This 10 percent is a sophisticated set of users, for the most
part, and tends to make extensive use of the available security
mechanisms - often augmenting those supplied by the service
bureau, with their own.
2.0 ANALYSIS OF MCHANISMS
We stated above that the service bureau industry in general -
and this includes all those surveyed - make available a wide range of
relatively sophisticated security mechanisms.
In this section we will present a breakdown of the security
mechanisms offered by those service bureaus surveyed. A detailed
summary of similar data for four of the service bureaus included in
the survey appears in Table 1.
The discussion of the security mechanisms available on the
systems surveyed will be divided into five parts:
* Security at login time
* Security at run-time controlled by user routines -- e.g.,
traps.
* Security at run-time controlled by system status-indicators
* Control of access to data sets
* Monitoring and Back-up facilities.
2.1 Security at Login Time - Authentication
Standard on all systems surveyed is the common
"user-ID/Password" combination for identification of the user.
The facility for associating several user-IDs with a Project-ID
is also common.
In addition to these well-publicized login procedures, there are
several other mechanisms that are quite common, but not as well
publicized. These include:
* time limits for logging in - if the user takes too long to log
in, the system hangs up. This is to make it unpleasant for the
user to try many different IDs or passwords.
* on some systems (e.g., NCSS) only one user of an ID may be
active at any time.
* passwords are generally easily changed if a user should suspect
that his password has leaked out.
* many systems permit specification of terminals from which a
password will be accepted. This allows use of physical security
- lock the terminal away - to augment the password mechanism.
* the user has the option of "extending" the login procedure
(e.g., the "PROFILE EXEC" of NCSS). This takes the form of
automatically invoking a set of user-written commands when
someone attempts to log in under a certain ID, that will attempt
to further authenticate the user attempting the login. The
commands may request additional passwords, or other information,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 'Volume 4
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before allowing the user into the system. This facility may also
be used to prevent the user from using certain system commands
or facilities.
These mechanisms for restricting access to the system as a
whole, are extremely powerful, but not widely used by the average
service bureau client. Many of these techniques (e.g., "PROFILE
EXEC") require a moderate degree of sophistication to make effective
use of them.
2.2 User-controlled Run-time Security
These facilities are those available to the user to more closely
specify the environment in which his routine will run. Examples are:
* With the NCSS "PROJECT EXEC", any attempt to attach a file on a
proprietary disk automatically invokes a set of commands written
by the file owner. These commands, stored as a file on the
protected disk, may simply ask. questions to further verify the
user's identity, or may invoke actual programs which may be
written in any of the supported languages (e.g., COBOL, FORTRAN,
PL/1, Assembler). Furthermore, while the user has this file
attached, special accounting is done in the supervisor to charge
separately for the use of this protected file - should the
file-owner so wish.
* The ISC system recognizes the file name extension of ".PRO", and
sets a status indicator which disables:
the "examine" feature
- the "deposit" (update) feature
- the "save" feature (essentially the same as "copy")
* The user often has the option of setting status indicators that
prevent the use of certain features, such as DEC's Dynamic
Debugging Tool (DDT).
2.3 System-controlled Run-time Security
These features include:
1) Disable the "attention" key while executing a "PROFILE"--or
"PROTECT EXEC" (on NCSS).
2) Traps to accounting routines if, after interrupting
execution, the user attempts'anything other than "RESTART".
3) On the ISC system, there is a system routine that unlocks a
user directory'for the life of the calling program only, if
the program name ends in ".PRO". In this way, data files
may be associated with a program. Only that program can
access the data file while it is running.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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2.4 1Enforcing Access Control to Data Sets
Control of access can be achieved by the conventional
restriction of access to a data set, or by rendering the data (or
program) unintelligible.
This can be done by encryption. Many of the systems surveyed
offer an encrypting package for a very nominal fee.
Restricting access to data sets (in the conventional sense)
consists basically, of two steps:
* the ability to differentiate between different types of
access
* the ability to specify to whom each type of access applies.
2.4.1 Access-type Specification
The NCSS system (IBM 360/67) recognizes two types of access:
* read only
* write access
DEC's PDP-10 (KI-10 processor) systems recognize four types of
access:
* read
* write
* execute
* append
Both the 360/67 and PDP-10 allow complete restriction of access.
The ISC system recognizes different types of access to a user
directory:
d read (i.e., use the directory)
* write (i.e., modify the directory)
* create
* destroy
2.4.2 User Categorization
The NCSS system categorizes users by the "user-ID/password"
combination. There is no notion of a group of users being treated as
a "Project".
The DEC PDP-10 systems categorize users into three groups:
· the owner of the file
· other members of that project (programmer number)
· all other users.
Specification of security (as in 2.4.1) can be applied to each of
these three classes separately.
Much of the enforcing of these access restrictions is carried
out by the hardware.
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2.5 Monitoring and Back-up
All service bureaus surveyed have, in operation, daily backup of
all files from disk to tape.
Some generate weekly backup tapes which are stored.
Some systems (NCSS, ISC) monitor file changes continuously, and.
keep this information in the system to allow recovery of a quicker
nature than reloading all files from tape.
3 .0 EXPLANATION OF FINDINGS
Given that we have the mechanisms described in Section 2.0, which
are certainly commensurate with the state of the art, a question
poses itself:
"Why is it that these sophisticated techniques exist in the
service bureau industry, and not, in general, outside of it?"
By way of providing an answer, we offer the following
explanations:
* The people that conceive of, and run service bureaus, are in the
main, technical people. Couched i terms of the belief that
security consciousness is a function of the level of awareness,
these are people who aro operationally close to the computer,
and so would he expected to exhibit a high degree of concern.
Being technical people, they have the wherewithal to bring into
existence such mechanisms as will, in their experience, provide
adequate security.
* The very nature of the service bureau environment requires that
the system be protected from the user, and that users be
isolated from each other. This is strictly enforced, except in
cases where specified access control allows sharing of programs
or data files. Such a requirement is mandatory if time-sharing
is to e possible.
There is much evidence of personal, and proprietary data being
kept in the system. Therefore, some form of access control is
necessary.
The service bureau is a natural outlet for the software vendor,
or the person selling the use of a data base. The seller may be
the service bureau itself, or a third party. In either case,
there is definite concern on the part of the seller for the
safety of his product.
This goes a long way toward explaining the existence of security
mechanisms in the industry.
·* As opposed to all the other industries surveyed, the service
bureau industry is the only one in which the use of computers is
the "raison d'etre" of the industry. This means that there were
no "traditional" approaches to dictate policy, as there were,
and still are, in industries such as the Financial and Medical.
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The service bureau industry began with a "clean slate", so to
speak.
We have implied throughout that the available mechanisms are
not often used by the average service bureau user. This, too, begs a
question: "Why is this so?" Again, in answer, we propose the
following:
* The available mechanisms were designed and implemented by
technical people, for technical people. The average user of a
service bureau is not a technical person.
Security is an option for which the user must choose to pay'- in
terms of both effort and dollars. It is an otion because it is
generally an "add-on" to the system, rather than an integral
part of the design.
The sophisticated 10 percent of service bureau clients is
prepared to expend the effort and the dollars to make use of the
available mechanisms for two major reasons:
1. They have the ability to understand and make use of these
security mechanisms.
2. They are aware of their vulnerability if no precautions are
taken to protect their programs and data.
u.0 ACTION FOR THE FUTURF
We have described a situation in which a variety of
sophisticated mechanisms exist, but are not widely used. By way of
understanding this situation, we proposed the explanations of
Section 3.0.
Now we reach the stage where we are faced with a decision; a
decision which will set the scene for the immediate future. What
courses of action are open to the service bureau industry?
.One course is simply: Don't do anything.
No one has done very much to date, beyond making security mechanisms
available, and things seem to have worked out fairly well. There have
oeen a few cases of disgruntled users, stolen data sets, and lost
data, but in the main, the situation has been far from serious.
Inaction, however, is not what we advocate. There is a definite
goal that can be set, consisting of two major parts:
1) Ease of use of the available mechanisms be brought to a
level where the average user can understand, and make
effective use of these facilities. This includes:
* make security an integral part of the system, which
will lead to the situation in which security is not an
option. In cases where this is already so - e.g., in
DEC PDP-10 systems in which the hardware access
control features are built into the system - the
default should be no access to anyone other than the
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owner of the file. Explicit specification of security
for cases where sharing is desired is then necessary.
once the optional nature of security is removed, there
will be great pressure to bring about "simple to use"
mechan isms
This is based on the philosophy that the demise of security
as an option will require all users to utilize the
facilities. If the user - the naive user - is forced to use
the facilities, these facilities will have to be suitably
simplified.
2) Education of computer users in general, and service bureau
users in particular, should he directed along such lines as
will result in a general increase in the level of
awareness. There is strong reason to believe that any
program with such intent would be well received, given the
attention currently being paid this topic by a major report
to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (2)o
Legislation in this area is expected to be forthcoming in
the very near future.
5.0 CONCLUSION
In summary, we have determined that many sophisticated security
mechanisms do exist, and are in use by a small percentage of service
bureau users. Their widespread use, however, is clearly not a
reality. Several explanations were offered that attempt to explain
why uso is so low amongst the great majority of service bureau
clients. Chief among these is the general naivete, and lack of
awareness of the average service bureau client.
Finally, we propose that positive steps be taken to educate the
average computer user so as to make him aware of his vulnerability.
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7.0 APPENDIX 1
SERVICE BUREAU QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Three major computer services are listed below. Select the
service(s) which your firm offers, and if there is more than
one, number them in order of importance, 1 = most important,
etc.
time-sharing
batch processing
--_ proprietary programs and/or data bases
2. How many unique user entities does your primary system
recognize? (e.g., in time-sharing, USERID-password
combinations, or in batch processing, account-programmer
combinations)
3. Do you provide services to firms or individuals who are in
direct competition with one another?
_ Yes
___ 
No
4. Rate, on a scale of 1-7, the security-consciousness of your
users regarding their programs and data.
not concerned
about security
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very concerned
about security
5. Rate, on a scale of 1-7, the security-consciousness of your
staff regarding user programs and data.
not concerned
about security
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very concerned
about security
6. Pate, on a scale of 1-7, the security-consciousness of your
staff regarding your own accounting data and proprietary
software.
not concerned
about security
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very concerned
about security
7. It is often true that a few active users consume a large
percentage of a service bureau's resources. Among your users,
taking the most active 10 percent by number, what percentage of
your resources do they consume?
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S. It has been suggested that the most "sophisticated" users of
computers generally indicate future trends for other users. To
what extent do your most sophisticated users make use of
security tchniques (either those provided by the system, or
techniques of their own design)?
no use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 heavy use
9. what brand of mainframe is used for your primary system?
DEC CDC XDS UNIVAC
IBM Burroughs ___ Honeywell
Other (specify):
10. On this system, you use (check one):
Standard Operating System software supplied by vendor.
(Name)
Modified Version of Standard Operating System.
(Name) ....
Your own operating system software.
(Name) -…___--_--_-_-
11. Do you use passwords for user identification?
Yes
No
12. The file system can best be described as:
-_ a master catalog structure, open to access by all users.
a tree structure, with open access for search by all users.
a tree structure with locks at each level.
a decentralized directory structure, with each user's
directory neither known nor accessible to others.
13. Does the operating system permit sharing of files
so that multiple users can concurrently access a single
file in read or write modes?
- so that multiple users may access, but only if they are
all in read-only mode? ,
- so that multiple users may access a file, but only one
user may have it in write mode?
such that only one user at a time may access a given
file?
such that a separate copy of a file is the only means
of sharing?
14. How many simultaneous processes does your primary system
support?
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15. What access do your systems programmers have to user data?
Unrestricted access
--- Restricted access (e.g., by permission of service bureau)
Controlled accoss (e.g., no access except by explicit
permission of the owner).
16. How are the privileges of your systems programmers administered?
Automatically, by association with the user identification.
_ By special password protection.
___ By physical interventions such as special terminals or
lines.
By the standard file system.
Other
17. If your operating system is modified, or of your own design,
note the relative importance of each of the following goals in
your design process. (1'= least important, 10 = most important)
_ improve throughput or service level
maximize number of concurrent processes
___ interface to special equipment
-- _ protect operating system from user processes
increase reliability
___ provide special accounting or billing
_-_ protect system files
protect user files
simplify command language
simplify file access or sharing
18. Which of the following protection mechanisms are currently
available on your system?
Access control lists
Multi-level password protection
Encryption
Memory protect hardware
"Trap" programs activated by certain accesses
. Date protection of files
Read-only access to files
Execute-only access to files
Restricted terminals for special access
_ Periodic automatic backup
Virtual machine capability
--_ Special files containing commands which execute
automatically at every logon. (Profile feature)
19. Rate the ability of your system to insulate itself fom
malicious user tasks.
unprotected 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 completely safe
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20. Pate the ability of your system to insulate concurrent processes
from one another.
unprotected 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 completely safe
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For each of the following situations, choose:
1. Responsibility rests with users
2. Responsibility rests with service bureau
3. Responsibility shared between users and service bureau
4. Responsibility rests with manufacturer of system in use
21. _ User accidentally deletes his own file, and has not provided
a backup copy.
22. ___ System crash destroys an online file belonging to user.
User has not provided backup.
23. A user steals a copy of another user's proprietary program.
24. A staff member steals a copy of user's private data base.
25. A user taps another user's proprietary program by gaining
execute access.
26. ___ An unauthorized person steals a registered user's password,
and plays on the system at that user's expense.
27. .__ An unauthorized person steals a registered user's password,
and causes the system catalog to be destroyed.
28. ___ A user program causes a system crash.
29. __ A user modifies a competitor's program in core while it is
executing.
30. Suppose that your system was modified to implement an access
control matrix, which contained authorization information on
various user-file pairs. The matrix would not be practical if
permission had to be specified for every user-file combination
on the system. For efficiency, there must be a default
condition, against which matrix entries are weighed. Mark one
of the following schemes:
A file is, by default, open to all users, unless
specifically designated as restricted in the access
matrix.
A file is, by default, regarded as the property of its
creator, and no other user may access it in any mole
unless permission is explicitly granted in the
access matrix.
30a. Would you consider such an access matrix a valuable addition to
your system (assume no performance degradation)?
negative value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 positive value
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31. The access control matrix must, of course, be continually
updated to reflect the extension and revocation of privileges,
as well as the addition and deletion of users and files. At
what level should the access matrix be maintained? Check one.
The access matrix should be accessible only to the
system security officer, and all changes should be
aade through this person.
Users should be given the right to set access on any
file which they create. The system administrator should
only install and remove users.
Users should be given the right to set access on any
file which they create. However, the system
administrator, in addition to adding users, also
should have access to all files as a
precautionary measure.
31a. In your opinion, what percentage of your users would make use of
the security features just described, if the default was no
security?
32. Does your system process any data which falls into any of the
following categories (check all that apply)?
sensitive personal data, such as payroll, medical, etc.
data which has a government security classification
__ proprietary corporate information, such as marketing.
33. Are any special precautions taken on your system when data of
this type is processed (leave blank or check all that apply) ?
_ o special precautions
___ All non-essential users barred from system
Special operators used
Special printers used for sensitive output
Other
34. Are you aware of any state or federal statutes which affect your
operations regarding the handling of personal data?
Yes (cite law if possible)
No
35. In what state(s) does your firm operate?
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In the next section, several statements are presented. Mark one of
the five numbers to indicate your agreement or disagreement with each
statement. The numbers are:
1 = strongly agree
2 = agree
3 = neutral
4 = disagree
5 = strongly disagree
Subjects on whom records containing personally identifiable
information are maintained should have the following rights:
36. 1 2 3 4 5 To be informed of the existence of such
records when they are started.
37. 1 2 3 4 5 To review on demand the contents of records
concerning them.
38. 1 2 3 4 5 To correct, rebut, update, and expunge
incorrect or obsolete information concerning
them.
39. 1 2 3 4 5 To be furnished periodically with an
accounting of the uses made of information
concerning them.
40. 1 2 3 4 5 To stop the exchange of information
concerning them among information suppliers.
The following actions regarding data banks containing personally
identifiable data are necessary:
41. 1 2 3 4 5 Registration as to purpose and contents.
42. 1 2 3 4 5 Standards of hardware and software security.
43. 1 2 3 4 5 Standards concerning the acquistion of and
dissemination of information.
44. 1 2 3 4 5 Periodic site inspections.
The following persons and organizations traffiking in personally
identifiable information should be licensed and certified:
45. 1 2 3 4 5 Data bank proprietors.
46. 1 2 3 4 5 Information brokers (suppliers).
47. 1 2 3 4 5 Data processing centers.
48. 1 2 3 4 5 Computer programmers.
49. 1 2 3 4 5 Data gatherers.
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SO. ate, on a scale of 1-7, the ability of currently available
operating systems and hardware to provide adequate security over
the next three years.
inadequate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 adequate
COMM ENTS
Your comments on our questionnaire are solicited, especially as
regards your opinion of its merit as: A) an
information-gathering tool for survey work, and B) a
consciousness-raising device for you as a participant.
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DATA SECURITY IN THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY
Bruce E. Stangle
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
The use of computers in health systems is becoming more
extensive. Currently, computers are used in such varied application
areas as payroll and patient monitoring systems. Because health
expenditures form such a large part of the U.S. Gross National
Product (GNP) and since medical costs have recently risen so rapidly,
it will be important for this sector to develop even more effective
means for applying computer technology in the future. U.S. health
expenditures were 7.4 percent of the GNP in 1971. Furthermore,
health-care costs have been rising at a rate that is twice the
average increase in costs in the economy. This is a more rapid rise
than any other component of the consumer price index. It seems
increasingly important in these times of growth and innovation to
evaluate the cope and breadth of automation so that fundamental
institutions and relationships are maintained despite technical
change. As applications of computers increase, one must recognize
that computers can be subverted for means which were never intended.
The information processing capabilities of the computer allow
health organizations to consider large-scale applications which could
potentially revolutionize patient care, but which also present
serious problems in the area of individual privacy. It is not
outside the realm of possibility that in the future all patient
records from every hospital, clinic, or other health organization
could be shared. The advantages of such a data base are clear when a
doctor must treat a new patient or especially in an emergency when
the doctor is not familiar with the patient's history and the patient
is not able to give this information. Equally as clear, though, is
the potential threat to personal privacy present in such a database.
Without proper protection, the database could be read by anyone with
access to the computer.
The aim of this paper is to analyze and discuss some of the
issues relating to data and information security in the medical
environment. This analysis will include an assessment of the state of
the art in computer usage, a brief review of the literature, a
framework for analysis, a statement of the problem, some tentative
hypotheses, and a discussion of the questionnaire that will be used
to test these hypotheses in a medical setting. It is important to
note that the findings and observations reported herein are part of
an ongoing research effort.
Before proceeding further, it isbest to define some of the
terms that will be used. Data security is a term that denotes safety
or freedom from any threat. Data, itself, can have several states or
qualities. Data can be private, confidential, operational, or public
knowledge. Common threats to data are disclosure, modification, or
destruction whether they be accidental or malicious. Often, such
countermeasures as passwords, encryption, and physical security are
employed against these threats. In Exhibits 1 and 2 these terms are
defined.
At this point it also is useful to provide the reader with some
examples of threats to medical information systems. The following
three scenarios are suggested as possibilities:
1. Many medical facilities have large automated files of
patient demographic information. Suppose a computer
programmer who was heavily in debt decided to sell all
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patient names and addresses to a direct mail advertising
firm.
2. The use of automated patient scheduling systems is
expanding, especially in outpatient or ambulatory clinics.
Doctor's schedules are stored in the computer and can be
accessed or updated via a CRT or television like device.
Consider the impact of appointment information leaks.
Suppose a business firm sends their employees to a clinic
and one of the patients notices on the CRT screen that his
boss is scheduled to see a psychiatrist.
3. Many medical facilities are automating patient medical
records. Assume a patient were allergic to penicillin but
for some reason (data input error, accidental modification,
or deliberate tampering) the patient's automated record
reports no such allergy. The patient goes into shock and
dies after a penicillin innoculation administered by a
doctor who thought the medical record was correct.
These scenarios are meant to offer a context in which to view the
medical data security problem. They represent threats to information
which are possible. It should be noted that many of these same
threats would pertain to non-computer systems as well. The difference
is that with computerized systems one may be able to bring data
security under tighter control and thus successfully deter these
threats.
1.2 STATE OF THF ART IN
EDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Before analyzing medical data security, it is necessary to
assess the extent to which computers are actually being used by those
in the medical community. (For a general overview of current
computer applications in medicine, see Ryan and Monroe (9).) In
order to make a thorough assessment of the state of the art in
computer usage, a series of. field interviews were conducted. Sites
were chosen so that a reasonably diverse set of organizational
criteria could be observed. This diversity will become apparent as
one reads through the brief site visit summaries that follow.
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KeX Definitions and Concepts in Data Security
Private: Data re private if they relate to a specific individual and
should not be known by anyone but that individual. For example, one
could claim that the amount of one's contribution to a charitable
fund was a private matter of concern to no one else.
Ccnfidential: Data are confidential if they can be shared openly
within the context of a professional relationship, i.e.,
doctor-patient, manager-employee, etc. However, the data should not
be available to anyone outside this professional relationship.
Operational: Data are operational if they are needed for the normal
functioning of a business. The information should be available to all
personnel who require the information in order to perform adequately
their job(s) .
Euhblic Knowledge: Data are public knowledge if they can be openly
,known by all persons either within or outside a business.
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'xhibit 2
Common Security Threats and Countermeasures
Common threats against data security are computer installation
sabotage, accidental system breakdown, fraud, embezzlement,
interception errors, disclosure of data, theft, sabotage or
unauthorized copying of data. Data security can be created and
maintained by some or all of the following elements:
Technical Protection automated):
* Computer system integrity (operating system, backup power,
fire protection)
* Remote access control (terminal authorization, user
identification).
· Data encoding (encryption).
Procedural Protection Imanuall
* Physical access control (guards, badges, locks, etc.).
* Data handling rules (offsite storage, written requisition of
storage volumes)
· Program modification rules.
* Input/output separation.
* Input/output controls.
* Audit.
Personnel Protection:
· Preemployment screening.
* Supervision.
* Division of responsibility.
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1.2.1. MEDICAL CENTER 1 (MC1)
MC1 is a ]arge, fee-for-service, specialty clinic that has used
computers for many years to improve the delivery of ambulatory
medical care. Numerous applications have been undertaken on both the
medical side and the management side of operations. Examples of each
Medical _Management
- Medical History - Appointment Making
- Diagnosis History - Billing
- Laboratory - Accounts Receivable
- Research - Payroll and Personnel
- Minnesota ultiphasic - Patient Data Base
Personality Inventory - Budget
- Other Test Results
One of the most important systems for any outpatient facility is its
appointment-making function. Because the amount of physician time
available for scheduling with patients is a critical resource, the
organization must effectively manage this area or face a loss of
revenue. MC1 has developed an online appointment system that permits
coordinators to query doctor availability files while talking on the
phone with patients. Key features of the system are the dynamic
update capability and the automatic generation of numerous hard copy
reports such as the doctor's daily schedule. This system alone has
allowed MC1 to provide service to many more patients without having
to increase manpower substantially.
1.2.2 MEDICAL CENTER 2 (MC2)
MC2 is a university health plan serving over 10,000 students,
staff, and faculty. Currently, MC2 is converting to a new information
system with the following planned features:
1. A patient master file for storing 'details on all patient
activities. Data included would be medical history,
diagnosis, treatment, and follow-up.
2. A pseudo-diagnostic routine would match patient symptoms
with a medical reference file and would suggest to the
physician the possible diagnosis and tests.
3. A general analysis system would scan subsets of the history
file for trends in the health of the patient population and
would evaluate the effectiveness of certain drug
treatments.
4. Anonymous information would be made available to university
researchers wh6 might want to use the clinical data base.
1.2.3 MEDICAL CENTER 3 (MC3)
MC3 is a newly established, prepaid, group practice or more
popularly a health maintenance organization (HMO). HMOs are an
emerging mode of delivering health services that stress the aspects'
of preventive health maintenance and comprehensiveness. An important
application at MC3 is the online medical record system. This is an
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heroic undertaking which has not been successfully implemented at
more than 2 handful of the nation's medical institutions, primarily
because of the unwieldy nature of most medical records. The MC3
approach has been to segment the record into two parts - encounter
reports and status reports. The former detail the results of any
physician visit and the latter summarize the up-to-date health of the
patient.
1.2.4 MEDICAL CENTER 4 (MC4)
MC4 is a large, urban, voluntary hospital. Within MC4 are two
separate information processing centers. One unit focuses entirely
on medical applications, while another develops administrative
systems. For the past decade both groups have been working on
innovative methods of applying computer technology to delivering
ia-patient medical care. An important product of this effort is a
high-level, interpretative, computer language with special
hospital-related features. Some of the representative systems
tackled by the MC4 medical unit are:
-Clinical Laboratory System
-Sequential Problem Solving
-Computer-Based Examinations for Medical Students
-Radiology Report Generation System
-Computer-Based edical Record for Intensive Care Unit
-Computer-Assisted Acute Respiratory Care
-Diabetic Ketoacidosis Program
Many of these systems although initially developed at MC4 are now
being implemented at other medical centers throughout the country.
These, then, are the four organizations that were visited by the
study team. The sites were selected both for their diversity in
objectives and for their pursuit of effective computer applications
to medicine. "hese visits demonstrated that a dichotomy exists in
most medical information systems between applications primarily in
support of management or administration and applications primarily in
support of delivery of medical care. The knowledge gained from these
visits facilitated the construction of a framework suitable for
analyzing the security issue in medical organizations. Before we
consider this framework, however, a brief review of the literature of
medical data security is needed.
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1.3 PAST EFFOPTS IN MEDICAL DATA SECURITY
Not a great deal of work has been done specifically in the realm
of data security in the medical community. The majority of the
efforts to date have a strong legalistic bent and expound upon the
importance of maintaining basic patient rights to privacy.
Curran et al. (2) advocate the adoption of a code of ethics and
clearly defined rules and regulations to govern the protection of
information in all health data systems. A similar recommendation is
made by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
in its request for a Code of Fair Information Practice (7). The key
safeguard requirements of this proposed HEW code are:
* There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose
very existence is secret.
* There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
* There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or
made available for other purposes without his consent.
* There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him.
* Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must
assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and
must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
Debate on the merits of these recommendations is under way in
Zongress, and reliable opinion is that a law may be passed soon in
this area.
Freed (4) takes an in depth look at the legal aspects of using
computers in medicine. He expresses that because hospital record
systems offer less valuable returns than such computer crimes as
check or credit forgery, less rigorous security systems will probably
be acceptable in automated health systems.
Two instances of private institutions analyzing the problem of
information security have been reported by Hulac (5) and Davis (3).
The former describes an urban, comprehensive, health system in
Denver, Colorado. A list of standards for ensuring the proper
handling of patient data is presented. The latter reports on the
Kaiser-Permanente Health System, a large, nationwide, prepaid, group
practice, that has been very active in the application of computer
technology to medicine.
Except for the above, the area of medical information security
has received little attention (1, 6, 10, 11, 13, and 14). Our
present intention is to provide a more systematic analysis of the
requirements for data security in the medical industry. To achieve
this end it is necessary to compile a framework suitable for
analyzing health information systems.
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2.1 ANALYTIC FR AMEWO RK
From a study of numerous user sites in various industries, an
MIT Sloan group (1'2) developed a framework consisting of these major
components:
1. Organizational Environment
2.. Data Environment
3. Technological Environment
The major policy variable to be analyzed is the amount of
requisite security for any given information system. Security
features have some cost associated with them. The amount of time and
money expended on security by an organization is strictly a function
of the three independent variables: organization, data, nd
technology. By carefully examining the dependent variable, security
requirements, in this manner one is then able to make comparisons
across organizations and across groups within the same organization.
We will return to this later.
At least four means are available for expressing the
organizational variable. These measures are organizational activity,
Organizational size, organizational goals, and organizational
structure. In the health sector a great diversity exists across each
of these measures. For example, although all medical organizations
are concerned with the improvement or maintenance of health, this
goal can he met by any number of activities. Some organizations
serve only a small group of patients; others try to meet the needs of
entire communities. Many organizations are active in providing
inpatient (hospital-based) care and others concentrate on outpatient
'or ambulatory care.
With respect to the second independent variable, data, there are
two dimensions which describe its nature. These are data types and
data attributes. Data types refer to data which are either personal
(i.e., medical histories) or not personal (i.e., software). The
distinction here is sharp: either data are personal or they are not.
Data attributes, on the other hand, are more relative as they refer
to the private, confidential, operational, or public nature of the
data (see xhibit 1). In health systems there are generally large
files of personal data relating to all aspects of a patient's medical
and financial history. With the high demand for these data by
different groups with varying needs-to-know, it becomes an important
matter if one can differentiate on a confidentiality scale between
personal data relating to diagnoses and personal data relating to
payments. In other words, to construct the data access rights for any
information system, one must, first; determine who the individuals or
groups are that require access, second, the attributes of the data
must be rigorously specified, and third, the links between data
attributes and individuals can then be mapped out.
The third independent variable, technology, is included because
it is clear that the need for security can be to a large extent
dictated by the type of installed configuration. For example, a time
sharing system using remote terminals connected to a computer via
telephone lines has a number of security threats to deal with that do
not exist in a batch system which is physically isolated from the
outside world, Similarly, the operating systems of the major
computer manufacturers generally are more or less vulnerable to
different threats.
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This then is a framework which facilitates data security
analysis. The three key independent variables of organization, data
and technology are the major determinants of a user's requirements
for data security. We now turn to an application of this framework.
2.2 METHODOLOGY
Any scientific investigation moves from initial observations
about some condition to more refined, general statements that attempt
to explain the nature of a system. This process of defining the
problem, testing the hypotheses, and stating the theory has been
employed in this analysis as well. Before we could adequately define
the problem, however, it was necessary to talk at length with those
in the field who were working with medical information systems.
Numerous interviews were conducted with physicians and managers in
health organizations actively involved in automating the process of
delivering medical care. From these discussions emerged a good
feeling for the problems concomitant with using computers in
medicine. The best way to state the problem is that current users of
computer technology are uncertain as to what level of security is
needed for their system. This uncertainty exists because computer
growth in the industry has been rapid with an attendant lack of
planning for security. Uncertainty also exists due to the general
lack of experience with data security risks.
2.2.1 HYPOTHESFS
In order to examine the dimensions of this problem we developed
a number of hypotheses. Some of the hypotheses are general in that
they apply to data security in any context whether it be the
financial, educational, or medical setting. Other hypotheses relate
more specifically to the problem of medical data security. The more
general hypotheses are:
G.H1: Security demanded by a user is a function of the user's
awareness of security as a problem.
G. H2: In an organization an individual's proximity (in terms of
job function) to the computer system will determine his
awareness of security as a problem.
G.H3: Differences in levels of security awareness and in
approaches to the security problem are a function of the
nature of processing in an industry and the perceived
value of the information being processed.
Besides making inferences from these, an important part of our
work has been to investigate the special problems of the medical
industry. From our work in the field, it became clear that the
following areas warranted further study:
* The threat of computers to confidential relationships.
* The perceived adequacy of present medical data security
systems.
· The sensitive nature of medical data.
· The access rights of different individuals to medical data.
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These four areas o concern capture the essence of the uncertainty
problem.
-The above areas can be stated more formally as testable
hypotheses. These are the hypotheses specific to the medical
industry:
M.H1: Computers by their very nature are perceived as a threat
to confidential relationships, e.g., physician-patient,
manager-employee.
M.H2: As computer usage expands in the industry in the future,
there will be an ever increasing need for security.
M. H3: In a Medical/Management Information System numerous types
of data are processed and stored from employee payroll to
patient diagnosis. These data items are fundamentally
different in nature and content, some being public
knowledge and others being highly confidential. It is
hypothesized that:
1) these different data types can be identified,
2) the different data types have varying needs for
security due to their various degrees of
sensitivity, and
3) the access rights of an employee to different types
of data is a function of his need to know and the
relative sensitivity of the data.
M.H4: Most physicians and managers see the role of the computer
dramatically expanding in their institutions over the
next few years. As this growth takes place it will be
incumbent upon computer manufacturers to provide
assurances to medical users that information can be
secure from interference. Without these assurances, the
medical industry may become even more concerned that
security threats constitute potential breaches of medical
ethics.
2.2.2 PRINCIPLES OF MEASUREMENT
In order to test these hypotheses, many of which deal with
attitudes, it was necessary to construct a measurement tool. This
tool had to adhere to a prescribed set of rinciples. Let us examine
these principles briefly before going on to consider the tool itself.
(For a more detailed discussion of this entire subject, see Oppenheim
(8) which is summarized below.)
1. Undimensionality 'or homogeneity -- One thing at a time must
be measured not three. If one is measuring length then you
cannot measure temperature or viscosity. A problem with
attitudes is that questions may stimulate numerous
unmeasurable (or unanticipated) responses.
2. Linearity and equal intervals or equal-appearing intervals
-- A scale should follow the straight line model and a
scoring system should be devised with interchangeable
units. Attitude scales assume linearity (although this may
be inadequate), but the creation of scoring units is
difficult, and they are not generally interchangeable.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology102 Volume 
3. Reliability -- Measurements taken today and next week
should be identical provided the object. has not changed.
Consistency can be achieved by greater length and diversity
in attitude scales, but complete consistency is difficult
to achieve since people are bound to react differently to a
scale when they are confronted with it a second time.
4. Validity -- Are we measuring what we thought we were
measuring? One may obtain unidimensionality by keeping
only those items which intercorrelate highly, yet the scale
may not measure what we want it to measure. For example,
instead of measuring authoritarianism it may just be a
measure of acquiescence.
5. Reproducibility -- This principle relates to a continuum of
attitudes and cumulative scaling. This may not be required
when dealing with constant and interchangeable units, such
as pounds or inches, but, say, if one is dealing with
symptoms of a disease it is helpful if the symptoms could
be scaled in terms of seriousness. In that way the
presence of symptom D would dictate that a patient also
must have symptoms A, B, and C.
In attitude research with questionnaires these five principles must
be observed. Now, we proceed to consider the actual measurement
tool.
3.1 THE SECURITY ATTITUDE SURVEY
We have stated the problem with respect to data security in
medical information systoms, and we have presented a list of
hypotheses to e tented. The actual test of these hypotheses is
achieved by administering a set of questions to those who work
directly in the medical community. We have put together a five-part
Security Attitude Survey which assesses the needs of a particular
organization for data security (see Appendix for the complete
document) . The questionnaire is divided into sections as follows:
1. Computer utilization -- this section reveals the extent of
the subject's familiarity with computers and any biases pro.
or con they may have toward computers in medicine.
2. Security and Privacy in the 1970's -- these questions deal
with general topics about perceived threats of computers to
confidential relationships and the security of computerized
data vis a vis other forms of data.
3. Computer Security at the Medical Center -- this section
asks the subject to specify the nature of a given number of
data items. The respondent must differentiate between data
which are private, confidential, operational, and public
knowledge. Next, the relative sensitivity of each data
item is rated on a scale from extremely important to
extremely unimportant. Finally, an access control matrix
is presented which requires that a type of access be
specified for each person to each data item. For example,
all employees may be permitted to have access only to
summaries of patient diagnoses. This is the most crucial
section of the questionnaire.
4. Respondent Profile -- Job functions and years of employment
are queried.
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5. Comments.
This tool has been extensively pre-tested to eliminate
ambiguity in wording and to further refine the measures, i.e., as far
as possible we have adheto d to the principles of measurement. It is
now being administered to a sample of physicians and managers at a
health institution in the Boston area. Results from this test and
from tests at another site will be forthcoming, thus allowing for the
rejection or acceptance of the underlying hypotheses.
4.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has sought to describe an on-going research project
dealing with data security in the medical environment. Results of
several site visits have been forwarded as a means for establishing
the state of the art in medical information systems. The literature
on the subject, sparse as it is, has been reviewed. A framework for
analyzing the matter of data security has been described. It was
stated that the major problem with medical data security is the
uncertainty surrounding the decision as to the required level and
degree of security. A number of general and specific hypotheses have
been advanced which seek to explain the data security problem. These
hypotheses are currently being tested by means of questionnaire
research. Once the responses are in and have been analyzed, a
thorough report of the findings of this study can be made.
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6.1 APPENDIX
Security Attitude Survey
The Medical Center (MC)
As you know the Medical Center has been doing things with computers
for a number of years. Currently the computer is used to help in
such different areas as printing the payroll, assisting in the
appointment scheduling process, and recording answers to patient
medical histories. It is probably quite likely that you have had
several experiences in the past with the Medical Center computer
system.
This questionnaire is designed to survey your attitude on some of the
important issues raised by the uses of computers in medical
organizations. Please complete the questions as carefully as
possible. Less than thirty minutes of your time will be required to
finish the survey.
A.rjt_L: Computer Utilization
1. My work is such that I often come in contact with computerized
information. (Circle one.)
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
2. The use of computers in medicine offers little promise for
providing a higher level of care to patients and for achieving
greater efficiency in managing health institutions.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
3. In the next few years at the Medical Center, the computer will
play a larger and larger role in assisting in the delivery and
management. of health care.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
Parl_2: Security and Privacy in the 1970's
1. In general, I am quite concerned about such things as security
leaks, bugging, and the invasion of privacy.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
2. The computerization of information increases the likelihood that
such data will be used for unintended purposes. In other words,
automated data is more susceptible than other data to either
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accidental or intentional disclosure, modification, or
destruction.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
3. The use of computers in health organizations poses a threat to
the confidential relationship between a doctor and patient.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
4. The use of computers in health organizations poses a threat to
the confidential relationship between a manager and employee.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
5. If you want to make sure that information is kept from the
knowledge of others, then it is better to keep information in
written form and lock it in your desk rather than storing the
information in a computer.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree
.art_: Computer Security at the Medical Center
1. How would you rate the present Medical Center system with
respect to the security of computerized information? (Note: If
you feel unequipped to answer this question, leave it blank.)
Excellent Poor
5 4 3 2 1
2. In the Medical Center computer system there are basically two
types of information, medical and administrative. The two
columns at the bottom of this page present examples of these
data types. One method of ranking the sensitivity of a
* particular item of data is shown in lettered code below. How
would you scale the sensitivity of each type of data? In
answering this question, use the following code by putting the
correct letter next to each data type.
Code
Letter Code Description
P These data are .rivate in that they relate to a specific
individual and should not be known by anyone but that
individual. For example, one could claim that the amount of
one's contribution to a charitable fund was a private matter
of concern to no one else.
C These data are confidential in that they should be shared
openly within the context of a professional relationship;
i.e. doctor-patient, employee-manager, etc. However, the data
should not be available to anyone outside of this
confidential relationship.
0 These data are operational and are necessary for the normal
functioning of the Medical Center. The information should be
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available to al personnel who require the information in
order to perform adequately their job(s).
rhese data are eneral knowledge for all persons either
within or outside the Medical Center.
None of the above.
Medical Data Administrative Data
Code
Data Type Letter Data TpeR e p o s e t o_ _u t_ _at e d
Responses to Automated
Medical History
Diagnoses
Lab test results
Personality inventory
results (MMPI)
Services rendered to
a patient
Name and address of
patient's local MD
Patient surgical
procedures
Payroll data--name,
check amount,
deductions, etc.
Patient names,
addresses, phone
numbers., etc.
Appointment data--MC
MD, availability,
bookings
Patient billing and
payment history
Blue Shield codes for
Medical Center services
Prices of all medical ctr
services procedures
Total revenue
generated by a staff
member
3. Computers like people, are both fallible and vulnerable. For
instance, it is possible to intercept or disrupt the
transmission of computerized data. As protection certain
security mechanisms have been developed which can deter the
threat of accidental or intentional disclosure, modification, or
destruction of information.
You have just scaled the relative sensitivity of several data
items. The next question is, how important is it that these
same data items be secure from interference of the above
mentioned threats? To answer this, enter a number from 1 to 5
which signifies the relative importance of security for the
particular data type.
Extremely
Important
5 4i
Medical Data
3 2
Extremely
Unimportant
1
Administrative Data
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Code
Number Data Te
Responses to Automated
Medical History
…..... Diagnoses
_____ Lab test results
…___ _…Personality inventory
results (MMPI)
Services rendered to
a patient
Name and address of
patient's local MD
Patient surgical
procedures
Code
Number Dat a_Tye
…_____ Payroll data--name,
check amount,
deductions, etc.
Patient names,
addresses, phone
numbers, etc.
Appointment data--MC
MD, availability,
bookings
Patient billing and
payment history
Blue Shield codes for
Medical Center services
Prices of all medical ctr
services procedures
Total revenue
generated by a staff
member
In many computer systems security mechanisms exist whereby
certain types of data can be assigned different kinds of access
according to various functions, "needs to know", or levels of
authority. For example, technological capabilities are such
that an automated record can be fully disclosed to one
individual, while only a portion of the same record is displayed
to another person. One can easily conceive of a situation in
which this capability would be useful; on a newspaper it is
likely that a sports editor would need to have access to
different information than a fashion editor. Keeping in mind
the needs and constraints of the Medical Center, what types of
information would you allow each type of person named in the
matrix on page 6 (of this Questionnaire) to access?
In order to complete this final (but most critical) question,
please fill in the matrix on the next page. The rows in the
matrix correspond to the data types of the previous two
questions, and the columns refer to those who either should or
should not have access to each particular type of data. Enter
the appropriate number in the box under each "type of person"
according to the type of access which you believe should apply
to that type of data.
To indicate your opinion as to the access rights of each type of
person please use the following codes.
Code
Number
_____ 
_
Code Description
This type of person should have routine access to any of this
data.
This type of person should have routine access only to
summarized data of this class; e.g. data which could not be
connected to a particular erson.
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A This type of person should have special access to some of
this class of data provided appropriate authorization has
been granted.
This type of person should have absolutely no access to this
type of data at any time.
If the list of codes seems inadequate for a certain situation,
then simply leave that box blank or make any comments you wish.
To illustrate how this coding might work a portion f a
completed matrix is shown below. In this particular case it was
felt that all Medical Center employees (in general) should not
have access to patient diagnoses or lab test results. Thus
there are "4" (no access) codes next to these data types. Also
it was felt that Medical Center prices could be widely known by
all employees, so there is a "1" (routine access) code for that
item.
Now go on to the next page to complete the matrix.I
IAll M.C. I
I I
Patient diagnoses I 4 I
Lab test rresults I 4
__Prices____... rvices I 1__
Prices of m.c. services I 1 1
_,,L! _ _____
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IA. I B. IC. ID. I E.IF. G. I H.1I.I J. 1K.I L. I M. I N. I
Responses to Automated I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Medical History I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Patient diagnoses I I I I I I I I I
Lab test results
Personality inventory
results (MMPI)
L 1--l i L111JJ AJ-I- I I 1 1f - 1 .j
I I 
I I I 
I I 1
I I I 
I I I
I I I
I I I
I I I
i I 1 I
I I I I I
I I I I I
I1 I 11 I
I I
I I
I I
I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I i I I I
Services rendered to a I I
patient I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
,,,,,_,~,__._____ _ __ ___________ ___l__ _L__l____l_
Name and address of I I I I I I I I I
patient's local MD I I I I I I I I I
Patient surgical I
procedures I I I I I I I I I I I I
Payroll data--name, I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
check amount, etc. I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Patient names, addresses,l I I I I I I I I I I I I I
phone numbers, etc. I I I I I I I I I i I
J-.__L--___ _-_ .__. LI________.lL__
Appointment data-m.c. MD, I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
availability, bookings I I I I I I I I 
Patient billing and I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
payment history I I I I I I I I I I !
Blue Shield codes for I I I I I I I I 
Sedical Center services I I I I I I I I I I I
Prices of all medical ctrl I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I
services I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Total revenue generated I I I I II i I i I I I i I
by each staff member I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l
_ ~ ~ ·- ___________ 1 ··- _II 1II -__ 1_1 tl __1__1 -
A. Director of Medical Center Research
B. Medical Center Staff Department Chairmen
C. All Medical Center physicians
D. Only certain Medical Center physicians*
E.' All Medical Center nurses
P. Only certain Medical Center nurses*
G. Director of Medical Center Data Processing Appt. Office
H. Director of Medical Center Laboratory
I. All Medical Center managers
J. Only certain Medical Center managers*
K. All Medical Center employees
L. Only certain Medical Center employees*
M. General public
N. Only certain outside parties (BC/BS, etc)*
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* "Only certain....." refers to those who in the course of their
job would be intimately concerned with a particular situation
whether it be treating a particular patient, managing a
particular employee, etc.
Ear_L: Despondent Profile
1.. Position with Medical Center (check one).
Staff
Man agement
2. Years of employment with the Medical Center
... less than 1 year
____ 1-2 years
.... 2-5 years
5-10 years
over 10 years
Part 5 : Comments
Thank you for taking time to complete this questionnaire. If you are
interested in the results, I would be glad to supply you with a copy.
Any comments you might have on the administration or content of this
survey can be made below.
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INTRODUCTION
Of all users of automated administrative data processing, the
financial community has the longest tradition and experience. Most
banks, insurance companies, investment and brokerage houses, and
other financial institutions have used computers extensively for the
past twenty years. Long experience in a field naturally creates
expectations of knowledge, sophistication, and advanced methods. It
was therefore with considerable excitement and interest that we took
a close look at data security as it is found in the financial
community.
The target of our analysis was not so much what we could see at
sach computer installation. We were less interested in the way
things are and appear to be, and more interested in the way things
are going to be, judged from a managerial viewpoint. In our survey,
we were concerned with the managerial attitudes toward the increasing
and changing nature of data automation. What do managers in
organizations strongly based on automated data processing think of
data security today, and what changes do they anticipate in the
future? What do managers think of the relative importance of
different kinds of protective measures? How concerned are the
organizations' clients with data security? What organizational
changes do managers foresee as a result of increased data security
considerations? These were some of the questions we asked the
financial community. The answers that we obtained are discussed in
this paper. Before this discussion, however, a short historical
review of data processing in the financial world is in place.
HISTORICAL PEVIEW
The evolution of automatic data processing in banks, insurance
companies, and investment companies has been long, diverse, and
unpredictable. Two distinct phases in this evolution are
discernible, however.
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PHASE ONE
The initial efforts in automation in the financial community
took place in the late 1950's. Typical of this first phase
transformation of information processing in the industry was the
conversion of basic clerical functions. The primary goal was to
reduce costs and to develop a capacity to absorb the ever-increasing
work load. During the period from 1940 to 1955, business
institutions experienced a "transactional surge" (exemplified by the
increase in numbers of checks written, telephones in use, social
security payments, tax returns filed, airline passengers, and so
forth). The computer was unleashed to handle this transactional
surge. The Phase One projects represented a degree of challenge, but
they did not require, nor did they attract the talents and
involvement of top management. The impact on top management's
thinking, Flanning, and decision making, and overall organizational
structure was minimal. There was a strong tendency to view the new
groups of systems designers and programmers as a necessary evil,
relegating their work to second-level status and, in many cases,
associating it with the historic clerical joDs it replaced. The
impact of the new systems was limited primarily within each
organization, and there were few, if any, competitive advantages to
being a leader.
The role of data security in Phase One is close in impact and
profundity to the tasks and projects implemented on the computer
system in the same phase of information processing. Concurrent with
the first changes toward automation was the attention given to the
most obvious needs for protection of data. The computer installation
and the data storage media were the vulnerable objects of the first
era because they were the new and obvious elements of the changed
processing concept (the people who did the processing and handling of
data were often recruited from other departments within the
organization). The computer site became protected against such
dangers as fire, flooding, heat, and power failure. A new small
industry sprang up, providing fireproof file cabinets for storage of
punched cards and magnetic tapes, and the organizations fabricated
extensive backup procedures and data duplication combined with
offsite storage in remote locations.
As more and more of the transactional surge was transferred to
the computer, new types of educated specialists became common in the
financial community: the computer operator, the computer programmer,
and the Management Information Systems (MIS) analyst. These
specialists often knew little about the organization and its data,
and were considered separated in job, responsibility, and
remuneration, from the rest of the people in the organization.
Because of the increasing awareness of the potential dangers of
having large amounts of data kept at one concentrated point, internal
auditors pointed out that those who created the computer programs
should be separated from those whose job it was to run the programs.
Thus, it became commonplace to insist that only the computer
operators had the right to be in the computer room during production
processing. Of course, because of tight time-scheduling, this was
sometimes hard to enforce. After all, programmers did need testing
opportunities for their programs. An attempt to overcome this was
the setup of a "closed shop" testing procedure. In some instances, a
remote terminal for testing purposes was acquired.
The initial concerns with data security were mostly induced by
the fear of either loss of data through physical damage or theft, or
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accidental destruction through errors and mistakes. Later came the
recognition of needs of protecting certain particularly sensitive
kinds of data against disclosure (for example, browsing and copying)
and modification (for example, fraud and embezzlement). A
safeguarded data archive was created, and data acquisition procedures
were brought into use. In principle, data volumes were strongly
guarded, though often not in reality.
Next came two important developments in data security. The
first was caused by the spreading ue of online systems with a large
number of terminals outside the usual, controlled domain of the
computer room. Ways of verifying that an authorized person was using
a terminal became common to prevent errors and mistakes, and also to
discourage attempts by unauthorized personnel to make intentional,
illegal changes in data. Password identification and authentication
were now necessary parts of proceo;sing. This often became a
sophisticated way of distinguishing between different rights to data
manipulation of different individuals. Some could create new data
and change existing data, and others were only allowed to see certain
portions of a file record.
The second important development in the security arena was the
intensive refinement of the physical safeguards for computer
facilities. This consisted of techniques such as security guards,
television monitors, special locks requiring identification cards,
and pushbutton combinations. This was partly a response to the
publicity given such things as sabotage of computers, and partly
because of the increased independence and organizational separation
of the data processing department.
PHASE TWO
Many companies in the financial community today are in Phase
One. Thifn is true both tin trml of data processing development and
with rgard to ata security protoction systems and procedures. A
number of financial institutions, however, are on their way into
Phase Two of data processing. This phase has begun with automated
cost reporting, budgeting, profit planning, and, in some cases,
incentive systems. Portfolio management centered around coded
objectives, security analysis, bond trade analysis, and investment
analysis are being transferred to computers. A whole new aspect of
data processing has evolved with the centralized administration and
validation of credit cards. Checks begin to show early signs of
ultimate elimination because of the growth of direct transfers and
debits. Automatic securities transfer has also been introduced. The
cashless, checkless society is slowly becoming a reality.
The impact of these changes in the financial community will have
profound effects throughout society. Where Phase One was mostly the
automation of well-established and well-defined procedures, Phase Two
will need strong managerial support and skills. New business
policies will emerge, and structural changes in organizations will
result.
An example of the latter is the creation of the so-called
"automated services division." This division is usually created as a
single profit center within the organization. In addition to serving
in-house customers, an increasing part of its revenue will come from
sales of data processing services to outside organizations, often
customers of the main line of the business (for example, banking and
insurance). The automated services division can, in addition to
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providing such common services as financial accounting and payroll
administration, also grant customer access to valuable data about the
economy and selected industry sectors, initially compiled and updated
by the financial institution for its own internal purposes.
What developments and changes in data security are likely to
occur, as Phase Two extends its effects? In other words, to what
extent are the security precautions of Phase One, such as current
personnel and procedural protection and employed hardware and
software safeguards, insufficient? It is not within the scope of
this paper to delve into the complexities of hardware and software
protection in such terms as voice-print patterns, read-only memory,
residual data, antibugging and anti-interception devices.
Here it is more to our interest to see if it is possible to
point to the changes, if any, in future data security in the
financial community. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper,
we have done this by asking questions of managers in the financial
community. We did this by means of a questionnaire survey of a
number of managers in several selected financial institutions.
ZH_ SURSY
Forty-two managers in five different financial institutions
(three banks, one mutual -funds company, and one life insurance
company) in the Boston area participated in the study. Seventeen of
these managers were responsible for information-processing-related
functions, such as systems design and development, programming,
program maintenance, computer operations and internal data processing
education, or they were in processing-related functions as liaison to
the users of processing services in the organization. We shall call
these individuals technical managers. The other 25 managers had
responsibilities in data user areas such as auditing, treasury,
controllership, personal trust, insurance, deposit accounting and
actuary functions. We shall refer to these individuals as
nontechnical managers.
The method of surveying was through a standard paper-and-pencil
questionnaire, distributed to each individual, to be completed
independently with no interference from superiors or subordinates.
lost of the answers were given on a 1 to 5 scale. The five values of
the scale can be characterized in a number of ways, depending on the
nature of the question. Examples are: 1 = Low, 2 = Quite Low, 3 =
Medium, 4 = Quite High, 5 = High; or: 1 = Not At All, 2 = A Little, 3
- Somewhat, = A Lot, 5 = Fully.
The questionnaire contained, as a point of reference, an
explanation of certain often-used terms. Three different kinds of
data security were defined: technical, procedural, and personnel.
Exhibit 1 shows some examples of these three categories.
Furthermore, in some of the questions, a distinction was made between
disclosure (for example, illegal browsing) and destruction or
modification of data (for example, fraud). Exhibit 2 gives examples
of the meaning of these terms. The questionnaire with the aggregated
findings is shown in the Appendix. (The discussion in the following
sections is based on the responses given to the questions in this
questionnaire.)
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exhibit 1
.omm6n ecurit _Threats and Countermeasures
Common threats against data security are computer installation
sabotage, accidental system breakdown, fraud, embezzlement,
interception errors, disclosure of data, theft, sabotage, or
unauthorized copying of data. Data security can be created and
maintained by some or all of the following elements:
Technical Protection_ automatedi:
* Computer system integrity (for example, operating system,
backup power and fire protection)
* Remote access control (for example, terminal authorization,
user identification)
* Data encoding (for example, encryption).
Procedural Protection _jmanualL:
* . Physical access control (for example, guards, badges and
locks)
* Data handling rules (for example, offsite storage written
requisition of storage volumes)
Program modification rules
· Input/output separation
* Input/output controls
· Audit.
Ersonnel Protection:
· Preemployment screening
· Supervision
· Division of responsibility.
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Exhibit 2
Data Disclosure: The revelation to an
unauthorized party of data possessing a
certain confidentiality. Examples of such
data are client names and addresses, credit
data and payroll data.
Data_Modification or Destruction: Accidental
or intentional acts performed on data, and
resulting in undesirable change or loss of
data. Examples of such acts are errors,
system malfunction, sabotage, fraud and
embezzlement.
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MANAGFPS' ATTITUDES ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF COMPUTERIZATION
It was anticipated that most managers would feel quite
comfortable about computer-based data processing. It was also
expected that managers would be more concerned with the dangers of
data destruction and modification than with the dangers of data
disclosure. The survey confirmed this. (See questions 1.1 and II.1
in the Appendix.) Two-thirds of the managers surveyed were of the
belief that computerization does not increase the likelihood of data
disclosure. The technical managers were particularly of this
opinion. When asked about the chance of data destruction or
modification created by the usage of computers, the feelings were
slightly different. The perceived likelihood for security violation
here (for example, fraud or embezzlement) was higher than for
disclosure. Twenty-seven percent believed that the chance of
destruction or modification was considerable. The majority of those
who believed so was nontechnical (only 18 percent of the technical
managers thought so, while more than one-third of the nontechnical
managers were of this belief).
An explanation of the generally higher perceived risk of
violations such as fraud and embezzlement as compared to the risk of
disclosure can be that managers more frequently referred to bad
experiences from cases of computer-aided fraud and embezzlement in
their organizations than to bad experiences from harmful disclosure
of computerized data. Also, this finding may reflect that fraud is
considered more harmful to organizations than disclosure.
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AT PLANNING STAGE
To the question of hat the managers' attitudes were toward data
disclosure are in general, 78 percent said that they were medium to
highly concerned with this issue. (See questions 1.2 - 1.5 and 11.2 -
1I.4 in the Appendix.) As one manager said, "You may get away with
telling others what diseases a person has, but you can never reveal
how much money he has in his bank account!" (This remark should not
be taken as indicative of the author's view of the relative
importance of protecting medical and financial data.) The concern
for data disclosure has been on the upswing over the past three
years, according to two-thirds of the managers, but one-third has not
noted any recent change in their concern for disclosure. Major
reasons for the change have been an overall trend in society, and the
increasing degree of computerization, often combined with the desire
for faster data processing. Personal ethics and company-wide
policies were other reasons given for the concern for data
disclosure.
Little change in attitude toward disclosure is expected in the
near future, that is, the next three years. Two-thirds of the
managers believe that the concern for data disclosure will remain
unchanged.
The change in the managers' concern for fraud and embezzlement
has typically been increasing much more than the concern for
disclosure. Almost seven out of ten managers characterized their
change in concern for fraud and embezzlement as either "more" or
"much more" when asked about the changes over the past three years.
The major reason given for this was the increase in degree of
computerization of data. Some managers attributed the increase to
factors such as "company-wide trend," the demand for faster
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processing operations, and personal experience with cases of
computer-aided fraud or embezzlement.
The anticipated risk of security breach caused by the
computerization of data was reflected in the considerations given in
the planning stage of system development. Here, again, opinions were
that disclosure is lss of a otential danger than fraud and
embezzlement. Protection against fraud and embezzlement was
characterized as "considerable" to "extensive" by 70 percent, but the
similar figure for the planning of protection against data disclosure
was only 49 percent. A majority of managers felt that the security
considerations in their organizations against disclosure was "medium"
to "uite high."
IATCH BETWEEN MANAGERS' ATTITUDES
AND ACTUAL PROTECTIVE MFASURES
The managers were asked if they felt that their concern for data
security was adequately matched by three different types of security
precautions: technical, procedural, and personnel (See Exhibit 1 for
examples of these three.) Again, a distinction was made between
Disclosure and destruction or modification. (See Exhibit 2 for
examples.)
The protection of data from disclosure by technical measures was
predominantly (85 percent of the responses) in the range of "somewhat
adequate" to "fully adequate." (See questions 1.7 and II.5 in the
Appendix.) It was mostly nontechnical managers (68 percent) who were
willing to state that their current information systems were "quite"
to "fully" adequate. Only 35 prcent of the technical managers felt
this degree of adequacy of the technical precautions. Assuming that
technical and nontechnical managers have understood the question the
same way, this finding points in an affirmative direction to the
psychological findings manifested in the attribution theory.
Psychologists believe that one way individuals evaluate the
motivations and behavior of others is by attributing to them the same
knowledge, values, and feelings that they themselves have.
Consequently, the technical manager whose proximity to the computer
provides him with the knowledge of the many ways the system can be
compromised is likely to have this knowledge influence his
attribution process.
Consequently, our survey seems to confirm the hypothesis that a
manager's concern for data security is a function of the manager's
awareness of data security as a problem. Obviously, technical
managers are more aware of technical problems and shortcomings in the
area of data security than nontechnical managers. Consequently, the
technical managers are more likely to feel any existing inadequacies
of technical precautions.
A similar result was found in the match between concern for
destruction or modification, and technically oriented precautions.
Ninety percent of all respondents believed that technical precautions
covered their concerns "somewhat" to "fully" adequately. Of those
who felt that the match was "quite" to "fully" adequate, the majority
were nontechnical managers.
Speaking of data disclosure, the managers felt that procedural
protection was more efficient than personnel protection. One-half of
the managers believed that data procedures, controls, and audits did
a "quite" to "fully" adequate job of protection. Only one-third
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would admit to the same opinion of personnel precautions, such as
preemployment screening, supervision, and division of responsibility.
We then asked the managers of the effectiveness of nontechnical
precautions in the prevention of data destruction or modification
(here meaning largely computer-aided fraud or embezzlement). The
prevailing opinion was that personnel and procedural countermeasures
are equally effective. However, personnel precautions were only
believed "fully" adequate by 15 percent, and procedural precautions
were considered "fully" adequate by 23 percent.
CLIENTS' SECURITY AWARNESS AND SPECIFIC SECURITY DEMANDS
Clients are perceived by management to be very concerned with
data security, but specific requirements have rarely been set forth.
This was the finding of our survey with regard to clients' data
security awareness and demands. (See questions I.8 and I.9 in the
Appendix.) Two-thirds of the managers believed that their clients
were "very" or "quite" concerned with the prevention of disclosure of
private data (for example, depository accounts, portfolio data,
operating data and payroll or insurance data). Only 20 percent
thought their clients to be little concerned with security. Of these
20 percent, the majority were technical managers. A possible
explanation of this surprising finding may be that technical managers
are not in direct contact with clients and, therefore, do not have an
accurate feeling for their needs.
Despite our observations of high client concern, few specific
security measures have been demanded by the clients. More than half
of the managers said that they had never or rarely come across such
client demands. Of the 15 percent of the managers who said that they
had experienced demands "quite often," all of them were in
nontechnical business functions. This result may again point to the
fact that nontechnical managers are in more direct contact with
customers than technical managers. Furthermore, there is evidence
that demand for security from clients; more often is posed by
procedural and personnel precautions than about strictly
computer-technical precautions. Also, the rather low reported
frequency of computer-based security violations in the financial
organizations may well have given the clients a feeling of security.
INEFFICIENCIES RESULTING FROM DATA SECURITY PRECAUTIONS
When we asked the question of whether security precautions had
given rise to any detectable degree of operating inefficiency, we had
the suspicion that this would be true for technical aspects such as
online terminal user authorization, and for some procedural
precautions, such as data requisitions, access control and
input/output control.
However, the survey showed that neither technical, procedural,
nor personnel precautions were considered noticeable impediments to
efficient daily operations. (See question III.1 in the Appendix.)
Substantial hindrances due to personnel precautions were largely
absent, and only one-fifth of the managers felt that the different
security precautions were causing any efficiency problems.
These results, paired with the knowledge of the existing
protective measures in the five surveyed organizations, seem to
indicate a good integration of basic security features. The daily
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operating efficiency obviously has been a major consideration in the
determination of the adopted level of security, combined with the
perceived level of security threats.
?HE RFLATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF SECURITY MEASURES
An attempt was made to evaluate the perceived importance of the
three types of security measures described in Exhibit 1: technical,
procedural, and personnel. By way of ranking, technical security was
in first place, preferred by 41 percent of the managers. (See
4uestion III.2 in the Appendix.) For comparison, the other two types
of measures were ranked first by 32 percent and 27 percent of the
managers, respectively.
Procedural precautions were ranked second in preference by most
of the managers. This type of security measure was ranked second by
52 percent of the managers. A similar number of managers ranked
personnel precautions third. The distribution of preferences for
these three types of security precautions was not significantly
influenced by the managers' type of responsibility (technical or
nontechnical). Many nontechnical managers felt that technical
security was most important, and were willing, in principle, to trade
off nontechnical with technical security.
On this background, the answers to the next question were rather
surprising.
WHEPR WOULD ADDITIONAL SPENDING OF
SECURITY MONEY BE MOST IMPORTANT
We asked the managers that if additional money from the computer
budget should he spent on data security, where should the money go?
A list of five alternatives was given: physical computer site
protection, software sophistication--operating system, software
sophistication--user programs, personnel practices, o data
input/output controls and auditing.
Because of the preferences revealed in the preceding question,
we had expected that the two types of software sophistication would
be prime candidates for additional spending. However, there existed
a clear preference for data controls and auditing. (See question
III.3 in the Appendix.) This type of protection was recommended
first by 45 percent of the managers. Software sophistication for
user programs ranked only second and fourth for operating system
improvements. The most obvious explanation of this result may be
that procedural protection is currently given too little weight
relative to technical security protection, which has attracted more
attention because of its perceived higher importance.
Personnel protection ranked third, and physical site protection
fifth and last on the "willingness to spend extra money" scale. This
indicates a preference among managers (both technical and
nontechnical) for extra outlays for improving personnel practices
before extra spending on operating system improvements.
Again, this must be evaluated in light of the relatively low
frequency of computer-aided data crimes experienced over the past
years, compared with the crimes that have been committed by personnel
or others in a noncomputer-related fashion.
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By ranking physical site protection last on the "willingness to
spend extra money" scale, the managers seem to support the hypothesis
that the current level of physical site protection is adequate.
CENTRALIZED OR DECENTRALIZFD CONTROL OF DATA SECURITY
A point of considerable interest is the role of data security in
a structural context within the organization. How are security
problems solved today, and is it reasonable to expect any
organizational ramifications of data security considerations?
Managers within the same organization frequently ha3 different
opinions as to whether security problems were solved jointly by the
different user departments, or independently in a decentralized,
noncoordinated fashion. On an aggregate basis, 59 percent believed
that data security problems were solved jointly, and 41 percent said
they were solved independently. (See question III.4 in the
Appendix.) One manager stated that the approach depended entirely on
the type of problem. Among the reasons given for independent
solutions to security problems were dissimilar data requirements,
dissimilar processing or procedures, and dissimilar security needs.
A majority (60 percent) felt that there was a need for a central
decision maker or decision-making group responsible for all data
security within the organization. Most of these managers believed
that the responsibility in such cases should rest with top
management, either directly related to the auditing department, or as
a spedial data security office. One manager felt that more important
than the actual functional level in the organization was the need for
someone thoroughly familiar with the nature of the organization's
data and its users, and with a strong knowledge of software,
hardware, and data procedures.
CONCLUSION
Data security has been the focal point in a questionnaire survey
of anagers in the financial community. It was found that managers
generally feel quite confident in the adequacy of the current level
of protection of data from destruction, modification, or disclosure
(either intentional or accidental). The attitude toward data
security is not expected to change substantially over the next few
years. Although technical security precautions such as system
integrity and access control are believed most important of all
protective measures, managers are more interested in improving
nontechnical protective features such as data handling rules,
input/output controls, and auditing. A slight majority of the
managers surveyed preferred a central decision-making unit within the
organization to adopt and implement data security policies. Most of
these managers felt this to be a top management responsibility.
Security features were integrated into daily operations to such
a degree that little or no inefficiency was felt. The prevention of
disclosure of data was believed to be less imperative than prevention
of destruction or modification (for example, fraud and embezzlement).
The technical managers surveyed were generally more concerned
with data security than their nontechnical colleagues. A possible
explanation is the technical managers' deeper understanding of the
existing data systems' vulnerabilities. Technical managers, however,
were less concerned with the confidentiality of client data, possibly
because of less client contact.
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Despite the limitations of sample size (42 survey respondents),
our findings appear generally reasonable and consistent, and, on this
basis, may be taken as representative of the financial community at
large. we conclude that financial institutions are concerned with
3ata security, and that they have taken action to adopt what is
considered a reasonable level of data security given current needs.
It is important for the financial community to recognize the
deep changes that data processing currently is undergoing. In the
introduction we touched upon the transformation from a Phase One to a
Phase Two in automated processing. we briefly mentioned the impact on
data security that such a processing transformation may have. We can
now speculate about the effects of Phase Two on the security needs
and demands of the financial community. What can we say about the
kind of change in data security that will take place in financial
institutions in the years to come?
Based on our survey results,. the obvious expectation is one of
little or no change at all. The state of the art in data security is
characterized as largely satisfactory by our sample of managers.
This raises the serious question of whether managers in the financial
community have adequately anticipated the changing demands for
security brought upon it by Phase Two. This question, in turn, leads
to the consideration of forces outside the financial community with
potential for policymaking.
Alri through our discussion we have distinguished between two
basic dimensions. These two dimensions are conceptually related to
Erivagcy and _interity. We have approached the potential violation of
these from the information user's side, here the financial community.
But our discussion of data security would be incomplete without
mentioning those other constituencies which have a possible impact on
data security policymaking.
Necessary conditions for privacy and integrity are safe
information processing practices and procedures, paired with usage of
computer hardware and software which is uncompromisable to a high
degree. This brings the computer manufacturing industry into the
picture as a potential policymaking factor. No recordkeeping system
can attain a high degree of security without being used in a computer
system which recognizes these needs.
Computer systems in Phase One have mostly been designed to
accommodate large amounts of data, and processing of these data at a
high speed with a satisfactory reliability. Parallel with the
efforts of the computer manufacturers to enhance these features, an
additional component in the design i emerging: the integration of
security features in the basic architecture of computers, such as
hierarchical access control, read-only memory, voice pattern
recognition authorization, erasure of residual data. Add-on security
considerations which are not deeply integrated into the basic
architecture of the computer system will, slightly overstated, be
like the automobile which is sent on the market, equipped with safety
belts and shatter-proof windshield, but without brakes.
The changes necessary to create a high degree of privacy and
integrity are so fundamental and far-reaching that it seems
unrealistic to expect data security policymaking merely to be limited
to the information systems users and tho computer manufacturers. A
third constituency is very likely to be active: the government.
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Sweden has recently taken legislative action to adopt fair
information practices. The primary purpose of this law, the first of
its kind, has been to eliminate the keeping of secret records, and to
allow the individual knowledge of existence, contents, and use of all
data file records pertaining to that individual. A Data Inspection
Board is the formal agency for the implementation of this law. All
data files must be registered with this board. Requests for the use
of a general individual identifier (such as the social security
number) will only be accepted from information users which can
document a genuine need for this. The result of such a law in the
United States would probably be the abolishment of the use of the
social security number for commercial purposes, such as bank
accounts, insurance policies, credit cards, etc.
Much seems to indicate that the United States is headed in the
same direction, although at a slower pace. Senator Ervin's
congressional hearings a few years ago brought increased attention to
the rights to information privacy. The Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare has recently published its report on automated
personal data systems, recommending the enactment of a federal "Code
of Fair Information Practice." (1)
Such a legislative step could place heavy administrative burdens
on the organizations which process personal information.
Furthermore, it might, directly or indirectly, require computer
manufacturers to adopt basic security features in computer systems
design.
Thus, in a climate where issues involving the rights of the
individual attain increasing attention, policymaking in the area of
data security may well occur as a result of legal imposition. And,
if legal forces fail to act, the public may well let its voice be
heard through spokesmen and activists, forcing organizations,
manufacturers, and governments to take action in what may be called
Phase Two of data security.
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A PEN DIX
Tabulations from Survey_Questionnaire
Sample Size = 42
T = Technical Managers (17)
N = Nontechnical Managers (25)
Impo_rt_ -Note:
All numbers in the following are percentages, with the total
number of responses (42, unless otherwise stated) equal to
100 percent.
art_ I: Data Disclosure
The phrase "data disclosure" is used here to mean the
revelation to an unauthorized party of data possessing a
certain confidentiality. Examples of such data are client
name and address lists, credit data and payroll data.
1. Is it your opinion that the use of the computer in your
department increases the likelihood of disclosure of
confidential data? Please circle or check one of the
numbers on the scale.
qo increase 1 __24 _ ____ 5 Great increase
Total: 36 31 17 14 02
T: 19 17 05 00 00
7: 17 14 12 14 02
2. How much attention has protection against data
disclosure received in the planning and implementation of
computer application systems currently in use in your
department?
Negligible 1 2 3 4 5 Extensive
Total: 00 12 39 34 15
T: 00 02 17 15 05
N: 00 10 22 19 10
3. what is your attitude toward disclosure of data being
handled by your department?
Little concern 1 2 3 4 5 Great concern
Total: 02 02 17 38 40
T: 02 00 07 17 14
N: 00 02 10 21 26
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____
4. Has there been any change in your attitude toward data
disclosure over the past three years, and if so how?
Such less concern 1 __2 ___3 __4 5 Much more concern
Total: 00 00 36 40
00 00 14 16
00 00 22 24
24
10
14
5. To what reasons do you attribute this change? Please
check one or more of the reasons listed. If no change, go
on to 6.
(Total number of reasons given: 67.)
T___ __ Total
11 10 21
06 06 12
03 03 06
09 09 18
06 12 18
03 07 10
00 04 04
04 03 07
00 03 03
Society trend
Company-wide trend
Trend within department
Change in type of data being responsible
for
Change in degree of computerization of
data
Concern for faster data processing
operations
Witnessed consequences from actual cases
of data disclosure
Personal ethical reasons
Other:
6. Assuming you have responsibility over the same kind of
data as today, do you think your attitude toward data
disclosure will change over the coming three years. If so,
how?
.uch less concern 1
Total:
2 3 _4 5_Much more concern
00 00 64 21 14
00 00 31 02 07
00 00 33 19 07
7. Do you feel that
is adequately matched
:[chn ical pecautions
Inadequate 1
Total:
T:.
N :
your
by:
attitude toward data disclosure
2 3 4 5
00 14 31 33 21
.00 07 19 07 07
00 07 12 26 14
Procedural precaut
Inadequate
Total:
T:
N:
1 2 3 4 5
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ g _ _-~-
05 14 33 24 24
02 12 14 07 05
03 02 19 17 19
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Adeguate
Adequate
m-----m-- - - -_m
____
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Personnel_ pSecautions
Inadequate 1 2___2 ___ _4 Adequate
Total: 05 19 45 17 14
?: 02 12 17 02 07
.: 03 07 28 15 07
9. What is your estimation of the overall level of concern
among your clients with the issue of data disclosure?
Little concern 1____2 3 4 5__ Great concern
Total: 10 10 15 33 31
?: 08 08 05 10 13
.: 02 02 10 23 18
9. Have specific security requirements ever been proposes
or demanded by your clients?
Never 1 2 3 4 5 Very frequently
Total: 05 49 31 15 00
T: 02 23 18 00 00
N: 03 26 13 15 00
PARTIIModifcationorDestruction_ of Data
Here we refer to accidental as well as malicious
modification or destruction of data. Examples are errors,
system malfunction, sabotage, fraud and embezzlement.
1. Is it your opinion that the use of the computer in your
department increases the likelihood of data destruction or
modif ication?
Great increase 1 2 3 __4 5_ No increase
Total: 17 10 23 25 25
T: 02 05 08 15 13
N: 15 05 15 10 12
2. How much attention has protection against data
modification or destruction received in the planning and
implementation of computer application systems currently in
use in your department?
Extensive 1 2_ 3 4 _5 Negligible
Total: 38 33 25 02 02
T: 15 16 08 00 02
N: 23 17 17 02 00
3. Has there been any change in your concern for
c2aputer-aided fraud or embezzlement over the past three
years, and if so, how?
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2 3 4 5 Much less concern
32 37 29
07 20 12
25 17 17
02 00
02
00
00
00
4. To what reasons do you attribute this change? Please
check one or more of the reasons listed. If no change, go
onl to 5.
(Total number of reasons given: 54.)
r N__Tota~
08 09 17
03 02 05
10 05 15
09 17 26
02 13 15
06 07 13
07 02 09
Company-wide trend
Trend within department
Change in type of data being responsible
for
Change in degree of computerization of
data
Concern for faster data processing
operations
Witnessed consequences
of computer-aided
embezzlement
Other:
from actual case
fraud or
5. Do you feel your attitude toward data
modification is adequately matched by:
destruction or
Technical precautions
Adequate 1 2 3 4 5 Inadequate
35 17 38 10 00
15 02 23 02 00
20 15 15 C8 00
Procedural recaut
Adequate 1 2 3 14 5 In adequate
23 35 25 15 02
13 10 10 10 00
10 . 25 15 05 02
Personn el precautions
Adequate 1 2 3 4 '5 Inadequate
Total: 15 35 28 20 02
10 12 11 10 00
05 23 17 10 02
PAPT III: Data Security in General
The following questions relate to the overall concept of
data security, embodying issues of disclosure, modification,
and destruction.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Total:
Total:
T:
N:
Much more concern 1.
Total:
,
__ _
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1. Are xisting data security mechanisms in your
department perceived s an impediment to efficient daily
operations?
Technical preca utions
No inefficiency 1 2 3 4 5 Great hindrance
Total: 46 32 20 02 00
T: 19 12 08 02 00
N: 27 20 12 00 00
Orccedura l_recautions
No inefficiency 1 2 3 4 5 Great hindrance
Total: 29 37 15 20 00
T: 14 13 08 08 00
1: 15 24 07 12 00
Dersonnel preca utions
'o inefficiency 1 _2 _ 3 _4 5 Great hindrance
Total: 46 27 22 02 02
: 19 10 10 00 02
2N: ~ 27 17 12 02 00
2. How do you in general perceive the relative importance
of the following types of data security precautions (please
give percentage estimates if possible, with sum equal to
100 percent) ?
Ranking (percentages) 1st 2nd 3rd
Technical precautions 41 22 28
Procedural precautions 32 52 21
Personnel precautions 27 26 51
3. If your organization were to commit an additional
5 percent of its annual computer budget to data security
measures, rank your personal choice among the following
alternatives (1 = most preferred, 5 = least preferred).
R an k i ng_._pe rce ntaie§sL
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
05 17 10 19 1 49 Physical computer site protection
10 23 20 38 14 Software sophistication (operating
system)
28 14 40 09 11 Software sophistication (user
programs)
12 23 10 31 19 Personnel practices
45 23 20 03 08 Data input/output controls, audit
Other:
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4. How do different departments in your organization solve
their data security problems?
Jointly Independently
Total:
N:
59
18
41
41
22
19
If independently was checked, give reason.
(Total number of reasons given: 37.)
T_._____ _Tot al
11
16
22,
03
08 19
06 22
05 27
05 08
14 08 22
00 03 03
Expedience
Dissimilar data requirements
Dissimilar processing or procedures
Required by outside authority
(for example, audits)
Dissimilar security needs
Other:
5. Do you think there is a need for a single decision
making individual or group responsible for all data security
in an organization?
Yes No
Total:
N:
60
24
36
40
16
24
If so, which level of management should be charged with such
a responsibility?
(Total number of replies: 25.)
T N Total
16 44 60
16 08 24
08 08 16
Top management
Middle management
Line management
If so, in which department should this decisionTmaking
individual or group be?
(Total number of replies: 24.)
T_I N Total
05 08 13
17 29 46
04 04 08
00 00 00
12 21 33
00 00 00
Controller's office
Internal auditor's office
Computer systems development
Computer operations
Special data security office
Other:
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
For the purposes of this report, we will define the state of
practice to be what the more advanced user installations are actually
doing, as opposed to those that might qualify as "academic" or
"laboratory" schemes. We intend to present some of the more evident
global trends, rather than an exhaustive technical expose. Space
considerations demand that we further confine our scope to a
representative sample of the emerging trends in "conventional" system
design. Omission of many of the schemes in operation today in no way
passes judgement on these schemes.
As the level of user awareness increases, so the demand for
secure systems is expected to increase. This is both logical, and
also more formally verified by responses to questionnaires on this
issue. We intend to show that current approaches to system design go
a long way toward facilitating secure systems.
What issues are of concern when we use the term "secure system"?
It appears reasonable to specify two requirements for a secure
computer system: 1) system integrity, and 2) access control.
For our purposes, system integrity concerns the predictable
behavior of the system under any and all conditions. Access control
is concerned with prohibiting and/or controlling access to sub-parts
of the system, user address spaces, and data.
This raises the issue of certification. It is all very well to
state the requirements of a secure system, and to claim that a system
- the "ideal" system - satisfies these requirements. But we are then
faced with the issue of certifying that a system is secure.
Certification of a system of the size and complexity of, for example,
OS/360 presents a formidable - indeed impossible - task. We contend
that by following some of the trends presented below, certification
becomes viable although still extremely difficult.
Exhibit 1 serves to introduce the key concepts underlying
integrity, access control_ and certification.
We contend that system integrity is a logical prerequisite for
uncompromisable access control, and both integrity and access control
are prerequisites for certification. Everything, therefore, hinges
on integrity.
An example may help to indicate the importance of system
integrity. Mechanisms, such as the IBM System/360 storage protection
keys, are frequently used to prevent access by user programs, the
areas of storage used by the operating system. An "integrity hole"
exists if it would be possible for a user program to gain access to
supposedly protected areas. How can such a hole exist? Let's
consider a possibility.
Most systems provide a facility whereby the user program may
request a copy of the current date by means of a supervisor request
such as REQUEST DATE (LOC), where LOC is the location in which the
date is to be placed. Presumably, LOC is within the user's
authorized area of storage. What if it is not? Then the operating
system -- if it does not carefully check -- may put the date into a
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Exhibit 1.
Integrity, Access Control and Certification
Integrity --- The predictable and meaningful behavior of the system
(i.e., Does the system follow orders correctly? Can
it be confused?).
Authorization (Access Control) --- The facilities, procedures, and
restrictions for establishing access controls to be
enforced by the system.
Certification --- The extent to which the integrity of the system can
be proven or measured.
Example by analogy: Let us consider a guard for a warehouse.
(1) Integrity --- We must make certain that the guard understands
all aspects of his job -- leaving no uncertainties. For
example, if his replacement is late for work, he should not
leave his post. Every situation must be identified and
appropriate actions specified.
(2) Authorization --- The warehouse would be rather useless if there
was no way to get things in and out. Thus, there must be rules
established that the guard can follow to determine whether a
request for access should be permitted. Since the guard cannot
be instructed, when hired, on the specific handling of each of
these future requests, he is, instead, told how to determine the
correct action.
(3) Certification --- Given that we have carefully instructed the
guard on his duties, can we be certain that he will follow these
rules faithfully? We would like to certify our guard's
competence by some test.
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location not authorized to the user and thereby destroy supposedly
protected information. The storage key is designed to restrict the
user's access. If the integrity of the system is such that it
permits the above incorrect action, then the storage key is rendered
ineffective. This example has its counterpart in a manual system.
Many guards have been tricked into letting penetrators into locked
areas under the guise that they had left something behind or have
come to repair the telephone, etc.
It appears that many systems in operation today supply access
control without a high degree of system integrity. This is analogous
t,o building a 20-foot high wall, and then leaning a ladder up against
it. Because we contend that system integrity is a logical
prerequisite for uncompromisable access control, this is clearly not
conducive to providing a secure system.
We shall structure the remainder of this report as follows:
A) Integrity
I) Data integrity
II) System integrity
B) Access control
I) System access control, i.e., control of access to the
system as a whole, by the login procedure
II) User address space access control
a) Data set level
b) Sub-file level
2.0 INTEGRITY
2.1 DATA INTEGRITY
By "data integrity" we mean the ability to insure that only
valid data is entered into the computer and that inconsistencies are
prevented. For example, we recognize 030-34-72.61 as a valid social
security number, whereas 134-736-123 is not. Also, if a record
indicates a person's age as 28, a birth date of July 19, 1932, for
that same person is clearly inconsistent.
At the present state of the art, extensive data integrity is not
common and is usually situation specific. For these reasons we do
not pursue this topic in this paper. It is assumed that future data
base management systems will direct more attention to this area.
2.2 SYSTEM INTEGRITY
Two key issues are involved in system integrity:
1) The system will do what it is expected to, do,
2) The various parts of the system behave as specified,
irrespective of the environment in which they operate, i.e.,
they are consistent.
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System integrity subsumes such issues as detection and recovery
abilities, as well as predictable and meaningful behavior in all
situations. It is of major importance that a system have a high
degree of integrity if, as in our prior analogy, the ladder is to be
removed from the wall - or at least shortened to 10 feet.
2.2.1 Behaving As Expected
The first of these requirements - behaving as expected - can be
approached through modularization of the system's subtasks. This is
common practice today, and has been for some time.
In order to allay any possible confusion, two separate issues
are presented: modularization, and structuring.
Modularization is the breaking up of tasks into multiple,
smaller subtasks, or "modules". This implies nothing about the
interrelation of the modules.
Structuring, on the other hand, implies a clear, well defined,
limited set of interfaces between modules, i.e., there is a structure
imposed on the interaction between modules and subsystems (5).
Here we are concerned with both modularization, and structuring.
If modules are of sufficiently small size, and module interactions of
a precise nature, it is far more probable that the behavior of the
system will not give cause for dismay. This is a major step toward
certification.
2.2.2.2 Consistency Of Operation
The second requirement for system integrity - consistency of
operation - is of somewhat more concern. It is far more complicated
to be able to certify that a module will behave as expected in
varying environments, than it is to do so for a constant environment.
This can be approached by clean, well-structured system design. "Hole
plugging" has at least two serious drawbacks:
1) Correcting a bug, or "plugging a hole", may well give
rise to other bugs, i.e., there is a propagation effect.
2) The cost may become exhorbitant as a result of the
propagation effect mentioned above.
The trend toward well structured systems is thus an extremely
sensible one, and one that is gathering an increasing following.
Despite the fact that the motivation behind this trend may be to
decrease and control costs, rather than the provision of secure
computer systems, the ramifications are of great importance in the
provision of secure computer systems.
2.2.2.1 Multiple-State Machines
Part of the evidence of this trend can be found in the change
from the more common "2-state" computer (problem- and supervisor
states) to the multiple-state machine. In the 2-state machine, which
is the common third generation computetr, certain instructions are
designated as being privileged, and so may be executed only in
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privileged - or supervisor - state. Notice that the designation of
certain instructions as "privileged", designates certain functions as
being "privileged". For example, in the IBM System/370, the "SIO"
(START I/O) instruction is a privileged instruction. This, then,
makes I/O a privileged function.
Similarly, more than two states allows more than two levels of
function privilege. In computers with multiple states, the most
privileged functions will exist in the most privileged state. For
example, the paging mechanism might be in a more privileged state
than the file system. The file system will, in turn, be in a more
privileged state than a user process.
Examples of multiple-state computers are:
* DEC PDP-10's 3 state machine with kernel, supervisor, and
problem state (9). Kernel state will contain such sub-systems as the
paging mechanism, the more basic interrupt handlers, etc. Supervisor
state will contain such sub-systems as the I/O- and device management
routines. The user program will run in problem state.
* The Honeywell MULTICS System has a multi-state computer embodied
in its rinq structure (7). These rings can be viewed as a series of
concentric annulae, numbered from zero in the center, sequentially to
its outer ring. The most privileged processes run in ring zero, less
privileged system routines in ring one, and so on out to the user
processes. Transfer of control into a more privileged ring than the
one in which execution is currently, has_to pass through a logical
"gate", where the credentials of the caller are checked by a "gate
keeper". Information passed from a more privileged to a less
privileged ring is checked against the original caller's security
clearance, before being permitted to pass.
* IBM's OS/VS2 is utilizing the storage key to provide a 7-state
operating system with 8 being the problem state (10). The storage key
is no longer needed for separation of user address spaces, as this is
now accomplished by making use of page tables. Again, the most
privileged system functions - the paging mechanism for example - runs
under key 0, and successively less privileged system functions run
under successively higher keys. User processes run under key 8.
* Structured programming is facilitated on the Burroughs B6700 by
the use of "display-" or "lexical levels" (2,8). The B6700 is a
stack-based machine. The display level is the index in the
processor's current stack. Entry 0 -- lexical level 0 -- in this
stack is the System Stack Descriptor. The System Stack contains
descriptors for all system routines. These system routines all
execute at display level 1. All user routines operate at display
level 2, and higher. Each called user routine (subroutine) operates
at a display level that is one level higher than the calling routine.
Notice that this also makes available a history of calls, so that
data passed to the original caller can be validated as data that he
has clearance to see. This history is available in the user stack.
This multi-state feature is inherent in Burroughs machine
architecture. It is not an added feature.
The multi-state feature is being implemented in the hardware of
these systems, and is evidence of the trend toward structured
programming. The importance of this approach is that it accomplishes
separation of the address spaces of:
* the system components,
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* subsystems placed on top of the operating system, from the
operating system, and,
* system and subsystem components from their users.
This clearly delineates the bounds of operation of each process;
the most privileged process being in the "kernel state" -- or "ring
0", or "storage protect key 0" -- and moving outward from there to
less and less privileged processes. Notice that these processes of
differing privileges are now separated by the hardware -- much as the
user address spaces were separated by the storage keys in the IBM
System/360. Similarly, in multi-state computers, the processes of the
same state are separated from each other by the use of the
segment/page tables. In this way, all interfaces can be clearly
specified, controlled and monitored. The repercussions of the
ability to do so are far reaching, and have their ends in etection
and recovery procedures.
The integrity of the system is greatly improved with the
multi-state approach, and the results are applicable to access
control. (This is inextricably bound up in the concept of the virtual
machine -- (6).) This is perhaps the major trend to be observed in
this section of the report. As stated previously, this trend may be
in evidence for other reasons -- most notably cost control -- but it
is a trend that has great applicability in the design and
implementation of secure computer systems.
At a somewhat higher level of system function, is the notion of
the hierarchical file system, with successively higher levels of
privilege needed to access higher nodes of the file structure. The
hierarchical file system separates logical file references from
physical devices. In general, it is safe to say that all of these
systems allow logical file references only, which is in keeping with
the concept of the virtual machine, and separation of user address
spaces. It appears that these trends are going to continue, and that
this continuation is going to be a major step toward making the
system of high integrity a reality.
2.2.3 Reuirements for Integrit_
Let us now propose some of the major requirements for building
an integral system:
1) All sub-parts of the system are isolated from their
environment.
2) Detection of errors of any type occurs.
3) On detection of an error, recovery procedures are available to
correct that error. If no procedure exists for a particular
error, the error will be logged, and the system will shut down.
4) There is continuous monitoring of the system, for the following
reasons:
a) detection of errors is facilitated, and
b) a record of activities can be kept which will enable the
system to return to the same point as that at which the
error occurred - i.e., recovery is facilitated.
We postulate further that, if isolation of a module from its
environment is, in fact, made a reality, then the only way in which
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it communicates with that environment is via the use of parameters.
Furthermore, we can assume that the module will check that any
parameters passed to it are valid - as part of the "will perform as
expected" requirement. The only point, then, that has to be
monitored, is the output of all modules. It is only possible for the
module to influence its environment by its output, and so detection
of errors is simply a function of monitoring the output of all
modules. This ability relies also on the fact that, in a well
structured system, all interfaces can be identified.
Recovery is a function of detection. If we can identify all
interfaces, and are able to detect all errors at the interfaces, then
we can produce a recovery mechanism to take care of the situation. In
all cases, the key to success is the isolation of the modules from
the environment in which they operate. This isolation is facilitated
by the existence of the multiple-state machine.
3.0 ACCESS CONTROL
3.1 SYSTEM ACCESS CONTROL
By "system access control" we mean control of access to the
system as a whole, via the login procedure. The standard approach
here has been to supply each user with a unique password which he
must use to verify his identity. User identification is quite a
critidal issue. Even in a secure system, a user can negate the
effect of the most sophisticated access control mechanism if he is
able to masquerade as another user. Positive identification of a
user is the first step in the process of access control, and, thus,
is crucial. Speculation on this subject would tend to indicate that
the way of the future is something along the lines of a hand- or
voice-print identification -- i.e., physical identification
mechanisms. At the present, the user-ID/password combination seems
to be considered sufficient for most applications.
3.2 ADDRESS SPACE ACCESS CONTROL
3.2.1 Data Set Access Control
As stated in Section 1, system integrity is a prerequisite for
uncompromisable access control. It does not make sense to have a
sophisticated access control mechanism which permits any user of
moderate sophistication to bypass it. (It is, in fact, with this very
issue that we are dealing in the Service Bureau Industry (11).)
We should point out that there are several other approaches to
data set access control in what might be called the "laboratory"
stage, in that they have not yet been implemented in a working
environment. We thus exclude them from our discussion of the
state-of-the-art. We can categorize the approaches seen to date into
two very broad classes:
a) Password/access-control-word oriented
b) Procedure oriented.
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3.2.1.1 Keyword Access Control
3.2.1.1.1 Password Control
Under "password/access control word" schemes, fall several
mechanisms. These range from the simple "you can have it if you know
the password," with a '0-1" type of control, to the complex "SET
ACL/CACL" of the MULTICS system, where each node of the file
hierarchy (be it a directory or a program- or data-file) has a list
of people who may see that node, along with their various privileges.
It is noteworthy that MULTICS has changed to a technique where
different people and/or projects are given different privileges. Each
person may be given privileges as an individual (7).
Filling in the spectrum between "all or nothing", and
"per-person" specification of access privileges, is Digital Equipment
Corporation (DEC) (9), where the users are divided into three groups,
each of which may have different privileges. These groups are:
tfe owner of the data,
* other users with the same programmer number, and,
* all other users.
There is also the Dartmouth Time-Sharing System (1,3) -- DTSS --
which divides users into two groups: password and non-password
holders. The Dartmouth scheme provides two access fields for each
file: the first specifies the allowable access without a password,
the second specifies the allowed access to those that know the
password. There are also facilities for procedure oriented controls,
via the use of the "trap" facility (see below). Controls are along
the lines of:
* execute only,
* read only,
· append only,
· write only,
· owner privileges,
· delete only,
· trap facility,
with one group for password holders, and an identical group for
non-password holders.
It should be pointed out that this system has been designed
along clean, logical lines, and all aspects of the system are
sensible. The result is a system with a record of reliability,
integrity, and security, which may well be unparalleled for a system
of comparable magnitude. An important feature of DTSS is that there
is no logical way to bypass the access control mechanism and the
integrity of the system is exceptionally high.
3.2.1.1.2 Cryptography
Under "password/access control word" schemes, there is also the
approach of "rendering data useless". The major technique here is
cryptography. Again, this hinges on knowledge of the cryptographic
key (a form of password) and so falls into this section, rather than
being in a separate class. There is an important distinction to be
made, however, between the above password schemes and a cryptographic
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key. The distinction is that the password schemes mentioned above
require that the password be stored internal to the system. The
cryptographic key is not internal to the system. This means that
there is no way for the system to determine whether the key is
correct. The file specified will be decrypted irrespective of the key
entered. However, unless the correct key is used, the data will be as
meaningless as in the encrypted form.
3.2.1.2 Procedure Control
Under "procedure oriented techniques," are such schemes as traps
and the "PROTECT EXEC" of National Computer Software Systems (NCSS).
Both of these facilities provide for the specification of routines'
that are to be invoked at the time that a user attempts access. These
invoked routines can do further checking as to the authority of the
process making the request. Such routines are generally user-written,
and can be as simple, or as complex as the individual user desires. A
problem with this technique is that it tends to require a moderately
high degree of sophistication on the part of the user. Such
techniques are, nevertheless, available and currently in use.
3.2.2 Subfile Access Control
By subfile access control, we mean control of access to
different records of a file, and in some cases, different fields of a
record. This is of particular importance in Information Systems that
use shared data banks.
As in the case of data integrity, we feel that control of access
on a subfile level falls outside the range of responsibilities of the
manufacturer. However, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer
to provide facilities that make this type of extension of the access
control mechanism easy to implement. These facilities - often called
"hooks" - are exemplified by such mechanisms as the DEC convention of
two types of calls to the operating system:
* Calls in which the code number passed as the parameter is
positive; these calls are to standard manufacturer-supplied
facilities.
* Calls to the operating system in which the parameter is
negative. Users may use negative parameters to invoke either
their own routines or installation-written routines.
The fact that all negative parameters are available for provision of
site-specific facilities, provides the user with "hooks" on which to
hang his own utilities.
One such hook, namely program access control, essentially solves
the problem of subfile access control. By "program access control" we
mean the ability to treat a program as a user, and deny or permit it
access to a data set. We could thus write our own routine that would
perform the function of controlling access on a subfile level. This
routine could intercept all requests to the data set, and only permit
those that were legal. We could further control access to the data
set as a whole in such a way that it would be restricted from access
by any other user or program. (This is the "hook": the program access
control.) In this way, our routine supplies the only interface with
the data set, and that routine could be as simple -- asking for
additional passwords -- or as complex -- selecting only the
permissible fields of permissible records -- as we care to make it.
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These "hooks" should not affect the integrity of the
manufacturer-supplied system. The fact that we have a facility (as in
the DEC system) to call the operating system to invoke our own
packages should not mean that we have free access to all, or any,
parts of the system.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The need for certifiably secure computer systems is destined to
become a pressing one indeed.
Two requirements for a secure system are:
1) A system of high integrity
2) Uncompromisable access control mechanism(s).
We contend that (1) is a prerequisite for (2).
A major trend can be observed in the computer manufacturing
sector: well designed, well structured systems appear to be emerging
as the norm. There is a strong probability that the reason for this
trend is financial rather than for the provision of secure systems,
but it certainly has far reaching benefits in this direction.
Judging from these trends, there appears to be a strong
indication that major systems in the future will be designed and
built along these lines.
Exhibit 2 summarizes the various security techniques in general
use, and indicates examples of systems that use these techniques.
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Exhibit 2. The State of the Art and Computer Security
System
Feature 
_ .
to to cat-
UJ - -C D r , -
Modularized A A A A A A A
Multi-state Machine A A A A A N N
Address Virtual Memory A A A A A A N
Space Virtual Machine N N N A N N N
Separation
Virtual I/O
rtual 1/0 A A A A A A NIntegrity (Logical refs only)
Structured System A A A A A A N
Predictable Extensive Recovery Procs. A A A A A A N
Behavior
Back-up Facilities A ? A A A A N
ID/Password Combinations A A A A A A A
Multiple Passwords A N N A A N N
System
Paswrd/TermInal A B B B B B N
Combination
Extended Handshakes B B B B B B B
Access Password A A B N N A A
Control User Categorization A A A N A A N
Access Types
Differentiation
Data Set
Cryptography B 8 B B B B B
AccessControl N N A N A N N
Lists/Data Set
Process Access Control A A A A A A N
Traps A N A A A A N
Key to Exhibit.
A Implemented
B Implementable, using "hooks"
N Not available
? Information not available
Notes:
t Included for purposes of comparison.
2 Dartmouth Time Sharing system.
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Exlanation of Terminoloqy of Exhibit 2.
Syste m_ntegqri_t
Modularized: See 2.2.1
Multi-state: See 2.2.2.1
Virtual emory: Each user is given a virtual address space, part of
which is in main storage while his job is running. Not all of
the address spacp need be in main storage to run a job. This is
accomplished via segmentation, paging, or a combination of the
two.
Virtual Machine: The ability to run several operating systems on the
same machine concurrently, e.g., OS/360, DOS, and OS/VS2 may all
run concurrently under VM/370.
Virtual I/O: All T/n references logical devices only. The system
may link any physical device to that logical device, and
vice-versa. The user never has access to a physical device
di.rectly.
Structured System: See 2.2.1
extensive Pecovery Procedure(s): See 2.2.3
Backup Facilities: See 2.2.3
System Access Control
ID/Password Combinations: When signing onto the system, the user
enters an ID, and the system then requests a password.
Multiple Passwords: The system may request additional passwords,
over and above that of the ID/Password Combination to
authenticate the user.
Password/Terminal Combination: Certain passwords will only be
accepted from specific terminals.
Extended Handshake: The login procedure is extended beyond
ID/Password Combinations. Several additional tests (other than
addition passwords) will be administered to the user for
purposes of authentication.
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Explanation of Terminology of Exhibit 2. (continued)
Data Set Access Control
Password: Before allowing access to a data set, the system requests
a password. (See 3.2.1.1.1)
User Categorization: Dividing the user community into groups, each
with specific access rights. (See 3.2.1.1.1)
Access Types Differentiation: Permitting specification of the type
of access to b allowed to a data set, along the lines of Read,
Write, Execute, etc. (See 3.2.1.1.1)
Cryptography: See 3.2.1.1.2
Access Control List/Data Set: Each data set has associated with it a
list of people (or groups) that may have access to it, as well
as their type of access. (See 3.2.1.1.1)
Process Access Control: See 3.2.2 and 3.2.1.1.2
traps: See 3.2.1.2
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THE SECURITY DECISION
our studies have approached the security problem from both ends
-- (i) the user environment and (ii) the state of the art. In this
paper we attempt to show how the gap between the two may be closed.
The user (D.P. Manager or Systems Engineer) is confronted with a
number of difficulties concerning the appropriate set of security
features for his system. He must enumerate the items to be protected
and the directions from which they are threatened (sources, paths and
impact points). These must be translated into technical
specifications that are matched with the available techniques
(constrained by the installed system if the user is not considering a
new purchase).
Difficulties arise because there are often multiple ways in
which to meet the user's needs. Choosing between these alternatives
is not simple as multiple dimensions exist for comparison, e.g.,
dollar cost, CPU load, response time and availability. The
significance of these dimensions depends on environmental conditions
(e.g., present CPU capacity utilization). These dimensions are not
reducible to a single dimension such as dollars, without loss of
information critical to the decision maker. The manager or systems
engineer is not able to optimize his choice because the trade-off
across dimensions varies with external conditions. However, there
may be solutions. that dominate others on all rvant dimensions.
The use of a network representation (nodes representing
available protection techniques and paths representing avenues
through the system) offers us two advantages. It enables us to
represent the logical prerequisite relations between different
techniques and reveals 'cunning' solutions that clearly dominate
others.
we are thus able to offer the user a set of dominant solutions
from which to choose. These are 'cunning,' economical, and correctly
located within the system. The output must be translated into
choices from which the user can determine the appropriate techniques.
THE DECISION CRITICAL PATH MODEL
The Decision Critical Path Method is a way of formally
considering the interaction between the scheduling and planning
phases of a project. (See Crowston and Thompson 1967 (2).)
1. Several competing methods are available for performing some of
the jobs. Each method has a different cost, different time
duration, and different logical dependencies. These
possibilities are represented as a network so that the
alternatives may be compared.
2. In the actual decision-making pha;e, consideration is given to
the effect of the alternate methods on the total cost of
completing the project. The alternatives that minimize the cost
are then calculated.
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To understand why this model is useful in describing the Computer
Security Decision, it may be helpful first to point out the
similarities and then to translate the model into our particular
decision.
ISOMORPHISM OF THE DECISION CPM
WITH THE SECURITY DECISION MODEL
Four major similarities are:
1. We have alternative techniques for achieving the same purpose,
and are seeking feasible configurations.
2. Although we have multiple dimensions for measuring cost, we can
demonstrate solutions that are dominant and that offer the
decision maker trade-offs.
3. Security techniques have clear precedence relations which must
be formalized.
4. We can make changes in a system where a number of features
(nodes) are already determined.
tHE SECURITY PROBLEM TRANSLATED INTO CPM TERMS
1. For choosing appropriate security control techniques within
a computer system, several competing methods (nodes) are available
for the same task. Each method has a different cost and a different
impact on the system's resources. Multiple dimensions can be attached
to the cost coefficient; e.g., availability can be represented as
zero for techniques currently available, and as very large for those
that are not available.
Logical dependencies are critical in configuring a given set of
security mechanisms. For instance, limiting data or program
combinations to particular users may be dependent both on preceding
identification and on some kind of reference monitor. The network
representation has some major advantages in handling precedence
relations of this kind.
2. In the actual decision-making phase, the method will enable
us to determine which set of techniques is best for a given cost
dimension. The trade-off between the dimensions is a difficult one.
Obviously, where one dimension is overriding, it is simple to pick
the optimal set. Mixed strategies present more difficult problems
unless the trade-off criteria can be formalized. For example, both
response time and CPU utilization may be important, but at different
levels of activity or user satisfaction, the trade-off will be
different. Thus, the trade-off is not uniquely determined; it is
situation-dependent. At any one point, however, it might be
formalized. The following example may help to clarify these points:
suppose we have four alternate feasible paths (configurations ranked
and measured as costs on three dimensions). (See Exhibit A.)
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Exhibit A
TECHNIQUE
CONFIGURATION
OR PATH
Path A
Path B
Path C
Path D
DIMENSION I
CPU
Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
% Utilization
3%
6%
12%
20%
DIMENSION II
RESPONSE TIME
Rank
2.
3.
1.
4.
Avg. Delay-secs
30
40
10
100
DIMENSION III
AVAILABILITY
AND SUPPORT
Digital Equipment
Corp.
IBM Class IV
IBM Class III
IBM Class I
If the decision maker is more concerted with 'Availability and
Support' than with any other dimension, he will choose D for his IBM
system. However for CPU Utilization and Impact on Response Time, D
is clearly inferior. No single configuration dominates on all
dimensions.
NETWORK STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
The first step in formulating th(e Decision Model of the Security
Techniqup is to develop a network representation of the possible
configurations. Each node represents a particular technique for
control or checking. The particular node will either be chosen or
dropped compared to other nodes that fulfill the same function.
Particular configurations will be chosen over others for their
efficiency in fulfilling a set of functions. Later in the paper we
develop a particular example based on VS2 Release 2.
Exhibit G shows how the network might look. Control points in a
column represent techniques. The column represents a function or
group of techniques. Each branch of the tree represents a transition
between control points, during which activities not involving
security checks are done. (See Appendix on "The Logical Nature of
Security." In a correctly designed system, any attempt to cross an
interface between activities will be monitored or inhibited by a
control mechanism.) The arrowheads indicate the sequence of
controls. Other sequences of functions are possible, but Exhibit G
indicates a particular order based on the hierarchical nature of the
functions to be performed.
The model enables us to find the most constraining set of
techniques that can be used to satisfy a given set of requirements.
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PROBABILISTIC ASPECTS OF THE MODEL
It is stated elsewhere (Appendix) that all security controls, by
their very nature, have less than 100 percent probability of
detecting errors. Even if a system is logically perfect and secure
from integrity problems, reliability is less than 1. The normal
procedure is to use the probability of the mean value to measure the
'expected value.' For problems that fluctuate only with reliability,
this is a reasonable estimate. However, where a loophole exists that
makes systematic exploitation possible, as in an imperfectly designed
computer system, we must abandon our 'expected value' approach.
VALUE OF THE NETWORK REPRESENTATION
The network representation is used to configure the security
system because it can specify precedence relations between the
different control mechanisms. The cost of the mechanisms may also
vary with the particular configuration chosen -- a kind of 'synergy.'
This can he represented by the different values attached to the paths
connecting the nodes. The direct costs are the price of obtaining
and installing individual mechanisms. The incremental changes,
caused by grouping in one way rather than another, are reflected
indirectly in the cost of each path. For instance, grouping program,
data, or user control with both a reference monitor and a data-base
management system, may result in a different cost being attached to
the configuration than if a traditional file structure was used.
Changes in one mechanism may, thus, affect the costs of all others.
where efficient combinations result in overall savings, the path
costs can reflect this. We can recognize that the efficiency of the
'cunning' solution is due to cost reductions that are dependent on.
the particular path by which a node was reached. The system is,
therefore, not 'memoryless' as the traditional CPM model is: the
costs to be attached to any configuration are a function of the paths
used. The choice of control mechanism is related to the particular
controls exercised elsewhere in the system.
One procedure for calculating the cost-coefficient matrix
consists of starting at the end of the network (i.e., at the point of
final impact or object. See Graham and Denning (1972) (3)) and
calculating the relative costs of using different configurations of
controls to reach this object. For further discussion of Graham and
Denning's work, see Stepczyk (1974) (7). The most constraining
series of checks will not necessarily be the most expensive to
implement. Thus we can demonstrate 'cunning' solutions, whereby we
get better control for less cost.
An example may be helpful here. (See Exhibit B.) A user (1)
can obtain access to the system in multiple ways, e.g., by terminal
(2), a central batch input (3), or a remote system (4). Each of
these access points has one or more ways of checking, for example,
verifying the identification of users. These are labeled A, B, C, D,
and E. Five ways are available to gain access to the system. We can,
therefore, construct a matrix. (See Exhibit C.) The numbers in the
matrix are cost figures.
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III
Exhibit B
5
System
Processing
Exhibit C
Source Identification Procedures
2A 28 3C 4D 4E
1. 2 j 5 jlj 3 2
The user is asked qualitatively to evaluate the rankings of
different techniques (with the help of questions) . Suppose, for
simplicity, we have no other checks in the system during processing
(5) in Exhibit B until the user's program asks for data from the data
base (6). We have three techniques for authorizing access: F, G,
and H. Exhibit D shows that G and H will be cheaper to implement if
we already checked for both ID and Program (or other user information
that enabled us to deduce the program e.g., from conversation with
the user).
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Here B represents program/ID combination and D remote
authentication.
The cost matrix is shown in Exhibit D. We must, therefore,
calculate the cost for arriving at each node as a function of the
path chosen.
Exhibit D
Path to Node 5
1-2-A-5
1-2-B-5
1-3-C-5
1-4-D-5
1-4-E-6
Data Control Procedures
6F 6G 6H
2 4 6
1 2 4
2 5 7
1 1 3
1 5 7
The most constraining check is H, but if combined with D, it is
cheaper than if combined with E. We, therefore, have a dominated
solution: E. The total cost matrix is shown in Exhibit E. This table
indicates that the cheapest way to implement H is 1-4-D-5-6-H,
whereas the cheapest procedures are 1-3-C-5-6-F and 1-4-E-5-6-F (if
we only wish to implement F). 1-4-D-5-6-G is preferable if we wish
to implement G.
Exhibit E
Path to Node 5
1-2-A-5
1-2-B-S
1-3-C-5
1-4-D-5
1-4-E-5
Cumulative Control Values
6F 6G 6H
4 6 8
6 7 9
3 6 8
4 4 6
3 7 9
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Exhibit F
Path
I
III
A, 8, C and D are relative values attached to the performance on each function.
In this example Path I 'dominates' Path III on every function except 7.
Whether it is chosen depends on the cost dimensions, AND the weight attached to 7.
FORMULATING THE PROBLEM TO FIND
THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE SOLUTION
Dynamic programming is the traditional technique for finding the
most cost-effective path out of a set of alternatives. Normally, the
following are true:
1. The cost-coefficient matrix is static, and independent of
previous choices in the network.
2. The network can be decomposed into subproblems, the costs of
which can then be minimized.
We have costs that are a function of the path chosen. Thus, we cannot
decompose the network into separate subproblems. If we were to have
precise knowledge as to how costs change as a function of previous
:onfiguration choices, we would be able to handle the
interdependencies. Currently, it is not clear that we can formulate
these. For example, how does the cost of field-level access control
change as a function of a data-base management system? Although any
one specific case can be calculated, we cannot state the general case
a priori.
The procedure described in the last example involves complete
enumeration. This becomes increasingly difficult to handle as the
system becomes more complex and detailed. Therefore, we should
establish criteria and logical ranking schemes that enable us to omit
'clearly dominated' solutions from our network (at least for given
cost dimensions). The truncated network will then consist of
alternatives that are not obviously superior or inferior to one
another. Rather, they will differ only in cost and this may be
evaluated differently at different times or by different users.
Note: A switch of the dimensions for measuring cost will change the
evaluation.
The decision maker has to consider:
1. Techniques that perform the same control for less resource
utilization than others.
2. Controls that are more powerful for the same (or less)
resource utilization.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cost Benefit for each Function
Resp. time %CPU 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
In Secs #% A C A B A C B A
InSecs #% B D C A B C A A
In Secs #% A C B D A B A B
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The user must determine the trade-offs between different levels
of resource utilization.
CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING
DOMINATED SOLUTIONS
We can use a framework like that of Graham and Denning (3) to
construct tables that classify a technique on the basis of the
characteristics of the Subject (Origin, Process, and Domain) and the
Object (Impact Point to be protected).
Having translated our requirements into subjects and objects we
can establish the following criteria. (See Appendix.)
1. Control techniques that provide separation of users dominate
those that do not. Referring to the matrix developed by Grant
Smith (1974) (6), it can be seen that one machine design will
dominate another. Often we are not facing a choice between
machines, but rather a choice between versions of the operating
system. If we consider an IBM System/370 installation, it is
clear that the VS2 Release 2 control of separate user
address-space is superior to that of OS/370-MVT. Note: A
solution that dominates on one cost dimension may be dominated
on another. For example, VS2 currently may be dominated by OS
on the dimension of system response time. The trade-off between
security and response time must be made by the user.
2. All access-control mechanisms that are logically impossible to
bypass dominate those that contain 'escape clauses,' e.g.,
loopholes designed for systems programmers. If the
access-control mechanism can be bypassed, the degree of
difficulty in doing so will cause some techniques to dominate
others (but all are far inferior to techniques that cannot be
bypassed). For example, techniques requiring operator collusion
dominate those where a lone programmer can avoid the system
control. These techniques, in turn, dominate situations where
the default is 'No Access Control.'
3. Techniques that perform more checks for the same resource
utilization are superior to those that perform less. If greater
control is exercised while using fewer resources, we have a
'cunning' solution.
4. Any solution that logically prevent:s increase in one's priority
level is superior to one where it is sometimes possible.
Although difficulty is a factor, because systematic exploitation
of a loophole is feasible, the relative difficulty may be
academic; it may be a challenge! The experience of those
involved in the Dartmouth Time Sharing System supports this.
5. Control mechanisms located close to the object to be protected
are preferable to those located farther away, unless the latter
provide additional features, for instance, context-dependent
access checking - such as: Which type of account is being
accessed by the payroll rounding routine? In this case, more
control may be exercised if the conitrol is close to the source
rather than the object. Generally though, remote controls will
be less efficient and will have a greater probability of being
bypassed. comparisons for a particular system must be made here.
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6. Unmonitored interfaces are incompatible with a secure system. A
change in source, domain, process, or access should initiate
certain checks for illegality, i.e., situations where harm to
other than the originator can result. Any techniques whose
default is "no security" undermine the validity of the network
control model. Note: An analogy may be made here with structured
programming. Paths that do not enter or leave functional
modules by a standard interface can cause havoc.
7. Control mechanisms require their own types of protection.
Mechanisms must be able to be modified occasionally, but must be
used frequently, without possibility of modification. Mechanisms
with the capability of owner-access dominate those without.
CONCLUSION
We have discussed several control dimensions on which one
feature dominates another. Obviously the cost dimensions are equally
important. Determining the appropriate cost measures for a particular
user must be done through an interactive process. Questionnaires
presented elsewhere in this Volume illustrate the type of questions
to be asked.
EoRMLATI _THE _DECISION CPM MODEL.
I. DEFINITIONS
Let C = C(1), C(2), C(3),... be a set of control functions
required to ensure adequate security. To ensure the desired level of
security, some of the control nodes within each control function must
be implemented. For each control function define the set of nodes to
perform that particular security function,
C(i) = C(i,1), ....... C(i,k(i))
With each set of control nodes, associate k(i) variables,
d(i,1)..... d(i,k(i)) so that d(i,j) is 1 if the control node C(i,j)
is to be implemented and is zero otherwise. If exactly one of the
controls in C(i) must be implemented, then C(i) requires the mutually
exclusive interdependence condition. In our problem this means that
we will only select one technique to perform a particular security
function. Multiple functions can be performed, however.
If groups of components combine 'to form a particular control
mechanism C(i,k(i)), they can be subsumed in a given node. Within a
given node, choices may have to be made between groups of components.
This is another network of component mechanisms within the node
C(i,k(i)). These could be represented as members of the set of
mechanisms for a node, equivalent to the set of techniques for a
given function. We have not defined such subsets in detail, (e.g.,
different techniques for Memory Protection), as each lower level
involves an entire network representation itself. Unlike the problem
that we have defined, alternatives are not mutually exclusive; they
may be complementary. As a result, formal techniques that are
dependent on heuristics (because of the dynamic cost difficulty) may
become unduly cumbersome. The most valuable part of the network
model for such choices is often the enumeration of alternatives. The
Decision CPM model will enable alternative desians for the same
control mechanism to be grouped to form the solution.
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Where complete searches of the network are required, this is
often most efficiently performed by the decision maker. Constructing
rules for eliminating dominated solutions is a helpful prerequisite
to systematic search. Complete automation of the search is often
undesirable. Heuristic methods, however, enable us to handle the
dynamic cost problem, i.e., cost can change as a function of a
particular configuration. We can thus hand back to the user of the
model two decisions: (1) the trade-off across cost dimensions and (2)
the evaluation of a minimum acceptable control level.
There may still be no feasible way to satisfy a user's needs for
his present computer system. Calculation of prices for introducing
better configurations, or relaxing other constraints, is possible
with the heuristic method, hut it is necessary to evaluate specific
alternatives. Having found an "optimal" solution using a heuristic
approach, the effort involved will he worthwhile if it suggests areas
for developing new techniques. We should beware, however, of major
reconfigurations caused by small changes in cost. The cost of moving
between solutions may be very great. D.P. managers are well aware of
the system disruption that may result from apparently small changes.
II. HEURISTIC TECHNIQUFS
We have already discussed the information needed to create the
network. The procedure described below is useful because it forces
the decision maker to structure his thinking.
1. Construct the network configuration including the precedence
relations and dummy nodes. This is a technological ordering.
2. Eliminate solutions not currently feasible or not under
consideration.
3. Rank all possible paths through tho network according to their
control capability.
4. Identify the costs of each path on the user-determined
dimensions.
5. Reduce the number of feasible patns in the network. If all
nodes may be connected to all others, we have, in the example in
Exhibit G, (eliminating dummy variables) 2,304 paths. (Order
matters, and only one can be taken from each group.)
Fortunately, if we eliminate nodes that represent unavailable
configurations, we can eliminate a good deal of work. In
addition, we can 'a priori' eliminate nodes or techniques that
we consider unsatisfactory (or dominated). We can constrain the
particular alternatives by the current computer system and its
current state, allowing some limited system changes. We can
also find node configurations that fall within a given budget
constraint before setting up the network. Where a major system
change is expected, it is wise to examine the alternative
systems contemplated because of the security features they make
available. It would be foolish to optimize the security
configuration first and then find a system that made it
possible. Security is only a part of the decision.
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Exhibit G
6. Having reduced the feasible paths to some practicable set,
probably under 50 (see Exhibit H) we can begin to trade-off the
degree of control for each path with the penalty for including
it. The formulation of the trade-off matrix, as discussed
earlier, is more valuable than attempting to translate all
penalties and benefits to dollars. The matrix will look like
that shown in Exhibit F. The rows represent paths, and the
columns represent different cost and benefit dimensions.
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SAMPLE FORMULATION FOR VS2 RELEASE 2
Groupings of Possible Techniques Based on "Requirements for
Secure Operating Systems", F. Stepczyk, (7)
(References are to Chapter 4.)
Sumber Name of Path or Function Techniques
Isolation
User programs from user programs
User programs from operating
system
System element isolation from
environmental factors
Operating system from user
programs
Basic protection functions
from user programs
Basic protection controls from
operating system
Operating system from operating
system
Information from users
Information from operating system.
Resources from user programs
and operating system
Information from information
Resources from resources
IS1 - IS6
IS6
IS7 - IS16
IS17 - IS24
IS25 - IS27
IS28 - IS33
IS34
IS40
IS46
IS49
IS52
IS54
- IS39
- IS45
- IS48
- IS51
- IS53
- IS56
Controlled Access Tech nique
Techniques on scope of controlled
access
Techniques on modification of
access attributes
Authorization techniques
CA1 - CA10
CA11 - CA15
CA16 - CA23
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1.0
1.1
1. 2
1.3
1.4. 1
1.4.2
1.5. 1
1.5.2
1. 6
1. 7
1.8
1.9
1. 10
2.0
2. 1
2.2
2. 3
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Techniques for Identification
Identification of users
Terminal identification by
computer
Terminal identification by
operating system
Input/output stations and their
media by computer and operating
system
Storage devices/containers by
computer and operating system
Computer identification
by termina.l
Computer by another computer
Computer by operating system
Program/operating system/data
identification and authentication
Int~r ity
Completeness/correctness
techniques
Maintainability techniques
Error prevention techniques
Error detection techniques
Error correction/notif ication
techniques
Data integrity techniques
ID1 - ID7
ID8 - ID13
ID14 - ID15
ID16 - ID19
ID20 - ID22
ID23
ID24
ID25
ID26 - ID35
IN1 - IN3
IN4 - IN13
IN14 - IN17
IN18 - IN26
IN27 - IN40
IN41 - IN50
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3.0
3. 1
3.2. 1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.2. 5
3.2.6
3.2.7
3.3
4.0
4. 1
4.2
4.3.1
4. 3.2
4. 3.3
5.0 Surveillance
5. 1. 1 Monitor action techniques SV1 - SV2
5.1.2 Decision action techniques SV3 - SV6
5.1.3 Compensatory action techniques SV7 - SV11
5.1.4 Reporting action techniques SV12 - SV13
5.2 Security audit techniques SV14 - SV23
Rote: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0 indicate major functions, the
decimalized numbers indicate control techniques (e.g., 1. 1, 1.2,
etc.) and alternate subsets of techniques (3.2.1, 3.2.2, etc.).
Using Stepczyk's listing of functions and techniques (see
Reference 7), VS2 Release 2 was subjected to analysis.
Implementation at M.I.T. is scheduled within the next year, and all
answers are based on the currently anticipated form. Note that this
is M.I.T.'s planned implementation which is being analyzed, not VS2
Release 2 per se.
Two hours were spent with an expert systems programmer to
complete the list of available techniques. The list is considerably
smaller than the set of possible techniques. A number of doubtful
techniques were eliminated although they may become feasible. Note:
For interpretation of numbers into techniques, see Reference 7.
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IPOSSIBLE TFCHINIQUES
I
IPossible Nodes
IIS1 - IS5
I1S6
JIS7 IS16
IIS17 - IS24
IS25 - IS27
IIS28 - IS33
IIS34 - IS39
IIS40 - IS45
1IS46 - IS48
1IS49 - IS51
IIS52 - IS53
IS54 - IS56
1 56
I
ICA1 -CA10
CA11 - CA15
I
ICA16 - CA23
I
I 23
IID1 - ID7
I
1ID8 - ID13
JID14
I
lID16 - ID19
I
1ID20 - ID22
ID2
!ID23
I
IAVAILABLE TECHNIQUES
I
IAvailable Techniques for
IVS2 Release 2 as Planned
Ifor M.I.T. -- Actual
I Nodes
IS4,5
IIS6 (with restrictions)
]IS7,11
IS17,18,19,20,21,23,24
IIS25,26,27
ITS30,31,32,33
I
IIS34
None
INone
ITS49,50
I
IS53
I'
INone
I23
INone
I
INone
I
INone
I
INone planned until later
release
I
1ID3,7
lID9,12
None
ID17
ID21,22
I N one
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NUMBER
_ ____ 
Function
or Column
in
Network
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4.1
1.4.2
1.5.1
1.5.2
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
TOTAL
2.1
2.2
2.3
TOTAL
3.1
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.2.5
j
3.2.6 JID24
3.2.7 ., ID25
I ID26
I
1 35
I
ID35
IIN1 - IN3
I
IIN4 - IN13
I
1IN14 - IN17
IIN18 - N26
I
IIN27
I
IIN41
I 50
I
I
ISV
I
ISV3
I
ISV7
I
ISV12
I
SV14
I 23
I
I
OVERALL I
TOTAL I
I
- IN40
- IN50
INone
1ID25
1ID26,27,33
I 11
IIN3
JIN6,7,8,9,10,12
1IN15,17
IN19,20,23,24,25
1IN27,30,32,34,37,39
IIN50
1 21
I
ISV1,2
INone
INone
I
ISV12,13
I
INone
4.
I 59
- SV2
- SV6
- SV11
- SV13
- SV23
187
This formulation indicates how steps 1 and 2 of the heuristic
technique will look in practice. Steps 3, 4, and 5 require further
discussion with the decision makers concerned. The formulation in
this paper allowed only one technique to fulfill each function. This
condition is not crucial to the usefulness of the model and can be
relaxed. The complexity of the search may be increased, however.
The prerequisite Conditions follow from Stepczyk's
hierarchical concept (7). Figure 3 of Stepczyk'.s paper indicates the
prerequisite structures: Integrity is most basic (Level 0).
Prevention is next (Level 1); below this are Controlled Access,
Isolation, and Identification (all Level 2). These three have
specific interrelations for each technique (Level 3). Below
Detection (Level 1) the next level is Surveillance (Level 2).
Although still large (59), tne actual set of techniques
available is substantially less than the maximum possible, using
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3.3
TCTAL
4. 1
4.2
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3
4.4
TOTAL
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.2
TOTAL
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Stepczyk's classification (187). Attributing costs and precisely
examining synergistic effects still require a good deal of effort,
but the basic structure for evaluation of a particular system has
been established. Comparing VS2 Release 2 with another system, e.g.,
installed version of IBM Virtual Machine Facility/370 -- VM/370 --
would now be very easy.
CONCLUSION
Although the heuristic procedure can become laborious and
cumbersome, it helps the decision maker to formulate the trade-offs
to be made between functions, and helps him to seek cunning solutions
(i.e., better control for less money). Arriving at an optimal
solution after making arbitrary trade-offs and cost allocations is
far less desirable than confronting the user with this decision
procedure.
We do not have to contend with utility functions or
transitivity problems. We avoid the 'impossibility' problem (see K.
J. Arrow (1963) (1)) of group decision making. We merely give to the
DP Manager and his superiors a basis for formulating the trade-offs
that will lead to their decision. If the situation changes, e.g.,
CPU capacity becomes a constraint, the trade-offs may be made
differently, and a new solution selected without difficulty from the
same set of information.
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APPENDIX: THE LOGICAL NATURE OF SECURITY
provinq Security
To establish that a system is secure it is necessary to show two
things:
1. That the system performs as advertised. (This is the same
as verifying that it meets specifications.)
2. That the system does nothing that it is not supposed to do.
To prove 1, we can use transaction simulation, sampling, test
programs, even continuous monitoring, and all the standard techniques
of auditing. To prove 2 has been likened to proving the Universe, or
rather the Universe minus N, where N is the set of things that are
supposed to be done. In fact, this turns out not to be the most
fruitful way to look at the problem.
A more helpful way to approach it might be as follows. Given a
startig point within N, it is necessary to transfer from N to
another set of transactions. The point of transfer requires an
interface. If such an interface exists, the very minimum protection
would be to have a monitor. Conversely, if N is perfectly separated,
there could theoretically be no interface. In practice, even where N
is running in a dedicated machine, there is at least one interface
with the operating system. The damage that can be done in this
situation is either to N, (and, therefore, does not constitute a
breach of security) or to the operating system, via the interface.
To operate any program, in practice, it is necessary to abandon
complete isolation.*
CONSEQUENCES
Perfect integrity (which implies that there is no way Form or
Content can be modified in an unauthorized fashion) thus becomes an
ideal. The monitoring or access control mechanism at the
interface(s) may be logically perfect (i.e., in software design), but
the possibility of hardware failure always exists. (This is a
reliability problem.)
From this we can state the following:
1. Complete separation of subsystems from the central system(s) is
impossible.
2. Interfaces can and must be monitored to provide the desired
access control.
3. Even a logically perfect system with maximum integrity and
logically secure access control is subject to failure
(reliability is never 100 percent).
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We can thus formulate the following probability of having security:
P = f(P p )
security integrity access control reliability
This can never be 1.0.
LOGICAL CERTIFICATION
rrom the preceding arguments it follows that for maximum
integrity and logically secure access control (e.g., Dartmouth Time
Sharing System), certain LOGICAL conditions must be met.
To define these it is useful to adopt the Black Box philosophy
from Cybernetics. A given input is to produce certain predefined
outputs. (The process by which the output is achieved is not
investigated directly.) The law of requisite variety requires that
an input disturbance not be passed on through the system. To ensure
this, it becomes obvious that the logical point at which to monitor
disturbances is either at the input or the output interface of each
subsystem. The size of the subsystem can vary from a module of a
structured program to a copy of an operating system for a virtual
machine user. The interface control is required to ensure that the
errors passed on meet certain criteria for acceptance.
(Theoretically, different criteria could be established for different
interfaces, but the criteria to protect the central system must be
the union of all requirements, as all users may be affected by
modifications here.)
Two things ae logically necessary to have a certifiable system:
(1) All interfaces must be practically identifiable. For example, an
attempt to replace GETMAIN in OS/360 failed because it was not
possible to identify all the logical consequences of the change. The
obvious extensions of this concept are Modular Programming and
Structured Programming. For Modular Programming, the interface is
defined. For Structured Programming, it is practical to examine the
complete set of interconnections for any one module. (2) The impact
points of all outputs from a given subsystem must be practicall as
well as logically identifiable. It should be possible analytically
to identify the impact of a system change before it is made.
Heuristic approaches should only be necessary as a final check.
Structured programming is an effective way to ensure the practicality
of specifying impact points. No system change whose impact is
unknown should be implemented in a Production Environment.
Summary List of Conditions
that Help Prevent the Violation of
the Lical Nature of Security
1. Integrity implies separation. Users should be separated to the
maximum extent possible, e.g., separate address space and
virtual machine.
2. The access control mechanism must be logically impossible to
bypass; i.e., the processing should be dependent on the access
control authorization, e.g., Dartmouth Time Sharing System
address pointers and bounds register checking on System/370.
3. Every access must be subject to the checking procedure, i.e.,
not just initial file opening. This is critical for item 2.
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4. There must be no logical way to acquire a higher level of
priority than one started with. (See (a) the method by which the
Dartmouth Time Sharing System was breached, (b) recursive
feature of the MULTICS system at M.I.T. to restrict priority to
the lowest -- most constrained -- priority of a series of
calling routines.) It is important to verify that the most
restricted access control applies to all subsequent processing.
5. Where shared facilities (Schroeder (1972) (5)) exist, the
monitor should be located as close as possible to the
item/location to be protected. This is not only in accordance
with controlling the maximum number of potential disturbances
with the fewest control mechanisms, it is likely to minimize the
probability of bypassing the control point. (Do not locate your
police roadblocks along the major highways if you want to
protect the President.) Controls located to prevent problems
whose context indicates their severity will need to be used
where the probability of successful trapping at the last point
is too small, e.g., transfer of rounding errors to programmers
paycheck. Usually, the closest control will be adequate if
correctly designed, for example, trap bit in I.S.C. system (6)
to prevent unauthorized operations following an interrupt.
6. Where non-shared facilities exist, it must be logically
impossible to step outside authorized bounds, i.e., to exit from
a module or process, a standard interface must be crossed.
Unauthorized creation of an interface occurs if unmonitored exit
is possible. Trap-door entry exploits an unmonitored interface.
Supervisor state has to be entered by an uncontrolled procedure
or instruction.
7. Fffective monitoring requires that the monitor have a higher
level of privilege that can be acquired by any non-owner of the
item or location being monitored (i.e., hierarchical structure).
At the program or user level, this means that only the owner can
modify the control procedure. (See (a) Graham and Denning (3) ;
and (b) Dartmouth Time Sharing System procedure for systems
programmers to implement system changes.-) Fundamental problems
exist with a system where for some purpose the supervisor is
merely "first among equals," as in OS. Thus, the operating
system must be logically at a higher level than everything else.
The two ways to achieve this are: by system protection and by
user constraint. The Resource Management System of VS2 Release 2
puts the system in overall control; similarly, a virtual machine
separates the user. Both accomplish or partially accomplish the
levels of separation. (See Madnick and Donovan, (1974) (4).
This book describes hierarchical criteria for operating system
design.)
8. Unidirectional access is necessary; i.e., a program can use data
or programs with a higher level of priority than itself, but
cannot acquire that level (e.g., System Catalog is modifiable by
a user program, but the user cannot acquire the authorization of
the catalog - Dartmouth Time Sharing System.)
9. Although masquerading as another user, e.g., by erroneous
physical or password identification, cannot always be prevented,
internal system masquerading can be made logically impossible.
Entering supervisor state is a special case of masquerading.
Items 2, and 6 are critical to preventing internal
masquerading.
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CONCLUSTON
It is hoped that the preceding conditions will provide a basis
for determining whether a system is loicallV secure. Even logically
insecure systems can have PROTECTION, DETECTION, and RECOVERY
mechanisms, but they are, in principle, UNCERTIFIABLE. The
possibility of undetected modification always exists so that even
'brute force' checking of every instruction or simulation may be
useless. To make the logical security requirements economically
feasible, several system features can be exploited. Examination of
these and of the preceding logical requirements establish that
CERTIFIABLE SECURITY can only be an integral part of the system
design, never an optional add-on feature.
IMPLICATIONS FOP VS2 RELEASE 2
The following checklist indicates the areas in which VS2 Release
2, as described so far, meets the logical requirements listed in the
preceding section. The nine categories correspond to those listed
previously.
CHARACTERISTIC I MET
Maximur separation IYes
No Bypass of Access- I Probably
control mechanism INot
I
I
Every access checked I?
I
I
No logical way to ac- IPartial?
quire higher priority I
I
I
Monitor close to item I?
to be protected I
Not stepping outside Iyes
bounds I
Higher level monitor ICould be
I
Unidirectional access IYes
IMasquerading I ?
IVS2 RELEASE 2
I -- .
ISeparate address space
I
INot yet defined
ISystems programmer will
Ihave override option
I
INot clear if this could
Ibe easily incorporated
ISystem Catalog
IResource Management
IVirtual I/O could
tinclude controls
I
I Possible
I
IBounds checking
ISeparate address space
IPointers to nucleus
I
I System mgmt capability
I
ISystem catalog
I
!Could be prevented
Igiven access control
I
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